Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

37. Summary of Actions¹

Washington, June 16, 1964, 4 p.m.

MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS

ACTION TAKEN ON VERIFICATION OF FREEZE PAPER

The 6 June 1964 paper outlining procedures for verification of freeze on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles was discussed with particular attention being given to the following points:

a. The four unresolved issues; i.e.:

(1) Types of controls to be applied to launchers;

(2) Limitations to be placed on research and development and prototype testing:

(3) The definition of ABM systems to be included in the freeze; and

(4) The need for aerial surveillance in connection with spot inspections.

It was agreed that the status of these unresolved issues should be made clear in the position paper or, in the case of aerial surveillance, in the forwarding letter to the White House.

b. The relationship of intelligence to the verification of the freeze and the risks of compromise to intelligence sources.

It was agreed that a classified annex discussing this relationship should be prepared for presentation to the White House prior to the use of the verification paper at the ENDC.

c. The vehicle sub-assemblies which should be controlled under the freeze.

After General Taylor presented the JCS views and general discussion thereon, it was agreed that guidance systems and re-entry vehicles should not be added to the sub-assemblies listed in the subject paper.

The proposed paper on the verification of the freeze was then approved subject to the changes and additions discussed above.

ACTION TAKEN ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION PAPER

Secretary Rusk requested informal views on the importance of the participation of Communist China in any non-dissemination, non-acquisition measure. Mr. Fisher expressed the views that such measures would still have great usefulness without Chinese participation since he felt it still important to prevent additional countries from becoming nuclear powers. Secretary Rusk pointed out that at the moment no Governmental position existed as to whether we would oppose other nations, and particularly India, having nuclear weapons once China obtains them.

Secretary Rusk suggested consideration be given to approaching the non-proliferation matter by means of a “letter of intent” in the form of a draft treaty along with a letter restating U.S. policy that the MLF should not lead to additional national nuclear capabilities. Others concurred in this suggestion as a useful approach.

Secretary Rusk and Secretary Vance expressed concern about Recommendation No. 1 in Mr. Fisher’s letter to Secretary of State Rusk dated June 15, 1964, on non-proliferation which singled out MLF members to make non-acquisition declarations not required of other nations.

It was agreed that Mr. Fisher would redraft the U.S. Governmental position on the subject of non-proliferation in accord with the discussion at this meeting.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament,ACDA Publications, Vol. III, Box 12. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State’s Conference Room.