Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, March 18, 1967, 4:55 p.m.

158191. Eyes Only for the Ambassador. Subject: US-Soviet Strategic Weapons Talks.

1. On basis Principals’ discussion and your 3928,² we have decided to proceed by your presenting paper transmitted by this telegram, calling for talks to begin on April 12. For such talks we contemplate sending small team of senior officials to assist you.

2. Text of Oral Statement to be delivered to Gromyko, copy of which you may leave, follows (paras 3 through 8 below):

3. “The US Government has carefully studied Chairman Kosygin’s letter to President Johnson of February 28³ and your statement⁴ to me on that same date. Despite some differences in approach, we see a common interest in ensuring the security of each side, without jeopardy to the security of the other, by avoiding a further costly and possibly dangerous spiral of the strategic arms race, and by creating the basis for reductions in existing forces. Accordingly we believe it possible and desirable to proceed promptly with discussions between our two Governments.

4. “US Government shares the desire of the Soviet Government not merely to prevent possible disruption of the strategic balance, but to move beyond this to reductions of existing forces. We see the forthcoming discussions as the best means to work together to increase the mutual understanding that is necessary to make progress toward this common goal.

5. “While the US Government hopes that it will be possible to move rapidly toward agreement on strategic arms reductions, it may be feasible in the interim to find a way to ‘level-off’ strategic offensive and defensive forces. We agree that measures for this purpose would have to be designed to ensure the security of each side rather than attempting to solidify the precise current correlation of forces or to freeze an advantage to one or the other side. In other words, we recognize that some appropriate adjustments in the present forces of each side might be necessary and would still be consistent with our common objective of providing assurance to both sides that their security will be maintained or enhanced, while at the same time avoiding the possibly disruptive effects and the great costs of continuation of a strategic arms race. It will of course be necessary to discuss the respective strategic weapons systems of both sides in order to reach agreement on precisely which systems would be involved, and what undertakings with respect to them would be agreed. The United States is prepared to consider the possibilities of placing maximum reliance on unilateral means of verification of limitations on deployment of strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems. With all of these considerations in view, we suggest that measures of agreed limitation on deployment should apply to all strategic offensive missile systems (launchers) and to all defensive strategic missile systems (launchers and radars) having a significant anti-ballistic missile capability. We can see now how stationary systems can be part of such an arrangement, but we will need to work out a way to include mobile systems.

6. “We continue to believe that it would be premature to consider the form in which agreements or understandings between us might be expressed—treaty or otherwise. The form would depend upon the content and nature of the understanding.

7. “The United States Government believes that a thorough and frank discussion of the general problem will in itself be of great value to both sides. Increased understanding should not only assist us in reaching agreements to limit and to reduce strategic forces, but can also assist in dispelling uncertainties which lead each side to hedge against doubts by acquiring larger forces than it might otherwise do. This in turn triggers the other side to do the same, activating a spiral in the arms race.

8. “In view of the complexity of this general question, the US does not believe that a formal agenda should be fixed. The US would welcome the comments of the Soviet Government. The US Government is prepared to send appropriate senior officials from Washington to support Ambassador Thompson in these discussions. It proposes that the discussions begin in Moscow on April 12, and it hopes that the Soviet Government will find it possible to agree to that date.”

9. FYI: It has been decided to open the discussions without presentation at this time of a detailed US proposal. (The draft position paper pouched to you has not been decided upon.) As a result of our discussions, it has been concluded that our proposal in the first instance should be limited to elements outlined in paragraph 5 above. We hope it will be possible on this basis to engage in the dialogue necessary before we can settle on a specific proposal. At the same time [we]recognize the reserved and suspicious attitude taken by the Soviet Government toward discussions of the strategic balance. We hope that the positive reference to the long-term possibilities of agreements on reductions, as well as the broad and loose framework for possible mid-term “leveling-off” agreements, will provide a context in which it will be possible to introduce a more sophisticated approach to the whole problem than the Soviet Government has hitherto displayed. With respect to the short term, we hope that it will be possible to establish a dialogue in which we can, for example, demonstrate to the Soviets that it would be in their interest not to preserve secrecy with respect to the mission and performance capabilities of the Tallinn system which results only in the need for the US to assume the worst in planning our own [future] programs. The dialogue may assist each side to make better unilateral decisions, and to hold down the arms race, even if no agreements are reached. (We recognize that care must be taken to avoid the impression of an intelligence fishing expedition.) Increased understanding of the current and prospective strategic situation could lead to unilateral slowdowns in specific areas pending broader and perhaps more formal bilateral agreements.

10. Our flexibility is designed not only to leave open the possibility for an agreement under which the Soviets would be permitted, for example, to keep their current Moscow ABM and their current ICBM deployments, which we are virtually certain they will insist upon doing, but also to permit us to hold open the option for a limited ABM deployment.

11. At your discretion, you may wish to indicate to the Soviets the level of representation from Washington in your support in forthcoming talks. It will be from State, DOD, and ACDA—probably McNaughton, Garthoff, Fisher or another ACDA official, a representative of the Joint Staff, and a scientist. End FYI.

Rusk

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 3546. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Raymond L. Garthoff (G/PM) on March 16; cleared by Kohler, McNaughton, Fisher, Stoessel, Walsh, and Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach.
2. Not found.
3. See Document 185.
4. See Document 186.