93. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan1
352. Amman’s 114 to Dept.2 Department commends your presentation to King Hussein of USG position on supersonic fighter squadron for Jordan. We relieved that King feels he will have sufficient argumentation at Summit II to delay decision on supersonics.
We concur in your recommendation that approaches to other UAC-member governments on arms problem concentrate on general dangers inherent in arms build-up, rather than on problem of Jordan. Amended instructions being sent separately.3
From Hussein’s response to your presentation, appears he may have mistakenly believed you were conveying President Johnson’s reply to his message of August 15. If this is case, would appreciate your recommendation whether further reply to King’s message is necessary.4
Separate message forthcoming on timing and terms of reference air survey team. In continuing US/UK conversations in Washington on Jordan arms problem it has come to be accepted that British would participate. If you anticipate GOJ resistance to UK participation, would appreciate your recommendations how best make proposal. In our view, we cannot avoid making proposal.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Killgore, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Grant. Repeated to London, Beirut, Damascus, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tunis, Khartoum, Baghdad, Tripoli, Jidda, Kuwait, and Cairo.↩
- Telegram 114 from Amman, August 23, reported a meeting the previous evening between Barnes and the King. (Ibid.)↩
- Instructions were sent in circular telegram 356 to Khartoum, Tripoli, Tunis, and Rabat and telegram 108 to Jidda, August 24 (ibid.), and telegram 39 to Kuwait, August 24 (ibid., DEF 4 ARAB).↩
- Barnes replied in telegram 120 from Amman, August 24, that he thought the King had interpreted his remarks as the President’s reply and that he did not expect any further reply. (Ibid.)↩