35. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson1

The attached position paper on the cutoff of fissionable material production and the transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses2 has been submitted by ACDA for your approval as guidance for the U.S. Delegation in Geneva.3 The paper has been agreed to by all interested agencies: State, Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Atomic Energy Commission, Central Intelligence Agency, and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Their comments are attached.4

The basic proposals in this paper have already been approved and were included in summary form in your January 21 message to the Geneva Conference. This paper is essentially an elaboration of our present position particularly with regard to the requirements for verification.

In order to achieve agreement, the paper intentionally avoids facing the issue of whether or not aerial reconnaissance should be involved in the verification procedure. Although there is agreement among all other agencies that aerial reconnaissance is not necessary in connection with this agreement, the JCS recommends that a provision for aerial overflight [Page 75] be included. Secretary McNamara has informally advised Mr. Foster that he is prepared to overrule the JCS on this issue but would prefer not to do so unless the Soviets show some interest in the proposal. Mr. Foster agreed to fuzz the language on inspection so that it would not necessarily preclude subsequent consideration of aerial inspection. Although this is a touchy point since even the hint that we are considering aerial inspection as a condition for this proposal would completely discredit it abroad, ACDA believes they can live with this instruction for the time being by avoiding the issue in Geneva.

Subject to your approval, the paper will be submitted for information to NAC next Tuesday5 and will be presented by Mr. Foster in Geneva next Thursday.6

I recommend that you approve the paper. If you approve, I will inform the interested agencies of your action.7

McG. B.
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. 1, Box 10. Secret. The source text is attached to a June 13 memorandum from Keeny to McGeorge Bundy. Keeny expressed reservations about the failure of the agencies to resolve the issue of aerial reconnaissance and the exclusion of certain types of nuclear reactors from inspection but nonetheless concluded, “I am impressed that all the agencies have agreed to the paper and believe that you should recommend that the President approve the paper as it stands.”
  2. See footnote 2, Document 32.
  3. Document 33.
  4. Reference presumably is to Document 32 and the documents referenced in footnotes 4 and 5 thereto, and Document 33, and the documents referenced in footnotes 5 and 6 thereto.
  5. June 23.
  6. On June 25, the U.S. Delegation submitted the U.S. working paper, “Inspection of a Fissionable Material Cutoff,” to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 235-238. This paper was virtually identical to the draft paper, June 4, cited in footnote 3, Document 32.
  7. The approval line of the recommendation is checked. In a memorandum to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Seaborg, McCone, and Hornig, June 16, Bundy indicated that the President had approved the position paper for guidance for the U.S. Delegation in Geneva. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memos to the White House, 1964)