Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

51. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 36.1–64

Washington, May 6, 1964.

NASSER’S POLICIES AND PROSPECTS

The Problem

This estimate is designed to assess the policies and prospects of the UAR’s President Nasser in his own country, in the Arab world, in the nonaligned camp, and in the world at large. It is aimed at providing judgments about where Nasser is heading, what he is likely to do along the way, and how his actions are likely to affect US interests.

Conclusions

A. Nasser’s fundamental objective is to create a new order in the Arab world—to build a prosperous Egypt, establish its independence and dignity and that of the Arab world generally, and bring about some measure of Arab solidarity under his aegis. He considers that the elimination of foreign influence is essential to the achievement of these goals, and he regards a strong military force as basic to his own retention of power. Since the influence of the Western powers is more extensive in the Near East than that of the Communist states, Nasser’s campaign against the status quo impinges more on US than on Soviet interests. (Paras. 1, 3, 4, 22)

B. Nevertheless, Nasser’s policies are designed not primarily to favor or to injure the interests of the West or the Bloc, but to serve those of the UAR. Indeed, Nasser is well aware of his need to remain on tolerable terms with both the US and the USSR, since he presently relies on the former for food, on the latter for arms and for aid to build the Aswan dam, and on each for the political backing that keeps him from becoming unacceptably dependent on the other. His basic consideration is to remain nonaligned; in particular, he would not want to see Soviet military bases and special political positions in the Near East replace those of the West. (Paras. 21, 24–26)

C. Nasser will continue to work for the establishment of governments favorable to him and for the removal of special Western political and military positions in the Near East. He will support Arab nationalists (except Baathists) with propaganda and material aid. A principal target in the near term will be Aden, where a dissident populace offers tempting opportunities. However, Nasser will exercise a good deal of caution to avoid a military confrontation with the UK. (Paras. 12–15)

D. We foresee a continuation of Nasser’s personal rule in Egypt and of his efforts to develop an economy largely controlled or supervised by the state. He is likely to incur repeated foreign exchange stringencies, but these will probably not be so severe as to cause major cutbacks. (Paras. 5, 7–9)

E. Nasser hopes that Israel will some day be eliminated as a state. He recognizes that for the foreseeable future he will not have the military strength to defeat Israel. He will bitterly resent any Western moves that seem to reinforce Israel’s political standing or military strength. (Paras. 17, 18)

[Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. A table of contents is not printed. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 6. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, and NSA representatives concurred; the AEC and FBI representatives abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction. Paragraph references are to the Discussion portion of the estimate, not printed here.