Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

33. Telegram From the Embassy in Norway to the Department of State¹

Oslo, September 25, 1968, 1200Z.

6752. 1. This morning (Wednesday, Sept 25) Ridgway and I were given account by Algard and Vraalsen of their dinner conversation with North Vietnamese last night (Sept 24).²

2. Algard told us that he had made a “final effort” over brandy to pin the North Vietnamese down by summing up his understanding of the substance of their visit. Algard told the North Vietnamese that the Norwegians had listened to their presentations with great interest and that he was convinced that the North Vietnamese had a serious approach to the question of peace negotiations if bombing stopped and that if the bombing were stopped the North Vietnamese would take no military advantage particularly in the area in and around the DMZ.

3. In reply the North Vietnamese said that their approach was indeed serious. They also observed that North Vietnamese do not use the words “take advantage” in this context. Algard told us that he thinks the North Vietnamese were trying to convey the impression that they do not think in terms of taking advantage. Algard indicated to us that he considered it useless to pursue the matter since it appeared to him that the North Vietnamese were under instructions to go no further.

4. Summing up his conclusion on the North Vietnamese visit, Algard told us he regarded as most important the facts that North Vietnam had sent a delegation, including a man who came all the way from Hanoi to Oslo, under specific conditions as to secrecy and the role of the GON and that “they played the game.” The North Vietnamese did not attempt to propagandize the public or to contact the local Vietnam Solidarity Committee. Algard believes that while the North Vietnamese “didn’t offer much directly in the way of assurances” the serious manner in which they conducted themselves was, in an “Oriental way” intended to demonstrate that they could play an honest game and that they would be willing to play an honest game if the bombing were stopped. I said I was very disappointed that the North Vietnamese delegation had been either unwilling or unable to give any substantive assurances and Algard admitted that he had hoped for more from them.

5. We now have and are translating the GON notes of their Friday and Saturday meetings with the North Vietnamese.³

Tibbetts

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/OHIO. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Ohio/Plus. Received at 9 a.m. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance from Davidson.
2. Prior to the meeting with DRV officials, Davidson transmitted to the Norwegian Government a message from Rusk to Lyng requesting that he attempt to get the North Vietnamese to remain in Oslo for several more days. (Telegram 243111 to Oslo, September 23; ibid.) Reports of meetings between Davidson and Norwegian officials on their discussions with the North Vietnamese representatives on September 24 are in telegrams 6725, 6737, and 6745 from Oslo, all September 24. (Ibid.) At these meetings, Chan noted that he was unable to remain in Norway and had to leave on September 25. A full translation of the Norwegian notes on their September 24 conversations with the North Vietnamese is in telegram 6808 from Oslo, September 30. (Ibid.)
3. The Norwegian notes of the September 20-21 meetings were transmitted in telegram 6762 from Oslo, September 25. (Ibid.)