Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

96. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Cairo, September 28, 1964.

In company with Ambassador, called on President Nasser noon September 28. After presenting him with copy of Warren report² and talking a little about assassination, in course of which he said it was in his opinion impossible to provide full security and at same time have President perform necessary functions of his office, I told him object of my visit. I stated President Johnson had very strong desire to emphasize to him that he had same interest which President Kennedy had in cordial and well-understood relationship with Egypt as well as in welfare and progress of entire area in which UAR plays such large and vital part. Because of interest and importance President Johnson attaches to this area, he had asked me as same emissary President Kennedy had used, to call upon him in Cairo in order to express the continuity of his interest in the peace and stability of the area.

I pointed out it had originally been intended I should call during hiatus between departure of Ambassador Badeau and coming of Ambassador Battle. He broke in to say he had become very tired during course of summer and what with the preoccupation he had in connection with visits of Chiefs of State and preparation for summit, it had been inconvenient for him to meet with me at that time and that he was glad that I had been able to adjust myself to his convenience.

I then recalled to him my last visit which was on the same general subject as that of my present visit. We had the same object in view, namely, to relieve tensions and avoid expenses of unlimited arms race in this area. I pointed out that though he had not felt it was desirable or practical to enter into any agreement with Israel or indeed with US in connection with any disarmament measures that affected Israel and UAR, he had stated he had no intention of introducing nuclear weapons in area nor had he any aggressive designs on any of his neighbors. I stated he had also said if test ban treaty was agreed to between US and Soviet Union, he would endeavor to be among first to ratify it; that he had repeated the above statements and had been among first to ratify test ban treaty, for all of which President Kennedy had been deeply appreciative.

Now President Johnson was replying to his letter of July 26, and had asked me to deliver it to him. I handed him letter³ which he took and read without further comment.

I told him he could see from contents and tone of letter that President was sincerely anxious to develop possibility of further action in this field of armament and that he continued to wish to find steps which would redound to benefit of all concerned. I dwelt on frustrating aspect of an arms race which no one could expect to win; that counter effort would inevitably be forthcoming from others if he attempted to build up his strength. I stated that we all knew that Israel with assistance of France had been building up missile strength as a counter to what they considered to be Egyptian threat. What President had in mind was, in view of increased expenses and increased dangers of missiles arms race, time had come to level off activities in missile field. What we had in mind involved no formal agreement between UAR and Israel or between UAR and US. On other hand we did contemplate and suggest independent action on his part, effect of which would be to level off at present state of missile strength. This independent action we suggested could be accompanied by a statement defining his position in this regard. Of course if any action inconsistent with spirit of such commitment on his part was engaged in by any other country in area, he would have full freedom of action restored to him and his commitments would not be binding. US would be prepared to bring its influence on Israel to respond in kind, again without formal agreement but with hoped-for result that badly needed resources could be deflected from purchase of arms to more beneficial purposes and dangers inherent in such arms race avoided.

I emphasized he should accept my visit as indication of our own strong interest in area and not as any attempt to advance interests of any particular country. We had heavy investment in area and because of its general strategic importance, both political and military, it was one in whose stability United States as a world leader must be deeply concerned. This interest was in keeping with persistent and conscious effort on part of US to do all in its power to relieve tensions in sensitive areas in hope of avoiding what otherwise might be a far reaching catastrophe. He seemed to accept our good intentions in this respect and was apparently less suspicious of our motives than he had been at the time of my prior visit. I then gave him our proposals on missiles which were somewhat modified from those that were included in talking papers.⁴ He read them as well as proposed statement which UAR could make. I then emphasized in reply to his question as to what form assurances would take that they could be either oral or written and that they were designed to avoid any form of inspection which might be invidious to him. I pointed out such information as he might be able to gather in regard to the carrying out of commitments of another country could be supplemented with information of our own.

At this point I told him that I was prepared to advise him upon instructions that at present time, Israelis were not possessed of any nuclear weapons nor were they producing any material for such weapons. I stated that this was an indication of our cooperation.

