Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

245. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, October 20, 1965, 1302Z.

223. Deptel 164²—Fatah. Conveyed Israeli points as outlined first para reftel and in Deptel 160³ to PriMin Tell Oct 19 making clear I was simply transmitting message and not endorsing various points. Tell reacted with extreme irritation, saying he had about reached limit of his patience in having “those people” tell him how to do his job and not do anything themselves. Borders were joint responsibility with both sides responsible for taking reasonable security measures. He thought Jordan had commendable record of arrests and regardless of what was said about full moon, he felt record of past three weeks indicated considerable progress had been made. He had authorized us to pass factual information to GOI and this should convince them of GOJ sincerity. What was Israel doing on its side to clear up this activity?

Tell said we could report that it would also be grave miscalculation to assume Jordan would not respond to another retaliatory raid. As for contact between local commanders this could serve no useful purpose and was obviously designed embarrass Jordan with other Arabs. To extent either army encountered Fatah he assumed they would take action. Problem arose in those areas where it was impossible fully to cover frontier. No direct contact would obviate this problem and he had no intention of getting into position where Israeli commander would try to control disposition of Jordanian forces. Curfew also not feasible unless they able fully patrol area in question and to extent they could do this curfew not necessary.

Re approaches to other governments, these had been most disappointing and indicated no disposition to help. Trip of security officer to Kuwait postponed since he too busy rounding up suspects but would be made later. Contact with Syria so far only through local Embassy and indicated complete disinterest. However Queen Mother would raise subject during her visit to Damascus next week. This attitude on part of neighbors explained GOJ inability to penetrate main apparatus which was operating outside Jordan. He felt financial center probably Kuwait but operating center Syria.

Comment: Asking us to pass message such as that in reftel embarrassing since it appears we are questioning factual information GOJ has given us. I think we need to remember GOI has no Mission here and all their information re GOJ activity obviously comes from spies. We on other hand have reasonably good direct contacts with local officials who have been most cooperative in providing facts and authorizing us to pass them to Israelis. We are satisfied GOJ is trying and is making progress and in face of evidence we have, it looks silly to constantly reiterate Tel Aviv line that “you are doing nothing” and “we are going to attack you for it.”

Barnes

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 ISR–JORDAN. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, and USUN.
2. Telegram 164 to Amman, October 18, summarized a conversation that day between Hare and Harman, who reiterated Israeli concern about Fatah. He said the Israeli Government attributed the absence of incidents in the past fortnight to the cycle of the moon and was apprehensive about what would happen when the nights were dark again. The government believed the Jordanians were not taking Fatah seriously enough and should “crack down hard.” He asked that the U.S. Government convey this assessment to the Jordanians and reiterate that it would be a grave miscalculation to think Israel could take more terrorist raids. Telegram 164 instructed Barnes to convey these points to the Jordanians and at first opportunity urge upon the King the “most vigorous possible prosecution” of Fatah. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 160 to Amman, October 16, summarized points made to a Department officer that day by Israeli Minister Evron. He suggested direct contact between Israeli and Jordanian commanders in certain boundary areas and imposition of a night curfew in certain parts of the border. (Ibid.)