Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

367. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 13, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Meeting Between the Secretary of Defense and Major General Khammash of Jordan, 11 a.m., December 13, 1966; Deputy Assistant Secretary Hoopes was also present

Secretary McNamara opened by expressing the US Government’s admiration for the coolness and courage with which King Hussein and the Government of Jordan were meeting the present crisis. He reiterated the US view that the Israeli raid of November 13 had been a serious and unfortunate miscalculation; he acknowledged that great psychological damage had been done, and that the pressing problem now was to repair that damage. He said however that we have reason to believe that the raid presaged no basic change in Israeli policy.

He said he would hand General Khammash a paper which represented his own recommendations, that he had discussed this paper with his colleagues in the USG, and that he believed they were in agreement with him. While the paper did not represent at this point a definite US decision and was therefore labeled “draft,” he expected that it would be formally approved, and he wished General Khammash to take a copy with him. He said that the President was prepared to send Ambassador Macomber to Jordan immediately to discuss the entire range of problems, including those dealt with in the paper. (It was subsequently agreed that, since General Khammash was pausing for 24 hours in London, it would be more appropriate for Ambassador Macomber to depart Washington on 14 December than 13 December.)

The Secretary then read aloud, paragraph-by-paragraph, the paper entitled “Measures For Strengthening Jordan’s Defenses” which is attached as Tab A hereto.

At the conclusion of the reading, General Khammash appeared grave, quiet and crestfallen. He responded in a low voice. He said that he was aware of the large financial and manpower implications in the lists he had presented on his arrival here, but that the lists did not exaggerate Jordan’s true requirements. He said terrorism is rising; Jordan is beleaguered; Israel is not the only foe; Jordan must also face the PLO, Syria, and the UAR. Iraq is another potential enemy, although quiescent for the moment. Unfortunately, whatever the Israeli intentions may be, their assurances can no longer be trusted. The Jordan Army was humiliated by the raid of November 13 and this has caused the people of Jordan to view the Army with suspicion; it has also caused the Army to question King Hussein’s leadership and his policy of moderation toward Israel.

General Khammash said that Jordan was projecting no military buildup, but was merely seeking to remedy “deficiencies” in supporting arms, especially artillery and air defense. He emphasized that the Jordan Army is presently handicapped by obsolescent equipment, and that it needs a great deal more mobility than was indicated in the US response (60 APC and a number of trucks). He said he must be very frank regarding the US response. He appreciated the assistance it represented, but it would not meet the criteria of “adequate defense” as set by the Jordan Officer Corps; therefore, it would not meet the problem of loyalty and reliability. Again he expressed the view that the projected increase of 16,000 men and the infusion of new equipment would represent no military buildup. He expressed the hope that Ambassador Macomber would be endowed with the necessary authority to “expand the list.”

The Secretary said that the US response had been developed in the context of three constraints: (1) availability of items, having in mind the heavy US requirements in Southeast Asia and Europe; (2) the financial cost to the US, having in mind the continuing downward congressional pressures on the MAP budget; and (3) the heavy cost to Jordan arising out of a substantial enlargement of its armed forces. With respect to point (3), he alluded to a “partnership relationship” between the US and Jordan, and said that partners must restrain each other from irresponsible acts. General Khammash said he could only repeat that he was “honest,” and that his requests represented “bare minimum needs.”

The Secretary said that we agree in principle on the necessity of some pay increase for enlisted personnel, but we want to discuss with Jordan how the funds can be found, and also how Jordan proposes to finance the purchase of the ground equipment and the F–104s under existing agreements. He said that these would be among the matters which Ambassador Macomber would be prepared to discuss in Amman.

General Khammash asked whether the Secretary had yet seen his own paper assessing the current situation in Jordan. The Secretary replied in the negative, and General Khammash then presented him with a paper which he had prepared after his arrival in Washington.² The Secretary thanked him for the paper and said that the US earnestly desires peace and stability in the Middle East. He said that he hoped sometime to visit Jordan “as a tourist.” General Khammash assured him that we would be welcome “in office or out.” The Secretary concluded the meeting by reiterating the US view that King Hussein has acted with courage, wisdom and restraint; that we believe the US package represents a substantial and prompt response; and that Ambassador Macomber will be departing Washington on 14 December to pursue the entire range of outstanding problems with the King and the Government of Jordan.

The meeting was adjourned at 11:40 a.m.

