Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

100. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 29, 1965, noon.

SUBJECT

• Non-Proliferation

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
• The Secretary
• Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large

The Ambassador said he had been instructed to make the following statement:

“The contents of talks which recently took place between you, Mr. Secretary, and the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, A.A. Gromyko,² were carefully examined in Moscow. During these talks positions of both sides were stated and explained with regard to major international problems and questions of bilateral relations between the USSR and the US.

“Now we would like to dwell on the question which, in our view, is not only one of the most urgent but appears to be more than other questions ripe for constructive discussion.

“Proper attention was given in Moscow to your words that the U.S. Government and personally President Johnson most seriously view the question of nondissemination of nuclear weapons and that the US is anxious to see to it that nuclear weapons would not come into possession of countries which do not have such weapons now.

“However, we cannot but feel concerned that while the consideration of the question of preventing dissemination of nuclear weapons has reached the stage of discussion of concrete drafts of an appropriate international agreement, there have been reactivated efforts leading in the opposite direction, towards drafting plans for the creation of a NATO nuclear force.

“Our position on this question is absolutely clear: we are against any forms and means of dissemination of nuclear weapons, we stand for true and immediate efforts to solve the problem of nondissemination. In no way can we be blamed for taking any steps which even with a most fault-finding approach would look like disseminating nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union is ready to conclude a treaty on nondissemination of nuclear weapons. We strive for an agreement on an equal basis and seek no special purposes except a firm international understanding to the effect that nuclear weapons should really be not disseminated. If one evaluates the state of affairs objectively, the United States should be no less interested in such an understanding than the Soviet Union.

“In this connection we have to emphasize once again that the plans for creating a NATO nuclear force are the main obstacle in the way of concluding an agreement on nondissemination of nuclear weapons. While explaining the position for the U.S. Government with regard to the plans for creating a NATO nuclear force you have repeatedly stated—and you did so, too, in recent talks with A.A. Gromyko—that the United States considers these plans as a means of preventing the emergence of a national nuclear force in West Germany. Yet, the fact remains: the realization of these plans would not keep West Germany further away from but bring it closer to nuclear weapons. This would mean dissemination of nuclear weapons by bringing them within the reach of precisely those forces which have twice in our time plunged Europe and the whole world into bloody wars.

“No one should ignore the experience of history and forget what attempts to satisfy revanchist claims of German militarism through one concession after another led to in the past. We would like to stress once again that plans to create a multilateral nuclear force or other similar plans to bring nuclear weapons within the reach of West Germany constitute a problem which directly concerns the interests of security of the USSR and states friendly to us. It goes without saying that in that case the Soviet Union and its Allies would take measures to safeguard their security. But implementation of such plans would exclude the possibility of concluding a treaty to ban the spread of nuclear weapons. Such an action would considerably aggravate the situation in Europe and throughout the world, it would greatly damage Soviet-American relations, the state of which, even without this leaves much to be desired.

“Now the moment has come when it is necessary to make up one’s mind, to make a choice. If the United States intends, one way or another, to put into effect the plan to create a NATO nuclear force, any negotiations on the problem of preventing spread of nuclear weapons become devoid of sense and are doomed to failure in advance. But if the U.S. is really willing to prevent further spread of nuclear weapons, it would be possible to start without delay business-like negotiations aimed at working out a mutually acceptable text of a treaty on nondissemination of nuclear weapons. For our part, we are ready for such talks.

“A hope is expressed in Moscow that these considerations of ours will be carefully examined by the U.S. Government and personally by President Johnson.”³

The Secretary stated he would wish to study the statement in detail, but it did not appear to him that the statement represented any movement in the substance of the question. He said it appeared to him that the Soviet Government was raising obstacles without knowing what the problem really was as they could not know the details of any nuclear arrangements since these had not been worked out. He also observed that it was not clear whether the Soviet draft of a non-proliferation treaty excluded existing NATO arrangements.

Dobrynin said that if existing arrangements provided for nuclear proliferation, that the Soviet Union was against them. He said, however, that the Soviet Union was ready to discuss their draft treaty article-by-article. The Secretary said that in conversation with Mr. Foster, Mr. Tsarapkin appeared to make a distinction between delivery vehicles and weapons.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that this matter could be looked at and the text of an agreement could be discussed.

The Secretary said that one thing that struck him was that the Soviets seemed to be nervous about their security with regard to NATO nuclear arrangements that were more secure and more safe than existing arrangements.

Dobrynin observed that this was a matter of judgment.

The Secretary said he was being driven to the conclusion that there was something in the Soviet minds other than proliferation. Dobrynin repeated that the Soviets were prepared to discuss both the American and the Soviet drafts.

The Secretary concluded by stating that he would wish to study the Soviet message but, at first glance, his impression was that it had not changed the situation.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret. Drafted and approved by Thompson (S/AL), October 29. Thompson informed British Ambassador Dean of the Soviet oral message, allowing him to take full notes, November 6. (Memorandum of Conversation; ibid.)
2. Document 97.
3. A November 3 memorandum from Keeny to Bundy transmitting a copy of the memorandum of conversation suggests that Bundy send a copy to President Johnson “with a covering memorandum relating it to the current debate within the Government on MLF problems.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, NPT, U.S. Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, Box 27) A November 23 memorandum from Thompson to Bundy transmitted an ACDA draft of a reply. (Ibid.) A December 3 memorandum from Keeny to Bundy states that “attached statement [in reply to Dobrynin], which is consistent with the full range of solutions to the NATO nuclear sharing problem, is acceptable.” It bears a check mark and a handwritten note “Hold for trip to ranch Dec. 7.” (Ibid.)