Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

84. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, August 8, 1964, 1:54 p.m.

78. Amman’s 60 to Dept.² We expect send you by separate telegram oral message from President to King Hussein³ to be used as opener for your meeting with him to explain our position. Following talking points are for use at that time.

As we envisage it objective this meeting with Hussein is to remind him of fundamentals US-Jordan relationship, to explain to him forthcoming aspects our partial compliance with Jordanian request, and to encourage in him the will to take positive stance in future discussions with UAC. Unless King himself has will to preserve integrity of Jordan even full US compliance with Jordanian request would be insufficient safeguard Jordan.

In your discussion with King you should concentrate on positive features our proposals to Khammash (as in resume for Khammash transmitted separately)⁴ and avoid final confrontations on any aspect of package we have developed.

Following talking points incorporating helpful suggestions contained in Amman’s 60:

1. USG has tried to be responsive to Jordan arms request. Despite our deep concern over box Jordan may be getting into, package we have developed shows we stand ready to be as helpful as feasible in meeting Jordan’s recognized problem.

2. US response must be viewed in context of proven long-standing US support of Jordan. Few countries are receiving as much in relation to size as Jordan is from us. USG support has helped Jordan, perhaps poorest Arab country, to outstrip almost every other in sound economic and social progress. Moreover, firm US position in opposition to aggression against Jordan has protected it against attack. We are sure King in no doubt as to our determination support Jordan’s integrity.

3. We are not mentioning the above in an effort to evoke gratitude, but to make clear our bona fides as Jordan’s largest, most consistent supporter, which in turn justifies us in asking King to listen most seriously to our counsel.

4. While Jordan fully entitled to legitimate self-defense, we fear UAC proposed military buildup going much too far too fast. UAC proposals, if fully carried out, will distort balance heretofore maintained between economic development and military strength. In first place, military strength cannot be built in vacuum. Rather, it flows as natural consequence from strengthening economic and social fabric of society. UAC buildup would mean additional continuing expenses of at least $30 million annually. If UAC funds fail after buildup has been accomplished, where would King get extra funds to support larger military establishment?

5. Jordan is even now considering its seven year development plan. This plan reflects our mutual agreement on the desirability and necessity of gradually reducing HKJ’s reliance on budget support as such. On the one hand we see no possibility of increasing our budget support to meet the ruinous recurring costs which the UAC plan may involve. On the other we stand fully ready to lend generous support for feasible economic development projects.

We sincerely hope King and Jordan will proceed coolly in this situation and avoid being pressured into commitments which could wreck so much of what Jordan and her friends have worked so long and hard to achieve.

6. Given absence of UAC funds, plus lack of assurances of continuing maintenance costs, UAC cannot reasonably expect Jordan go further at this time than USG proposals for buildup. Otherwise,GOJ is abdicating sovereignty to UAC. King needs press this point at September 5 Cairo meetings. Package provided Khammash stands on its own feet.

We are not forthcoming on aircraft because in our view these make no economic, political, or military sense for Jordan. Begin FYI. Even Brigadier Khammash admits Jordan does not need supersonic fighters. End FYI. We believe King can argue point at forthcoming Cairo sessions.

King must realize USG has its own problems. If Jordanian military establishment becomes distorted out of proportion, Congress may not be willing continue support Jordan so generously as in past. Adverse Congressional reaction would predictably be increased if Jordan accepts Soviet military equipment.

We wish HM to know there is no breath of threat contained in foregoing. As good friend we have to make sure he understands our genuine concerns over the threat to US-Jordanian relations bound up in exaggerated military appetites.

7. Jordan’s concurrence with Arab decision to divert headwaters of Jordan River is not in Jordan’s interests. Arab decision to spend vast sums of money on counter-diversion scheme of Jordan River headwaters makes no sense. Money could much better be spent on constructive projects in Arab countries. Jordan may end up with less water than under Unified Plan, to detriment of its development. (Employ points made in Sections 5 and 6 Reftel.)

8. We hope we can continue rely on HM’s assurance to Ambassador Macomber shortly before latter’s departure from Jordan that, in Jordan’s own interests fundamentals of Jordan’s relations with US could not be changed.⁵ When Amman agreed exchange Ambassadors with Moscow, King made foregoing assurance. In our view old relationship is being threatened. Can King still assure us it is not? Hussein cannot believe Soviets have any real regard for him. For example, would he expect Soviet assistance if King were overthrown by internal coup or if Jordan attacked from outside? In our view Soviets are clearly engaged in wrecking expedition. We cannot understand HM’s failure perceive this.

We do not wish discuss present sincerity of any Arab leaders. We merely hope King will remember the past. How much faith can he put in constancy of other Arab regimes if sudden shift seemed to dictate casting Jordan adrift? As King knows, we have always tried to maintain good relations with Nasser and have never opposed Arab unity freely achieved. In the past we jointly have considered Nasser’s control over Jordan would be bad for Jordan. We assume King still feels same way.

9. So we trust King will keep his head until present situation is clarified. We hope King will agree USG has been understanding and forthcoming in effort to meet his problems. We believe he has enough to seek clarification of overall situation at forthcoming Arab Summit Conference in September. If Hussein comes out of September meetings with cash funds for military equipment, and assurances of annual maintenance support for future, which we jointly consider convincing, we will then consult further with the King on steps that appear most likely to advance our mutual interests.

FYI. As to best time for you approach King, we inclined believe you should not wait until Khammash has returned to Jordan and reported to King. In final session August 6 reported separately Khammash himself urged King be informed as soon as possible. Accordingly we favor your seeing King as soon as appointment can be arranged.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 US–JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Killgore, Symmes, and Duncan; cleared by Stoddart, Macomber, Warren, and Komer; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Cairo and London.
2. Telegram 60 from Amman, July 29, suggested that before Barnes left in mid-August for leave he should review with the King the situation on arms for Jordan. (Ibid.)
3. Document 85.
4. Document 82.
5. Reference is apparently to Macomber’s farewell conversation with King Hussein on December 23, 1963. Macomber reported in telegram 296 from Amman, December 24, 1963, that the King “spoke of his determination to continue this forward momentum [of Jordan’s economic development] and his appreciation for USG friendship and major contributions to progress which had been achieved.” (National Archives and Records Administration,RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL JORDAN)