Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

104. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 8, 1965, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Non-Proliferation

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
• The Secretary
• Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

The Secretary said he wished to make the following oral communication in reply to the oral remarks which the Ambassador had made to him on the subject of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons:

“The United States Government has carefully examined the oral statement made by Ambassador Dobrynin on October 29, 1965.²

“The United States Government agrees with the Soviet Government’s view that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have a mutual interest in reaching an agreement to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. We also agree that this is one of the most urgent problems and that it is ripe for constructive discussion. Finally, we agree that the objective should be that nuclear weapons really not be disseminated. As a recently-adopted General Assembly resolution which we both supported declares: ‘The treaty should be void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form.’³

“We must point out, however, that as long as the Soviet Union had hundreds of intermediate and medium range nuclear missiles aimed at the territories of our allies in Europe, our allies are naturally going to desire participation in their defense against possible nuclear attack, but without the proliferation of nuclear weapons. For this reason, no non-proliferation treaty which, in addition to barring proliferation, also bars such participation will be acceptable to the United States. We have no intention of signing any agreement which would preclude our allies from participating in their own defense, so long as such participation does not involve proliferation.

“We have assured your Government in the past that no proposals for the defense of NATO nations which we have supported would produce proliferation. Our proposals are, on the contrary, designed to prevent it. If, as your statement indicates, you do not accept this conclusion and believe such arrangements could in the future lead to proliferation, then you should join us in negotiating a treaty to prevent proliferation from taking place in any manner.

“The United States is prepared to negotiate a treaty, such as the United States draft, which bars dissemination in any form, directly or indirectly.⁴ We are prepared to agree that no non-nuclear country acquires nuclear weapons, rational control over nuclear weapons, the power itself to fire nuclear weapons, or information on how to manufacture nuclear weapons. We are prepared to agree that these things should not be done directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States, or through units of the armed forces or military personnel of States, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance. Finally, to close any conceivable loophole that might otherwise remain, we are prepared to ban any action which would cause an increase in the total number of entities having independent power to use nuclear weapons.

“We believe this to be a reasonable basis upon which a treaty could be negotiated, assuming the Soviet Government is interested in such a treaty. We believe it possible to proceed with negotiations promptly, in New York, in Geneva or elsewhere. To expedite those negotiations, Secretary Rusk suggested, and Foreign Minister Gromyko agreed, that a beginning be made with the articles of the two draft treaties upon which agreement appears to be close, and such talks have begun.

“The United States Government continues to attach the greatest importance to achieving progress on the problem of proliferation, and is ready for constructive discussions to this end.”

The Secretary added that if the concern of the Soviet side was proliferation, we should be able to reach agreement. We are not, and never have been, thinking about proliferation. We were as opposed to this as the Soviets for many of the same reasons. On the other hand, if the Soviet objection was based on the fact that they did not like NATO, we could not help them. The Secretary said he had not seen the British Foreign Minister yet to see if he has had any further reflections on his discussions in Moscow.⁵ He was not certain whether Mr. Stewart would be coming with Prime Minister Wilson or not.⁶ The Secretary said that this matter had had the personal attention of the President who was familiar with these discussions. The Secretary reminded the Ambassador that he had spent yesterday at the President’s ranch.⁷

Dobrynin asked about the meaning of the word “entities,” which was explained to him.

After a long conversation on other subjects, Dobrynin returned to the subject of non-proliferation and said that our reply introduced nothing new. The Soviet impression was that we were yielding to pressure from the West Germans. The Secretary said if the Soviets were prepared to concentrate sincerely on proliferation, we should be able to reach agreement.

Dobrynin pointed out that we wished to have an agreement but also an arrangement in NATO. He said it would have been easier for the Soviets to have confined themselves to criticizing our draft but they had put in one of their own, to which there was some opposition in Moscow, in an effort to get a solution. They would be prepared to sign tomorrow if the NATO issue could be cleared up. He pointed out that even the NATO representatives in Washington were not clear about the United States position. He said that representatives did not question United States sincerity but did not know what we were really planning.

The Secretary said he had told Gromyko that neither he nor we knew what an eventual arrangement might be.

Dobrynin said the Germans were now thinking of medium-range missiles. He had discussed this with members of the German Embassy here, who were quite frank about it and they were equally frank in Bonn. He said the Soviets believe that the future of Europe lay in reconciliation. Many Germans, and this had been particularly the case during the time of Adenauer and Dulles, believed that by creating military power of their own, they could get East Germany back. Some of them seemed to think they could exploit Soviet difficulties with China. We were making one concession after another to the West Germans.

The Secretary said these questions did not arise in NATO until the Soviets created this enormous nuclear force, targeted on Germany. Dobrynin said that we had moved first in this matter and had put our missiles in Germany and then the Soviets had reacted. The Secretary said we took seriously the matter that the Soviet Union and we had heavy responsibility for peace. We were not trying to mislead the Soviets on non-proliferation, and could not do so in any event. The Soviets, in fact, sat at the NATO table on these discussions but when we ask about the Warsaw Pact we get no answer.

Dobrynin rejoined that the Poles had given the Secretary a clear answer by saying they had not asked for nuclear weapons.

At this point the conversation turned to other subjects.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246, US Officials Memoranda of Conversation with Leading USSR Officials, 1965. Secret. Drafted and approved by Thompson (S/AL) December 9, and in S/S-S by John P. Walsh. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.
2. Document 100.
3. For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX), adopted November 19, 1965, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1965, pp. 72-73.
4. For text of the U.S. Draft Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on August 17, 1965, see Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 347-349.
5. British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart visited the Soviet Union November 29-December 3 for talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.
6. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson visited the United States December 16-18 for talks with President Johnson and other administration officials to address the U.N. General Assembly on December 16.
7. Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy visited the LBJ Ranch in Texas on December 7. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book, 1965) No record of their discussions with President Johnson has been found.