Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

50. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic¹

Washington, May 3, 1964, 4:41 p.m.

5141. Eyes only Cane for Ambassador. Our previous two Cane probes with Nasser have accomplished little more than provide a basis for continued discussion. But risks of continued arms buildup in the Near East so serious that we believe it essential to continue dialogue and press for some tacit agreement on both types and quantities weapons before matter gets out of hand. We believe that in frank discussion we should put our cards on table and make clear we think missile-nuclear arms race one which Nasser cannot win given Israel’s financial resources, technical capabilities, and general availability armaments. In any case Nasser knows that US and other Western Powers simply cannot allow Arabs to knock Israel any more than (as proved at Suez) we intend to tolerate Israeli aggression against Arabs. We should also make clear that in our approach we are not seeking to do Israel’s work. Our bona fides has been established in 1956 and years following. Now armaments are threatening to get out of bounds with increasing risk to area stability and of possible great power involvement in any conflict which might inadvertently develop. Self-defeating nature missile race should now be more evident to Nasser. For example, IDF’s General Rabin stated April 15 that Israel has appropriate answer to UAR missile threat and Adzhubei implied in Paris April 8 that France supplying Israel with SSM’s. So did Foreign Secretary Butler’s backgrounder here, which undoubtedly got to Arabs.

Recent Eshkol statement to Feldman that he would halt Israel’s efforts enter SSM race if Nasser could be persuaded exercise restraint is additional new element. Israel is particularly concerned about missiles just as Nasser worries about Israel’s nuclear potential. Therefore, what we aim for are tacit, private assurances from both sides re nuclear non-acquisition and missile restraint. If Nasser will come along, we can probably get Israel agreement as well.

Accordingly, you should take early opportunity make following points to Nasser:

1) You may say President Johnson much appreciated Nasser’s recent letter,² and will be replying. President particularly noted Nasser’s assurances about UAR opposition to nuclear weapons races. President hopes will be possible to work out some practical means of dealing with risks of ME arms race, and has requested you to take matter up quietly with President Nasser once again.

2) USG gravely concerned over implications ever more-rapid acquisition destructive weapons by Near East states. We were pleased to learn from President’s talk with Talbot that UAR not now planning major deployment SSM’s but clearly, basic problem remains. UAR missile development is forcing pace leading to Israeli reaction. Nasser may now be aware from Adzhubei statement in Paris that Israel apparently obtaining small number SSM’s from France. UAR acquired missiles first. Israel is following suit. We tell Israelis UAR missiles do not represent significant military threat but they are nervous. With missiles, Israel will have added incentive seek develop nuclear capability. US determinedly opposes nuclear proliferation but recognizes Israel might be impelled try “go it alone” in response UAR missile build-up. However, missiles are expensive and we believe Israel would forego them if convinced that UAR would show similar restraint.

3) If UAR pressure continues build up, Israel has financial strength to match acquisitions. We doubt support from world Jewish communities likely taper off.

4) Accordingly, we think Nasser would be foolish not to consider seriously some kind of tacit arrangements of mutual restraint which would embarrass neither party. In fact, one could argue that Nasser would gain more than Israel. There is parallel here with variety of tacit arrangements we have arrived at with Soviets. In addition to Test Ban Treaty, we have understanding on bombs in outer space and matching decisions to curtail production of fissionable materials. These are not policed except through our intelligence capabilities. As UAR intelligence on Israel’s armed forces is good, so is Israeli intelligence on UAR forces. If Nasser could only assure us that he does not intend to proceed further with UAR missile development and will not acquire nuclear weapons (see separate message),³ we believe we could also obtain quiet assurances from Israel not to deploy SSM’s or develop nuclear weapons. If Nasser not really intending waste lot of money on missiles, we see to his advantage not to spook Israel too much.

5) So far as nuclear weapons are concerned Nasser is aware we are pressing Israel to accept these safeguards; we shall continue to do so. We are puzzled by UAR statements on IAEA at Geneva Disarmament Conference where UAR representative objected to IAEA safeguards on transfer of fissionable materials or equipment as proposed by U.S. delegate March 5. We had impression from Talbot discussion that Nasser thought it possible for UAR to accept IAEA safeguards at an appropriate time. If UAR considers present IAEA arrangements too complex, we would like to know.

6) UAR support for principle of IAEA safeguards would help our worldwide effort extend these to increasing number of peaceful use facilities of all member states. Of these, Israel is clearly one of most significant where agreement most needed. We also recognize major nuclear powers must accept for increasing number peaceful nuclear activities same inspection they recommend to other states. USG therefore is offering major US reactor for IAEA inspection. We hope this offer, like Tarapur in case of India, will be helpful precedent.

7) In our approaches, we not seeking press Israel’s case and we hope our bona fides sufficiently established for Nasser to realize this is so. We are aware Arab conviction Israel inherently expansionist and poses continuing threat. We do not share this conviction, on basis our knowledge. We wish affirm categorically that US would vigorously oppose any effort by Israel to expand its borders. Similarly we would react within and without UN to threat of aggression against any area state.

8) Although we especially concerned over new rivalries in missile and nuclear field, we also hope to develop some means to slow down race in conventional arms. As UAR has acquired larger quantities modern tanks and aircraft, Israel has sought same. The more Nasser gets from Soviets, more Israelis will have to get from French, UK, FRG and US. Time to curb arms race is running out. With appreciation for Nasser’s understanding of area forces and trends, we would welcome his thoughts on how spiraling of arms stockpile might be slowed.

9) We hope Nasser will give these points careful thought. US remains determined pursue effective Near East arms limitation not because it favors either side but because, in its own interest, wishes avoid being drawn into conflict into which it will almost inevitably be drawn. We earnestly hope it will be possible for Nasser to see merit of our contention. We also hope he can make early response re foregoing ideas.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/McCLOY. Top Secret. Drafted by Davies and Dickman; cleared by Walt Rostow, Harriman (by telephone), Foster, U. Alexis Johnson, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Talbot.
2. Nasser’s April 26 letter was transmitted in telegram 2508 from Cairo, April 27. It welcomed the continuation of correspondence between himself and Johnson and expressed agreement on the desirability of expanding areas of cooperation and seeking to reduce areas of disagreement, but it went on to review broad areas on which he implied there was disagreement: imperialism, Arab disunity, inequality between rich and poor nations, inequality within nations, and Israel. (Ibid., POL UAR-US)
3. Telegram 5140 to Cairo, May 3, instructed Badeau to note that Nasser had told Talbot he would reconsider a statement not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, although he had difficulties with the proposed draft letter that Badeau had given him in October 1963, and to make clear U.S. willingness to consider a new draft or some other technique. It transmitted the text of an alternate draft letter from Johnson to Nasser. (Ibid., POL 7 US/McCLOY) Except for minor revisions in the first paragraph, Johnson’s May 20 letter to Nasser (Document 59) is identical to the draft letter.