Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIII, Congo, 1960–1968

115. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in the Congo¹

Washington, April 23, 1962, 2055Z.

Dir 05822 (Out 75526). Ref: A. Leop 3705 (In 23506);² B. Dir 05755 (Out 75339).³

1. Have not consulted ODACID since receipt Ref A but following based recent talks and furnishes framework for discussion [Gullion] prior contingency action.

2. ODACID accepts nationalism as fact of life support of which is only basis successful long term ODYOKE policy. Thinks artificial injections to uphold conservative forces which do not represent main stream Congo opinion will inevitably alienate and isolate ODYOKE. Similarly support military coup per se or in support [Identity 1] will lead to deep ODYOKE commitment down blind alley. Desires continue support [Identity 1] subject above caveats in belief no other now able seriously challenge him despite errors. HQS largely shares this view.

3. Supplemental HQS thoughts: [Mobutu] span control largely limited Leop Province. His illegal assumption power would most likely result Orientale breakaway with Lundula in better legal position than [Mobutu]. This would open Congo to infusion unilateral aid bloc and Casablanca states. Hence believe best chance [Mobutu] survival as internal force is keep ANC out of politics.

4. [6 lines not declassified]. Presume [Gullion] will soon brief ODYOKE contingency plan so [Identity 2] able explain more lucidly to Lundula possible consequences of deterioration middle of road govt.

5. HQS also desires actively seek political action instrument other than large injections funds for each crisis. [5½ lines not declassified]

6. Comments invited.⁴

End of message.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 10, [cryptonym not declassified] Operations. Secret; Rybat; Priority. Drafted by [name not declassified] and released by Tweedy (C/AF).
2. Leopoldville believes that the current political situation requires contingency planning. Ambassador Gullion believes Station must be prepared to provide additional financial aid to [Identity 1]. [Footnote in the original.] This telegram is printed as Document 114.
3. Authorized [monetary amount not declassified] for support of [cryptonym not declassified]. [Footnote in the original.] Telegram 05755, April 21, is in Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 10, [cryptonym not declassified] Operations.
4. Telegram 3756 from Leopoldville to CIA, April 27, responded that the Station concurred, and emphasized that, in its opinion, no main stream of Congo political opinion was yet discernible; the majority of Congolese politicians were still jockeying for personal position. Thus, the Station’s objective had merely been to prevent from coming to power those (such as Lumumba) who once in power would turn to the Communist bloc for support and guidance. It was devoting considerable time to analyzing the current political situation, and believed the Station was now in a position to obtain assets responsive to CIA guidance rather than those cooperating only on a self interest basis. (Ibid.)