Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

205. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, September 1, 1967, 1909Z.

703. Disto. Subject: Co-Chairmen’s Meeting —Soviet Recommendation on Article III. For Secretary and Fisher from Foster.

1. Summary: At September 1 Co-Chairmen’s meeting at Roshchin’s initiative, Soviets presented Foster with text of draft Art III (sent septel).² Roshchin said there were many elements of draft which would be troublesome for Moscow to accept, but that his delegation had taken into account views presented by US regarding special Euratom problems. Roshchin said he considered draft best possible compromise between US and Soviet positions. He could not predict whether it would be acceptable to his superiors but would recommend it to Moscow for acceptance. Foster said he would report draft presented by Soviet delegation as basis for solution to Art III impasse. Foster said not sure that Washington would find Soviet draft satisfactory either to US Govt or its allies. However, he recognized that Soviet draft represented considerable departure from earlier Soviet position on NPT safeguards and that it had been the result of fruitful exchange of views between delegations. Foster said he would recommend Soviet draft to Washington as something US Govt should try out on US allies.

2. Details: Roshchin asked for Co-Chairmen meeting Sept 1 in order to present Soviet compromise proposal for Article III. Roshchin noted that Bunn and Gleysteen on US side and Antyasov and Shustov on Soviet side had debated two drafts following Aug 26 Co-Chairmen’s meeting (Geneva 629).³ Soviets had obtained greater insight into safeguards problems as result Aug 26 and earlier Co-Chairmen’s meetings and problems their draft Article III posed for US and its Euratom allies. These points had been further clarified during informal meetings of Deloffs. Foregoing had made it possible for Soviet delegation to present draft Art III which Roshchin thought takes into account problems of US and special interests of Euratom allies. Roshchin said Soviet draft had not been discussed with Moscow and he was not sure whether it would be acceptable, but he was prepared to recommend it as best possible compromise between Soviet position that IAEA safeguards apply to all non-nuclear-weapon signatories and US position that Article would have to take into account political realities of US alliance structure.

3. Foster said he would recommend Soviet draft as something to try out on Washington and on our allies. Foster said that while we are anxious to resolve Art III issue before NPT draft is moved on to UN, we of course would have to obtain views of allies before tabling any Co-Chairmen draft on Art III. While he personally hoped Soviet draft might provide basis for compromise of conflicting interests and recognized that Soviets had made important concessions, he could only say he would recommend draft to Washington for presentation to US allies.

4. Foster and Roshchin agreed that utmost discretion required to avoid leaks.

5. Several days after Co-Chairmen’s meeting of 26 Aug, Antyasov and Shustov invited Bunn and Gleysteen to meet. Soviets suggested that Soviet Art III be utilized but that following language be added to it: “The above-mentioned guaranties shall apply to the states as provided for in the statute of the IAEA and the document on safeguards.” Soviets contended that our Euratom allies could enter into “bilateral or multilateral” arrangements with IAEA because they were provided for in IAEA statute and safeguards document. They also said they thought some of our allies would like a specific reference to the IAEA safeguards document.

6. We said Soviet suggestion inadequate because it did not contain language from US Art III on following points:

(1) Clear statement of purpose of safeguards in beginning;

(2) Right of Euratom members to enter into verification agreement with IAEA through Euratom and related provisions recognizing important role of Euratom;

(3) Application of safeguards to “source or special fissionable material within its territory or under its jurisdiction” rather than to “its nuclear activities” as in Soviet text;

(4) Three-year transition period;

(5) Language re economic and technological development and safeguarded international interchange of nuclear materials and equipment;

(6) More precise language for export provision.

7. Subsequently Soviet Deloffs presented US Deloffs with text substantially same as text reported septel except for first sentence. They said they could not accept US statement of purpose because it referred to “source or special fissionable material” and Moscow would suggest addition of “principal nuclear facility.” As to other references to “source and special fissionable material” in US text, they could perhaps be accepted provided language from safeguards document on when procedures applied to principal nuclear facilities could be added. (See second and third sentences of para 1 of text reported septel.)

8. Soviet Deloffs could not accept language US Art III referring to other safeguards systems and verification agreement for Euratom although they understood Euratom would enter into an agreement with IAEA on behalf of its members covering their NPT safeguard obligations. Soviets said Moscow would reject word “multilateral” but language “individually or together with other states” might be acceptable. They would not accept three-year transition period; they had guidelines permitting only year and one-half transition; but perhaps language of para 4 which based on LA-NFZ Treaty⁴ would satisfy Moscow as compromise. However, Soviets could not accept language like first sentence of provision in LA-NFZ Treaty; an undertaking to accept safeguards was required for them. US Deloffs said they would report above to Foster.

9. At the Co-Chairmen’s meeting which occurred today, Roshchin asked Foster to consider the first sentence of the text reported septel as a substitute for the US language on statement of purpose. Soviet Deloffs said “nuclear energy” was vague and should be understood to include “source and special fissionable material” which they could not accept in first sentence of treaty. (Comment: It clearly does not include nuclear “facilities.”)

Brodie

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis.
2. For the Soviet draft of Article III, see Document 206.
3. Telegram 629 from Geneva, August 26, reports: “At August 26 Roshchin luncheon, Foster reviewed tactical situation in ENDC, saying it most important to have ENDC recommendation of NPT in some form before draft passed on to UNGA. Roshchin said ENDC could not endorse NPT as a committee without unanimity, but saw no problem in finding procedural means to report to UNGA submission NPT by Co-Chairmen and status of debate on it in ENDC. Roshchin considered it essential to reach Co-Chairmen agreement on safeguards and security assurances as soon as possible in order that NPT would be easier defend at UNGA. Foster gave long review of U.S. and Soviet drafts on Art. III, pointing out deficiencies and loopholes of Soviet draft. Foster also pointed out need for Soviets to start moving on ABMs and conventional arms transfers before too late.” (Department of State, S/S-I Files, Exdis/Limdis Telegrams/Airgrams, Reel 163A, August 25, 1967-September 9, 1967)
4. On February 12, 1968, Rusk advised the President to sign Protocol II of the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty; see Document 226. The United Stares is not a signatory to this treaty, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. For text of Protocol II, see footnote 2, Document 226. For text of the treaty, see 22 UST 762.