62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic1
5567. Embtel 2758,2 Deptel 5435.3 Near East Arms Control.
When you hand President’s letter to Nasser, mention to him that, as in the case of our letter, we count on opportunity see his proposed reply before it is in final form.FYI. We would hope thereby preclude his preparing response with conditions that would emasculate assurances we seek from him. End FYI.
Judging by previous reactions we hopeful Nasser this time will have views on IAEA safeguards on which have pressed him last three approaches. In discussing this aspect you might wish suggest that best assurance Nasser could have that Israel will not develop nuclear weapons would be Israel’s acceptance IAEA safeguards for all of its reactors.UAR acceptance same safeguards would be small price to pay. FYI. If Nasser should say IAEA could only provide safeguards for Israeli manufacture and not against acquisition from other nuclear powers, you should point to February 6 Foster statement at Geneva that it declared US policy not transfer nuclear weapons into national control any state not now possessing them. We would do our best obtain similar assurances from other nuclear powers as regards UAR and Israel even before achieving a world-wide non-dissemination agreement. End FYI.
In connection with Israeli intentions you should call his attention to Eshkol’s statement of May 20 (Tel Aviv 183 to Cairo).4 You should cite in particular Eshkol’s point (C) that GOI prepared to join in any effort to rid the area completely of all arms at present in area under reciprocal control. We recognize UAR not willing to discuss this directly with Israel nor to enter into arrangement that would be susceptible of exploitation as direct dealing with Israel. We continue believe, however, there is ample scope for an arms control arrangement that would avoid points UAR finds objectionable. In any case, Eshkol statement [Page 146] encourages our belief now is time to work out something, and we hope UAR will not let slip opportunity to prevent further worsening of situation.
You may say to Nasser that we have of course been seeking persuade Israel, too, not to pursue nuclear and missile development. If UAR continues missile development, we believe this will not only lead other side to obtain or develop matching or better missiles but may also lead them develop nuclear capability. Therefore we urge Nasser to think this problem through and hope he will consider carefully effects of closing door to our approaches.
We strongly desire you probe Nasser’s missile intentions, perhaps citing UK newspaper report UAR preparing force of 1000 missiles by 1965–1966 as means of drawing Nasser out. You should also ask him whether report UAR planning on CW warheads accurate, in light UAR use of gas in Yemen.
If Nasser’s general attitude negative and discussion proves unproductive, we would hope you nevertheless could keep door open and obtain his agreement reconsider various aspects at some later date. In so doing, suggest you say our concern over arms rivalry has received and will continue to receive attention highest levels of USG. We shall be exploring other means of reducing threat to peace and stability caused by Arab-Israel arms rivalry. Thus, Nasser should not be alarmed if he receives reports we have discussed NE arms rivalry with other states concerned. Our intentions will always be aimed at being helpful. We will of course discuss with UAR any avenues that appear promising.
Since this may be your last meeting with Nasser on this subject, request you say we hope exchange of views will bear fruit both in terms of peace and security of his own country and region and in terms of peace we all seek on this planet.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL UAR-US. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Dickman and Harrison M. Symmes; cleared by Wreatham E. Gathright of S/P, Deputy Assistant Director of ACDA’s International Relations Bureau Richard B. Freund, and Komer; and approved by Jernegan.↩
- Dated May 19. (Ibid.)↩
- Not found; it apparently transmitted the text of Johnson’s May 20 letter to Nasser, Document 59.↩
- Not found.↩