Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

94. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic¹

Washington, August 24, 1964, 8:20 p.m.

1063. Deptels 995 and 895,² Amman’s 114 rptd Cairo 44.³ Developments reported Amman’s 114 to Department obviously require changes in rationale approach to UARG outlined in reftels.

You should convey following to Nasser via Sami Sharaf⁴ or other suitable channel:

1. Despite formidable obstacles there has been created in Near East a delicate political balance that reduces threat of governmental instability or provocative initiatives and permits states therein to move ahead on urgent business of economic development and social reform.

2. USG feels this balance has been reinforced by: a) Its impartial commitment to prevent aggression by any state in the area; b) Constructive relationship built up in recent years between US and UAR, a notable product of which was understanding so far as possible to freeze Palestine issue.

3. Prior convocation Second Arab Summit we wish express USG concerns that developments flowing from first Arab Summit meeting could affect profoundly balance of political and military forces in Near East if they should continue along present course.

4. At January Summit meeting, Arab leaders under leadership UAR had wisely decided against war and had made statesmanlike announcements to that effect. Nevertheless some measures decided on in January have developed in such manner as to appear to be leading to greater risk of war and instability in Near East. This seems true particularly with regard to Unified Arab Command.

5. Aside from UAC developments we have also noted various statements about diversion of Jordan waters, excitation of Palestinians through Palestine Entity, and other measures such as proposed Jerusalem radio project. Statements about war with Israel by Arab military spokesmen have been more bellicose since Summit. In addition, in recent days there seems danger in raising expectations of Palestine refugees by making unrealistic demands on UNRWA for increased expenditures at time when no further funds forthcoming, costs are rising, and UNRWA budget coming up for discussion at UNGA. USG, which has borne burden of refugee support over years, especially concerned that funds that might be used to support refugees and promote economic development of Arab countries are instead being diverted to acquisition extensive new armaments under aegis UAC.

6. USG has recently discussed with Jordan extensive UAC-sponsored military procurement requests that in our judgment are inconsistent with freeze on Palestine problem, would involve self-defeating drain on funds badly needed for Arab economic development, and could upset Near East political and military balance.

7. We have informed HKJ we wish to comply with request insofar as our arms policies and economic realities permit. We cannot, however, go so far as to upset stability we have done so much to establish.

8. Jordanians have suggested they might have to turn to Soviets if US sales not possible. Jordanian purchase of Bloc weapons would make if difficult if not impossible to convince US electorate of necessity to continue Jordanian “budgetary and other assistance at present level. Pressures to provide compensatory assistance to Israel might also be irresistible. We would see pressures on Jordan to arm too much too fast as upsetting prevailing pattern of military strength and political alignments in Near East.

9. We wish to emphasize that the closer the Arabs and Israel come to hostilities, the more remote becomes the prospect of a just solution. We have been gratified by UAR leaders’ recognition that Arab-Israel dispute is insoluble by force of arms. While we look confidently to the UARG to take the lead in dissuading Arab states from aggressive action, we are also deeply concerned that measures taken solely in the name of self-defense not be so precipitate or so extensive as to increase the risk of hostilities or result in a major acceleration of Near East arms race.

10. In our efforts to meet Jordanian requests, we have stretched our arms policy to limit. We believe expansion of Jordanian military establishment should be carefully phased over period of several years. We do not want to be forced into hasty decisions on matters with far-reaching implications for US interests in area and for very viability and integrity of Jordan. We hope UAR can understand that USG, which has borne heavy burden support economic development and budget of Jordan for almost decade, would wish examine carefully new pattern of expenditures with widespread implications for Jordan economy.

11. To sum up, USG hopes Second Arab Summit will not foreclose our efforts to preserve area calm and US-Arab cooperation. We are especially concerned lest UAC, by forcing disproportionate arms program of unprecedented character, might introduce into tense Near Eastern situation irrevocable new elements with dangerous and unpredictable implications for all governments concerned to say nothing of starting accelerated arms race in Near East. USG counts on UARG, as leader of Arab opinion, to guide proceedings of Second Arab Summit in statesmanlike and constructive paths.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 JORDAN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Symmes, cleared in draft by Killgore and Curtis F. Jones, and approved by Grant. Repeated to Amman, London, and CINCMEAFSA/CINCSTRIKE for Ramsey, and pouched to Moscow, Algiers, Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli, Beirut, Taiz, Kuwait, Khartuom, Jidda, Baghdad, Damascus, and Tel Aviv.
2. Telegram 895 to Cairo, August 15, instructed the Embassy to convey to Nasser the U.S. view that it was essential to maintain the political balance in the Near East, the U.S. concern that the United Arab Command “by forcing on HKJ a disproportionate arms program of unprecedented character” might introduce into the situation new elements “with dangerous and unpredictable implications for all governments concerned,” and the U.S. hope that the Second Arab Summit would not foreclose U.S. efforts “to preserve area calm and US-Arab cooperation.” Telegram 995 to Cairo, August 20, reiterated the instructions in telegram 895 with one revision but instructed the Embassy to wait until the Embassy in Amman could assess Hussein’s attitude following his visit to Cairo. (Both ibid.)
3. See footnote 2, Document 93.
4. Director for Information for the UAR President’s Cabinet.