Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

36. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 16, 1964, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

• (1) Verification of Freeze
• (2) Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Discussed by the Committee of Principals

PARTICIPANTS

• See attached list²

1. Verification of Freeze

Mr. Fisher briefly outlined the scope of the proposed position and mentioned two areas which warranted further discussion because of differences of opinion or because decisions have been postponed.³ A major substantive disagreement in the existing paper arose from the Joint Chiefs’ views that production of additional subassemblies, such as guidance packages and re-entry vehicles, should be monitored, while DOD and other agencies had not concurred in this proposal. In addition, the present paper postponed resolution on some of the key issues which were still under discussion in the basic position paper agreed upon in March.⁴ These included: (a) What type of control should be applied to launchers; (b) What limitations should be placed on research and development and prototype testing; (c) The definition of ABM systems to be included in the freeze; and (d) The need for aerial surveillance in connection with spot inspections.

With relation to ABMs, Mr. Keeny suggested that there should be a specific reference to them in the paper to avoid giving rise to the misconception that ABMs had been dropped from the freeze or that no inspection was required. Secretary Vance and General Taylor requested information on exactly what was our position on the inclusion of ABMs since they were unclear on agreed linkage of ABMs to the remainder of the freeze proposal. Mr. Fisher quoted from the President’s 21 January message to the ENDC which included strategic defensive missiles and from a speech by the U.S. representative referring to ABMs in later presentations at Geneva.⁵ He pointed out that ABMs were just as much an agreed matter for exploration as were the offensive missiles, although we had consistently indicated that precise definition of such systems had not been arrived at. Secretary Rusk said that he understood ABMs had been included at the request of DOD to provide against a possible loss of deterrence if only offensive vehicles were frozen.

Secretary Rusk asked for information on Soviet interest in the freeze proposal. Mr. Fisher indicated that the Soviets had shown no enthusiasm but nevertheless had given evidence of careful study since their statements had emphasized many of the unanswered questions and twisted them to Soviet advantage. In particular, the question of inspection and verification had been misconstrued in order to make it appear very unacceptable. Mr. Fisher felt that the present paper was needed in order to make the record straight on our ideas on inspection which had been designed to minimize intrusion consistent with maintaining U.S. security.

Secretary Rusk indicated he felt the present subject needed NATO discussion and questioned how we could avoid the four subjects upon which no decisions had yet been reached. Upon request for a schedule as to when these matters might be completed, Dr. Scoville indicated that the launcher question was basic to the entire MLF problem and it had been agreed that no attempt would be made to reach a decision until after the Soviets had evidenced constructive interest in the freeze proposal. With respect to prototype testing, a paper had been prepared and distributed to the Principals⁶ whose reply was presently being awaited. The problem of ABM systems definition had proven technically very difficult and a task group had just been formed to try and clarify this problem along with our ideas on how such controls on these systems could be verified. However, results could not be expected until August. The question of aerial surveillance would be resolved at any time that the principals chose to make a decision in this area.

Mr. Fisher indicated that our proposed schedule for processing the verification paper involved transmittal to NAC at the earliest possible time for discussion which might be somewhat more limited than the NAC discussion on the basic freeze paper. Following this, it would be discussed in a co-chairmen’s meeting at Geneva prior to public presentation at the ENDC, probably within three-four weeks (now scheduled for 9 July 1964). This presentation was needed in order to answer the most critical public questions on the nature of the freeze.

Mr. Fisher indicated that the other major problem with the position revolved around Mr. McCone’s worries on the use of intelligence to support the verification. He believed that the paper had been modified so that intelligence was primarily in a supporting role but that he believed Mr. McCone had wished to discuss this matter.⁷ In Mr. McCone’s absence, Mr. Marengo indicated that the particular worry concerned the launcher problem which had not yet been defined. The paper proposed no inspection of existing launchers. While intelligence might be adequate for evaluating present declarations on launchers, there would always be a question on adequacy if the deployment made were changed or if mobile launchers were involved. He also worried about the perishability of intelligence and particularly how we could convince Congress and the public that our verification was satisfactory without disclosing intelligence sources.

Mr. Fisher agreed that convincing the public and Congress was a problem but one which had been handled satisfactorily in the past. Mr. McCone himself had been very effective in the test ban hearings and with proper briefings and other measures available to the Executive Branch, it is felt that proper support could be obtained for the measure without compromising our intelligence capabilities. Dr. Scoville mentioned that the proposed verification procedures used intelligence only to supply the U.S. the necessary information to make decisions. The basis for these decisions need not be disclosed and, therefore, the intelligence source not compromised. This appeared an appropriate use of intelligence in support of U.S. disarmament policy and Mr. Marengo agreed. General Taylor indicated he would like to receive a copy of Mr. McCone’s letter on the proposal and Mr. Fisher read the letter to the group.

Secretary Rusk pointed out the significance of CIA’s views on the reliance which we could place on intelligence. Mr. Fisher next raised the matter of which subassemblies should be monitored. Gen. Taylor believed that the more subassemblies that could be monitored the better, and he indicated that from his studies both guidance system and re-entry vehicle production should be included. Dr. Scoville indicated that guidance systems had been omitted because of the difficulties in verification. Such systems could be produced in very small facilities, and it would be virtually impossible to detect clandestine production. Including guidance systems would put the U.S. in the position of abiding by a restriction over which they would have no reasonable possibility of confirming Soviet compliance. Dr. Hornig and Mr. Seamans⁸ concurred in this evaluation. With respect to re-entry vehicles, Dr. Scoville indicated that while these might be verifiable, they presented certain security problems to the U.S. Monitoring the production of re-entry vehicles might disclose sensitive U.S. information on warhead or penetration aid characteristics. Therefore it had been decided that it would not be in the U.S. interest to risk disclosure in these areas by allowing foreign inspection of such production. General Taylor indicated that he did not feel strongly on this subject and that if the others concurred, he would not press this point further.