After reading proposals on missiles, whose new form follows in separate message,⁵ he said we must understand that problem in Middle East is not problem of missiles but problem of Palestine. Arabs cannot accept present status in respect to Palestine. There must be solution of Palestine problem based upon justice. Nothing can stop the arms race or change the atmosphere in Middle East except solution of Israeli problem. This is fundamental to everything and it is fatuous to suppose that agreement in respect of missiles or any other incidental issue could solve this fundamental problem. He added that this was a profound political problem and he himself had no solution. Missiles were now very close to the heart of the army. It had no interest in nuclear weapons, but the missiles were a symbol of its renewed strength and confidence. They were a counter to deep reactions suffered in the 1956 invasion. All soldiers wanted all weapons they could get. Whereas our Pentagon might not be involved in political matters, army in Egypt was and it had deep political significance because of its fundamental position in domestic as well as international security of country. Missiles, therefore, carried strong political implications. He had to be frank about this and we had to understand it.

Nasser said that he would give thought to proposals and talk them over with his advisors, but he would have to say he was not optimistic in regard to an understanding which involved limitations in regard to missiles. When I asked him how long it would take him to give us reaction to proposals, he said about one week. I told him under these circumstances it would be best to leave further discussions on this subject to Ambassador Battle. However, I wanted to point out that though Palestine might be a fundamental problem in the Middle East, a limitation of arms race was not inconsistent with a recognition of that fact. Indeed, limitation of arms might create an atmosphere in which a better solution might be effected. Because Palestine was difficult and fundamental problem was no reason why one should not attempt moderation of arms race in view of inherent dangers that were involved in such race, and great wastage of resources that could not benefit anyone.

It was apparent both to Ambassador Battle and to me that he felt he would be faced with a very real political problem if now he attempted to limit production of missiles. It was this rather than any outright hostility on his own part to the proposals which he seemed to stress. Also involved, in our opinion, was his assumed role of leader of Arab world, whose sole binding element is antagonism to Israel. Only unity that existed in Arab world was Palestine issue, and his preoccupation to remain as the influential leader of Arab world precluded any action now which could be interpreted as softness toward Israel. Any weakening of his position toward Israel would impair that leadership and a suggestion that the missile program would be tapered off would be construed by his colleagues as weakening. When I suggested that we had found in our dealings with the Soviet Union that unilateral action of this sort was sometimes productive of improvement in our relationship, he insisted that the parallel between US and Soviet Union and between Israel and UAR was not a good one. Israelis were occupying Palestine, Arab soil. They had invaded and committed aggression against UAR. Only parallel would be if Soviet Union were occupying California.

It was left that he would carry on discussions with Ambassador Battle for moment, that I would not stay to await his reaction, and that if it seemed desirable, I could return to carry on further discussions at a later date. But I think it was clear to both of us that he felt it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to accept proposals. Both of us had impression that he would indeed be involved in heavy political difficulties because of the symbolic character that missiles now occupied in minds of his soldiers and people if he suggested cut back. Moreover, he was fearful of any action that might expose him to charge he was being soft toward Israel in view of his position as leader of Arab world.

He was most cordial throughout, recalling number of other occasions we had managed to deal with outstanding issues, and seemed in good health.

As we left, he rather warmly, I felt, requested I pass on his good wishes to President Johnson.

Comment: In appraising conversation, we found Nasser less flexible on missiles than we had hoped. While tone of conversation may have suggested he could see some advantage in proposals, it was obvious he felt his internal and external political problems were major hindering factors to any action he could take. At this point my view which Battle shares is that it is important keep the dialogue going and hopefully not to have direct turndown for fear ending what has thus far been useful discussion with possible side effects of bringing about exactly what we attempting avoid, acceleration rather than moderation of arms race this area. Our guess is that UAR will not give us early answer and may delay giving us any final response, which may be preferable to direct turndown if we press too hard at this point.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by McCloy on September 30 at 11 a.m. A typewritten note on the memorandum reads, “Text prepared on cable forms but hand carried to Department.”
2. Reference is to the Report of the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964). McCloy was a member of the commission.
3. Document 90.
4. The talking papers have not been found. Background material relating to McCloy’s mission are in Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 72 D 438, Background Papers for 2nd McCloy Probe W/Nasser, 9/64.
5. See Document 97.