Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

83. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

JCSM–673–64

Washington, August 7, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Formal Clearance of the National Policy Paper: United Arab Republic (U)²

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I–26001/64, dated 10 July 1964,³ subject as above, which requested comments and reservations on Part I of the third draft of the National Policy Paper on the United Arab Republic (UAR).

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the draft policy paper provides a generally effective statement of US policy toward the UAR. However, Nasser’s recent opposition to the US base in Libya, his overt and subversive pressures against the UK in Aden, his continued intransigence vis-a-vis Israel, are clearly inimical to US interests and objectives. Therefore, provision should be made to permit a firm policy toward the UAR, as necessary, to protect US interests. At the same time, any “harder” line toward Nasser should be developed with recognition of the possibility that punitive action might place important US interests at risk.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the draft paper should give more emphasis to the possibility that war might break out in the Near East within the next several years. It outlines certain conditions under which Israel might attack; but it does not explain that relatively minor incidents could lead to Arab interference with Israeli activities (i.e., shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba or diversion of Jordan waters) and to Israeli military retaliation. It states that the UAR or Israel might pre-empt in the face of a nuclear threat; but it does not explain that the UAR could erroneously decide that such a threat exists. Such considerations lead to a dangerous possibility of overt hostilities—with related possibilities of escalation and US involvement. It follows that progress in the settlement of basic UAR-Israeli differences should be attempted with a greater sense of urgency than is reflected in the draft paper.

4. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the complexity of Arab-Israeli problems and the efforts of the United States and the United Nations to resolve such issues, they note that discussions with the UAR and Israel have usually focused on isolated problems. It is suggested that consideration be given to the initiation of appropriate international negotiations on the complete range of Near East political, economic, and security problems. Such negotiations should take into account the wide-range of US actions and inducements which might be used to encourage constructive solutions.

5. Subject to incorporating the views stated above and the specific changes recommended in the Appendix hereto,⁴ the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the draft policy paper provides an effective statement of US policy toward the UAR.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

J. W. Davis
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director, Joint Staff

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Arabia 091. Secret.
2. See Document 45.
3. Not found.
4. Not printed.