Deputy Secretary Vance stated that the DOD was prepared to go ahead with the subject paper as presented. Secretary Rusk indicated that he would like to have the paper revised to define explicitly the status of our existing positions on the unresolved issues: prototype testing; launch site construction; and ABM. He also believed there should be a classified intelligence annex to the paper for discussion with the President which would point out the interaction of intelligence with the proposed verification procedures and the risk to intelligence of disclosure in justifying a measure before Congress and the public. He believed that there should also be a paper which outlined the parliamentary situation, i.e., our schedule and procedures for discussion with NAC, the co-chairman, and the ENDC. Dr. Seaborg, Dr. Hornig and Mr. Seamans indicated they had no problems with the paper as written.

2. Non-Proliferation

Secretary Rusk opened the discussion on non-proliferation by asking for views on whether we would be prepared to have a non-proliferation agreement along the lines of previously proposed non-dissemination, non-acquisition measures without the participation of Communist China. How critical could the absence of China be to the usefulness of such agreements? The West Germans had indicated that they would go along if the Chinese would. Would the Senate concur in such measures without Chinese participation? Much of the previous thinking, and particularly the Soviet interest, had probably been directed at providing pressure on the Chinese. The possibilities of other countries obtaining an independent nuclear capability were more remote, although India, Israel, and Sweden were potential candidates. He did not wish for any formal Department positions but rather informal views. Mr. Fisher indicated that he felt that Chinese participation was not essential in order to have a very useful measure. The acquisition of a nuclear capability by China at some time in the not too distant future had already been written off by most of the world since no one at the present time saw any particularly promising way of preventing this. If we continue to insist on the participation of China as a precondition to non-proliferation agreements, this would indicate that the U.S. had written off non-proliferation as a viable measure. Other nations would question our sincerity in this area and this, in turn, might influence their decisions on developing nuclear capabilities. General Taylor asked whether we would propose to treat China as a nuclear power once she detonated her first nuclear weapon. Mr. Fisher indicated that we should continue to use pressure, even after the detonation, to get China to adopt a sane nuclear policy. Secretary Rusk asked whether the Government has seriously looked at the problem of giving India nuclear weapons in the event that China had such a weapon. Mr. Fisher indicated that he knew of no detailed look, but that he felt rather strongly that it would be more desirable to have U.S. controlled weapons providing defense or a deterrence against nuclear attack on India rather than India’s having its own nuclear capability. Secretary Rusk indicated that he did not wish to prejudge this question but that he felt such a look would be useful. He pointed out that no Government position exists as to whether we would oppose other nations having nuclear weapons once China obtains them.

Secretary Rusk then stated that he had considered a new U.S. approach to the problem of non-dissemination. This approach might take the form of a draft treaty on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. In addition, we would circulate a letter with those statements of our policy relative to MLF which state that this force should not lead to additional new national nuclear capabilities. This approach might replace the agreed minute under which we operate at the present time. Mr. Meeker indicated that he thought this would be a good approach since silence can be considered as meaning consent. The treaty would not be signed initially, but a “letter of intent” would be circulated first to the nuclear powers and then to the non-nuclear powers. This would provide the opportunity for each to indicate his “intent” but not to the point of commitment until it could be ascertained which other countries were going to be included.

Secretary Rusk indicated that although the Soviets have always stated that the MLF is their only objection to a non-dissemination agreement, they may indeed have others. However, we had reason to believe that the Soviets had a real interest in non-dissemination and that, therefore, this might be in an area in which we had sufficient community of interest to obtain an agreement. He felt that we should work out a draft agreement and “letter of intent” and then send it around to see how many nations would join us, and then see who was missing.

Secretary Vance indicated and others generally concurred that this was a matter worth exploring.

Secretary Rusk said he had some questions about Recommendation #1 in Mr. Fisher’s letter of 15 June on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the MLF.⁹ He felt that it singled out the MLF members to make non-acquisition declarations which would not be required of other nations. Secretary Vance indicated that he had the same worry about this recommendation.

It was agreed that Mr. Fisher would redraft the U.S. Governmental position on this subject of non-proliferation in accord with the discussion at this meeting.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, ACDA Publications, Vol. III, Box 12. Secret. Drafted by Scoville. The source text is attached to the summary of actions taken at the meeting, Document 37, which notes the time of the meeting and that it took place in the Secretary of State’s Conference Room. Also attached is a June 30 note from Keeny to McGeorge Bundy (who missed the meeting) that asked him to note the summary of actions and Secretary Rusk’s comments “on the problem of nuclear weapons for India when China obtains nuclear weapons.” Another account of this meeting is in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 8, pp. 566-567.
2. The list of 22 participants is not printed.
3. Reference is to the position paper, “Verification of a Freeze on Strategic Nuclear Vehicles,” June 6, which was transmitted under cover of a June 6 memorandum from Fisher to the Committee of Principals. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, January-July 1964)
4. Reference presumably is to the undated draft paper prepared in early March; see footnote 3, Document 19. See also Document 21.
5. For example, Fisher mentioned anti-missile systems in his statement to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on April 16. (Ibid.)
6. See footnote 7, Document 30.
7. See Document 28.
8. Dr. Robert S. Seamans, Associate Administrator, NASA.
9. This recommendation stated: “That a policy decision be made now that the United States will assure that at the time the MLF Charter comes into being there will be some public commitment by the non-nuclear participants not to acquire a national nuclear capability.” (Memorandum from Fisher to Secretary Rusk; Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Multilateral Force-General, Box 22)