Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

34. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, September 25, 1968, 1750Z.

21378/Delto 770. From Vance. Subject: Meeting with Oberemko, Sept. 25.

Ref: A. Paris 21192 (Delto 754); B. Paris 21344 (Delto 767).²

1. Afternoon of September 25 Vance met at Soviet Embassy with Minister-Counselor Oberemko, who is Chargé d’Affaires in Zorin’s absence. Negroponte was also present, and Bogomolov attended on their side.

2. Vance told Oberemko that since their last meeting we had spoken again with Tho and Thuy at today’s tea break. The meeting had been totally unsatisfactory. We had told the North Vietnamese that the subject of which parties will be included in the serious negotiations that would follow the cessation of bombing had become a major roadblock to progress. We had told the DRV side today that an understanding on this subject would be a major factor in facilitating a decision to stop the bombing. We emphasized the word “would” rather than “could” since, at our last meeting, the DRV side had commented on our use of the word “could” as indicating uncertainty. We told DRV he had taken their comments into account and had consulted with Washington and could state that an understanding on the subject would be a major factor in facilitating a decision to stop the bombing. We had said to the DRV that we trusted that what we had said today would clear the roadblock.

3. Vance said that our discussion with Tho and Thuy at today’s tea break had lasted more than an hour and that they had been totally intransigent. We had gotten absolutely nowhere. We have tried from the beginning to be constructive and we had hoped that what we said today would clear the roadblock, but the DRV side has not budged one inch. Vagueness of language is not a problem in view of the change that we had made today. We wondered what Oberemko could tell us today. Vance asked whether Oberemko had heard from his government, and how they viewed the problem.

4. Oberemko said that he had reported Vance’s remarks of September 21 to Moscow and had not yet received a reply. He said he presumed that the matter was under consideration and expected to hear some word in the next couple of days. Vance suggested that Oberemko might also wish to transmit our change from “could” to “would.” Oberemko replied, “Yes, this is a clarification,” and that he would transmit it without delay. Oberemko said he would refrain from any further comment since he knew what we wanted was an answer from Moscow. He said that he thought that the position taken by the DRV remains unchanged, and we have known it for a long time, that is, that the US must unconditionally cease the bombing and all acts of war against the DRV, and then the DRV will be prepared to discuss any question either might wish to raise.

5. Vance said that the question of the GVN inclusion is not one of reciprocity, but is a question of the definition of serious talks. There cannot be serious talks if the GVN representatives are not included in talks regarding the political future of South Viet-Nam. For our part, we are willing to have seated on the DRV side the NLF, the Alliance, or any other group they may wish. The DRV’s unwillingness to accept GVN representation raises grave questions as to their seriousness and whether they merely want to string us along. It does no good for them to call our proposal a demand for reciprocity.

6. Oberemko replied that it was still a condition. Vance said that it was a question of defining what serious talks are. We think the world would be shocked if they knew that the DRV is refusing to include the GVN in talks regarding the political future of South Viet-Nam. This must mean that Hanoi wants to dictate the political future of South Viet-Nam. Vance said that the time has come for the Soviet Government to weigh in on this subject.

7. Oberemko replied that he would communicate the clarification from “could” to “would” which he said was clear to him and to Bogomolov. He said that, it would be useless for him to predict what the reply from Moscow would be, but he would let us know when he gets a reply.

Harriman

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-September 1968. Secret; Nodis; HARVAN/Plus. No transmission time is indicated; the telegram was received at 2:26 p.m.
2. Documents 26 and 32.