191. Notes of Meeting1
[Here follow discussion of the selection of a new director for the Argonne National Laboratory and an account of the opening of a symposium on outer space exploration.]
At 4 p.m. I attended a meeting of the Principals in Secretary of State Rusk’s conference room. Present were: Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler, Hornig, Helms, Rostow, Fisher, Webb, Kohler, Katzenbach, McNaughton, Marks, Scoville, plus Labowitz, Barber, Garthoff, et al. Rusk opened the meeting by calling on Fisher. Fisher referred to the State/ACDA paper, “Proposal on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Missile Systems,”2 that had been circulated before the meeting, and said this is a simple plan that would not go all the way that the Soviets want toward complete disarmament. Kohler went on to say that this plan has been essentially agreed to by all the Deputies. He said its potential success depends on the dependability of the unilateral detection system. Rusk mentioned that there are a couple of places in the paper in which it is suggested that the U.S. make concessions, even before the Soviets have said, no, and he thought we should at least feel them out before establishing these less desirable positions as the U.S. position.
Rusk then called on General Wheeler for his reactions. Wheeler said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the paper and came to the following five or six conclusions. They want a plan that would maintain the strategic superiority of the U.S. at all times. They would insist on on-site inspection. If on-site inspection was impossible, they would limit the plan to those systems that could be verified unilaterally, and this would mean only the fixed land-based systems. They do not wish to forego the possibility of the U.S. deploying an ABM in the future. They believe that the plan should be formalized as a treaty. They think there should be withdrawal provisions to come into effect if there were 1. hostile actions interfering with our information-collection systems, 2. attempts to deceive, or 3. deterioration of our ability to detect.
Rusk then called on McNamara who said he does not think the U.S. is ready to put forward such a plan in written form. He also said that he thinks the U.S. should not agree to anything we couldn’t check ourselves. Rusk then asked me for my opinion. I said I agree with McNamara. Rusk found it a frustrating situation because he felt we should do something along these lines, but we shouldn’t do anything that we couldn’t check, and that doesn’t leave very much. Rusk called on Webb who said that he could live with the plan. Rusk called on Helms who said he is queasy [Page 467] about our ability to carry out the unilateral verification under the plan. Rusk called on Hornig who said he agrees with McNamara, but thinks some steps should be taken, and the question is how to begin.
Rostow said he is especially interested in the nature of the Soviet Tallinn system,3 and thinks we should somehow learn more about it. This led McNamara to suggest that our first objective should be to try to establish the nature of the Tallinn system. He thinks we might use this as a basis for opening a dialogue with the Soviets, and perhaps we might be successful in a 6-12 month period of time. If we aren’t successful, this particular plan is no good; and if we are successful, we might be in a position to proceed further. He said he thinks we should start with some exchanges on our capabilities, and maybe even show each other reconnaissance photographs. Rostow said, when we reach such a point, that might be the proper time to table a paper.
Fisher pointed out that we have been talking a long time, and that we must talk in a context of holding down offensive missiles. Kohler agreed with Fisher and expressed doubt that the dialogue approach that had been suggested would be possible with the Soviets. Katzenbach also indicated that he doubts such discussions would be successful, but that there might be a by-product, namely, we might end up in deciding on a mutually advantageous unilateral showdown. McNamara said he doesn’t think we are very close, that is, within a year or two, to an agreement with the Soviets on any of these matters. (He left the meeting about 4:45 p.m.) Rusk made the important point that he regards detection by national means as limited to means within the power of the U.S. itself. He said he would have another go at this with Kohler and Fisher in order to prepare a cable for Thompson, to give him (Thompson) guidance to begin the dialogue with the Soviets. These instructions would perhaps be along the lines of probing further on three or four points.
Rusk went on to say that verification is a key issue, and that we are already having difficulty on verification. He referred in this regard to the Space Treaty4 and to “Dr. Seaborg’s treaty” (the NPT). I said I bought the idea of this being my treaty provided there were proper safeguards in Article III. Rostow expressed optimism that the dialogue with the Soviets would be successful. Rusk expressed the interesting thought that, as time goes on, we will find ourselves in the situation that we won’t be able to make progress in these matters in bits and pieces; that we will need something dramatic to take a big step, and this within a few years. Rusk ended the meeting by saying he would circulate to the Principals the instructions that will be sent to Ambassador Thompson.
[Here follows a note on Seaborg’s biweekly report to the President.]
- Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 14, pp. 304-306. No classification marking.↩
- Not found.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 176.↩
- See Document 167.↩