Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

97. Memorandum by John J. McCloy¹

Cairo, September 29, 1964.

Following are verbatim texts of two papers given President Nasser September 28 during McCloy visit:

Proposal for Missiles:

1. Private assurances, written or oral, would be provided that large land-based surface-to-surface missiles would not be deployed either through the use of mobile launchers or the construction of permanent launching facilities for this purpose.

2. Assurances would also be given that procurement or production of large surface-to-surface missiles for military purposes would be held to present levels. As it is understood that the number of missiles that are now available is limited, there would be no question of destroying any existing capacity.

3. Any space research programs would be conducted openly and in a manner consistent with furthering international scientific cooperation. Any production of rockets for use in such programs would be limited to the numbers required for planned launchings.

4. With respect to production or acquisition of missiles, the type of assurances that might be given to create confidence that the above commitments were being carried out would be left for further discussion. It is believed this could be done without the introduction of any type of inspection system which would be considered invidious to the countries concerned.

5. With respect to deployment, information which the countries accepting this arrangement would seek to obtain through their own resources could be supplemented by such information as may become available to a third country which would be aware of the arrangement.

6. If any country in the area should take any action inconsistent with the above, this commitment and related assurances would not be binding.

Proposed written statement:

The United Arab Republic wishes to provide assurances that its efforts to develop surface-to-surface missiles have been undertaken only for the purposes of self-defense. As a result of its missile development program, the UAR is now in a position to create a large missile force should it be necessary. It will be appreciated that the question whether the UAR should decide such a force is necessary for its national defense will be strongly affected by the course others in the area may follow. In the long run, the UAR hopes that the real value of the missiles it has developed will be for the role they can play in furthering man’s knowledge of outer space.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Top Secret;Exdis. Drafted by McCloy at noon on September 29. A typewritten note on the memorandum reads, “Text prepared on cable forms but hand carried to Department.”