59. Letter From President Johnson to President Nasser1

Dear Mr. President:

As Ambassador Badeau was asked to convey to you last year, the United States much appreciated your personal endorsement of the partial nuclear test ban and your Government’s prompt signature of the treaty. Your action contributed greatly toward near unanimity in world support for the treaty. As you know, this step has now been followed by a further effort on the part of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States to curb the increase of nuclear weapons. Thus we are embarked on an earnest effort to reduce tensions and curtail the arms race.

Since assuming the Presidency, I have had an opportunity to review the statements made by you and your representatives on the need for disarmament and I have noted your mention of this subject to me in your letter of April 26.2 I find in your statements assurance that the [Page 138] United Arab Republic views nuclear warfare as the greatest danger to mankind and that your Government regards itself as committed, in a broader sense, not to develop nuclear weapons or introduce them into your defense program. Your confirmation that this understanding is correct would represent a step which others might follow to ensure that the threat of nuclear warfare is further constrained.

The ultimate goal we all seek is that of a peaceful world and we must work together in resolving these difficult problems. I know you share this hope and expectation and I would welcome a further expression of your views.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, UAR, Nasser Correspondence, Vol. I. Top Secret. A draft of this letter was transmitted to Cairo in telegram 5140, May 3, and given to Nasser by Badeau on May 7, as reported in telegram 2632, Document 52. The letter was sent to Johnson for signature with a May 19 memorandum from Komer, noting that Nasser had said he would give assurances as to UAR intentions to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. Komer wrote that although Nasser had not indicated whether he would do so privately or publicly, his statement was sufficiently promising to fulfill Badeau’s request for an official copy of the letter “to smoke out Nasser.” A note in Bundy’s handwriting on Komer’s memorandum stated that he and Rusk strongly concurred. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, UAR, Nasser Correspondence, Vol. I)
  2. See footnote 2, Document 50.