Townsend Hoopes
Principal Deputy

Tab A

MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN JORDAN’S DEFENSE

In a meeting of December 13, 1966, between US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Major General Amer Khammash, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of Jordan, the Secretary of Defense made the following points:

1. The US understands and shares the great concern which the Israeli action of November 13 has caused the Government of Jordan. The US has notified the Government of Israel, in the strongest terms, of its concern and of the serious implications of US-Israeli relations should there be a recurrence. The US has strong reason to believe that the attack at Samua does not presage a change in Israeli policy.

2. The US appreciates the unfortunate effect which the raid has had on Jordan’s sense of security and on the morale of the Jordan Armed Forces. The US fully recognizes the important role the armed forces play today, and must play for some time to come, in the maintenance of Jordanian stability and security. The US is especially aware of the need to assure the armed forces that adequate measures are being taken respecting their basic equipment, organization and pay; and also to increase the visible defense of Jordan’s border villages. The US is prepared to provide prompt and meaningful assistance to meet these needs.

3. The US is seriously concerned however about the financial implications of Jordan’s projected force goals and indicated equipment requirements. Security is vital, but it can never be absolute; moreover, it is rarely a function of the size of armed forces, but is more often a function of their quality and spirit. It could be a tragedy for all concerned if the Government of Jordan were to embark upon a military buildup which later events proved to have been an incommensurate response, and for which resources were shown to have been inadequate.

4. The US believes it would be wiser for Jordan to concentrate on qualitative factors designed to improve the firepower, mobility and communications of its forces, rather than to embark upon a force expansion at this time. The US must ask the Government of Jordan, as a condition of further assistance, to forego any manpower increases until it can discuss more fully with the King and his advisers the financial implications of any force expansion.

5. The US notes the Government of Jordan’s view that some increase in the pay of enlisted ranks is required in the present circumstances. The US agrees in principle, but would want to discuss this matter with Jordan to determine how the necessary resources could be found.

6. The US has already accelerated the delivery of certain items in the current program as a first step in our effort to meet the problem facing the Government of Jordan.

7. The US is now prepared to deliver (by airlift to the extent feasible) an additional quantity of material within the next 30–60 days as set forth in the Annex hereto. The US regards this additional material as representing a very substantial and forthcoming response. It requires diversions from US forces and from the forces of several allied and friendly countries. It is designed to meet the indicated priorities of the Jordan armed forces and at the same time to constitute a sufficiently prompt and dramatic manifestation of US support to meet the psychological problem facing King Hussein.

8. The 6 F–104 aircraft listed in the Annex will be provided on a loan basis from the United States Air Force inventory, pending the availability of the planes originally designated for Jordan. These latter aircraft will be available for substitution beginning in July 1967, as agreed between the two governments, and will constitute a more modern and powerful version of the F–104 A/B than the loan aircraft.

9. Jordan must recognize that the United States is constrained from meeting its full requests by their adverse financial implications for both the United States and Jordan, and their adverse implications for a Middle East arms race, which the United States does not wish to stimulate.

10. The US notes the intention of the Government of Jordan to proceed with the purchase of ground equipment under the US-Jordan agreement of 1965 and to exercise the option to procure additional F–104 aircraft under the US-Jordan agreement of 1966. The US is fully prepared to honor these agreements, provided that the Government of Jordan can give satisfactory assurances that the necessary funds for their purchase and support will continue to be forthcoming from sources external to Jordan. This is in accordance with the terms of both agreements. In this connection, the US is prepared to give strong diplomatic support to Jordan’s efforts to obtain the necessary funds from sources such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, but cannot contemplate a change in the terms of the contracts.

11. The US will continue to keep under close study the situation in the Middle East and the requirements of the Jordanian armed forces. The US is prepared to send a special emissary to discuss with the Government of Jordan a number of questions, including (a) the relationship of recent events to the limits on Jordan’s budget as defined in the several US-Jordan agreements; (b) the optimum size and appropriate equipment of the Jordanian armed forces; (c) the levels of external assistance likely to be available from traditional sources; and (d) what role the US might usefully play in a Jordanian effort to develop supplementary financial support from other Arab states which have an important stake in the continued integrity and stability of Jordan.

12. The US reaffirms its admiration for the manner in which the King and the Government of Jordan are facing the hard problems created by recent events, and extends renewed assurances of US friendship and support.

[Here follows an annex entitled “Equipment To Be Furnished Jordan.”]

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 70 A 6648, 333 Jordan. Secret. Drafted by Hoopes and approved by Secretary McNamara on December 17. Filed with a December 16 covering memorandum from Hoopes.
2. The paper, undated, bears a notation that Khammash gave it to McNamara during their meeting. (Ibid.,OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Jordan 091.3 MAP)