103. Editorial Note
In telegram 2533 to the Central Intelligence Agency, December 2, 1961, the Chief of Station in Leopoldville reported on a meeting with Joseph Mobutu at which Mobutu stated that he considered U.S. Congo policy to be “equivocal.” Mobutu explained that he and many other moderates could not reconcile U.S. clandestine support of the [cryptonym not declassified] with its overt policy of all out support for the United Nations Operations in the Congo. Commenting that he would not have been able to mount his coup on September 14, 1960, or maintain the commissioner form of government in power without U.S. help, he contrasted that assistance with the refusal by the United States to provide the overt support which would have solidified the moderates’ position and avoided the present situation in which the Government of the Congo was dependent upon support of Stanleyville elements. He added that could not understand why the United States continued to funnel all overt aid through the United Nations Operations in the Congo when, in his opinion, the UN supported individuals such as Christophe Gbenye who were unfriendly to U.S. policies. He also indicated that he believed the UNOC to be inefficient, noting that it had done nothing to revitalize the economy or assist him in his efforts to reorganize the Congolese National Army. He concluded with an impassioned plea for unilateral U.S. aid to the GOC. He insisted that such aid would have the advantage of supporting the [text not declassified] and thus permitting them to defeat the more extremist forces and establish a government and policy which in the long run would be more favorable to the United States. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 1, Folder 8, [cryptonym not declassified] Operations)