Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic¹

Washington, October 13, 1965, 11:42 a.m.

2129. Eyes only for Ambassador from the Secretary. After full discussion with the President, I told Kaissouni that the President wished him to know that PL 480 question was before the President personally, that the President had asked for certain additional information relating not only to Egypt but to other countries where large PL 480 arrangements had existed and that the President would not be able to bring this matter to a conclusion while he is still in the hospital. I told Kaissouni that we would try to get word to him as quickly as possible.²

FYI. Principal problem here is not the political issues with Egypt, which have improved in important ways, but certain policy questions regarding PL 480 as a whole on which President wishes to be clearer. For example, the policy of sending large quantities of PL 480 food on extraordinarily generous terms to countries who are themselves food exporters or to countries who use their own foreign exchange to buy food in other markets needs clarification. My talk with Kaissouni was friendly and, although he was disappointed at not having an immediate yes, he recognized that he was not getting a no.

My suggestion to you is that you simply state that you are awaiting further word from Washington which you hope to have without undue delay under the circumstances.³

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Handley.
2. A memorandum of Rusk’s meeting with Kaissouni on October 12 is ibid., AID (US) 15–4 UAR.
3. Battle reported in telegram 1070 from Cairo, October 20, that Kaissouni told him that morning that he had conveyed Johnson’s message to Nasser, who asked him to convey to President Johnson his appreciation for the message, his pleasure that political problems had abated, and his hope that U.S.-UAR relations could proceed normally and build on the improvement already begun. (Ibid., AID (US) 15 UAR)