Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

32. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, September 25, 1968.

21344/Delto 767. From Harriman and Vance.

1. Tho, Thuy and Lau were present at the tea break.² The tea break lasted an hour and 5 minutes and was devoted entirely to substantive talk.

2. We opened by saying that in our last private talk³ we spent a great deal of time discussing the parties who will be included in the serious negotiations which would follow a cessation of bombing. This subject has become a major roadblock to progress.

3. We said we could state today that an understanding on this subject would be a major factor in facilitating a decision to stop the bombing. We said that they would note that we had used the word “would” rather than “could.” We said that we had taken into consideration their comments at our last meeting on our use of the word “could” as noting uncertainty. We said that we had consulted with Washington and could now tell them that an understanding on the subject would be a major factor in facilitating a decision to stop the bombing. We said we trusted that what we had said today would clear the roadblock.

4. Tho replied that we had different conceptions of what the word “serious” meant. He said they considered talks to be serious when the United States ceased all bombing and other acts of war against the DRV. Tho said that we had a different definition. He said that we wanted to force agreement on the inclusion of the representatives of the GVN before the cessation of bombing and they believed this position to be a demand for reciprocity. Tho said that after the cessation of bombing discussion of who will participate in subsequent talks could be immediately discussed between us. This, Tho said, was a positive proposal on the part of the DRV.

5. We argued the point at great length. We said that the necessity of reaching an understanding on the inclusion of representatives of the GVN was not reciprocity and it did not become reciprocity just because the DRV said it was. We said we had made it quite clear that we were not willing to stop all the bombing and have another delay such as we have experienced before we got down to serious talks. We said that if the bombing were to stop and we came in with the GVN representatives and the DRV refused to join the talks, it would be simply a farce.

6. Tho said he wasn’t trying to force us to accept his definition of reciprocity. He said he would not discuss the matter of GVN participation until after the cessation of bombing and then they would let us know their views.

7. We replied that we were getting a clearer and clearer impression that they were not prepared to let the representatives of the GVN participate in the determination of the political future of SVN. We said that if they were not ready to accept the fact that we would be accompanied by the GVN representatives, then we could only conclude that they were not interested in getting on with serious talks.

8. We said we had consulted with our government and reminded them that we had asked them to consult with theirs. We said that we wanted them to understand that we will have the GVN representatives present with us and if they did not object, then we could make progress. If they objected, then there would be no serious talks.

9. Thuy replied that they had reported to their government and that their government had reiterated that there must first be an unconditional cessation of bombing and then the questions of interest could be discussed.

10. We said that the US had no intention of stopping the bombing and then having another lengthy wrangle. We said we hoped they would consult their government again. Tho replied that they had already consulted their government, and then added, that he had not yet expressed himself on whether or not they agreed on the inclusion of the GVN. He said this would be discussed after the cessation of bombing.

11. We said that we were dissatisfied with their response. We said that it was fundamental with us that neither we nor they are going to impose a political solution on South Vietnam and they must realize that fact. Therefore, GVN must be included. We said we had nothing more to say and that we would be prepared to meet with them on Friday⁴ or any other time during the weekend if they had something to say to us, but there did not seem any point in meeting on Friday as things now stood. Thuy replied that they were ready to meet if we had something to say on Friday, or any later day if either side wished. If not, we would meet next Wednesday.⁵

Harriman

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-September 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis; HARVAN/Plus. No transmission time is indicated; the telegram was received at 11:29 a.m.
2. The full report of the tea break discussions is in telegram 21423/Delto 776 from Paris, September 26. (Ibid.) A summary of the formal session was transmitted in telegram 21345/Delto 768 from Paris, September 25. (Ibid.) Jorden’s notes of the formal meeting are in the Johnson Library, William Jorden Papers, WJJ Notes.
3. See Document 24.
4. September 27. No meeting occurred on that date.
5. October 2; see Document 45.