Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

182. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, November 2, 1968, 2020Z.

41743. Ref: Paris 23320.²

1. The GVN has made it a point, especially during the last (“marathon”) session October 31/November 1,³ that they want to be included in discussions of procedures. However, they also made it clear that the reason they wanted to discuss “ground rules” was that they wished to establish that the NLF is to be considered part of the DRV delegation.

2. They have told us that they will not come to the substantive meetings until there is agreement on procedures. Therefore, it seems to us that it is to our advantage as well as theirs if we can work out the procedural matters with Lau or through the French, and without them, as long as we do so along the lines of the desiderata that we have established in our discussions with the GVN during the last weeks.

3. However, we think we should not hold the first meeting of the “direct and serious talks” without clearly giving the GVN an opportunity to participate. Accordingly, while we have no objection to bilateral talks with the DRV about procedural matters, we urge that the date for the “first meeting” on November 6 be postponed.

4. Our difficulty with having the first meeting appointing a committee to draw up the rules of procedure is that when we tell the GVN what we plan and invite them, they may protest the inclusion of the NLF and not come; or they may come and inject into that meeting their demands that Hanoi admit they are one delegation, and withdraw when Hanoi refuses, only making matters worse. However, we must at all costs invite them to such a procedural meeting, even though this may happen. Otherwise they will charge that in our negotiations here we were opposed to having them come to our preliminary discussion of procedure with Hanoi, yet we were prepared to enter into discussions of procedure with the NLF. We must avoid being put into this position.

5. In view of the negotiating record, which shows a DRV preference for a later plenary meeting, we think it should be possible to persuade them to accept their own erstwhile position with respect to a later date. If they press us, we can simply say that we are not prepared to meet November 6 because the GVN is not yet ready. This has additional merit of being the simple truth.

6. It is of course imperative that there be no flags and name plates on the tables. If in the judgment of our delegation this is better accomplished by working through the French, then we favor the suggestion in paragraph 7(B). The GVN is exceedingly nervous about the press being at the first meeting, and if arrangements can be made to rule this out, it would be helpful here.

Bunker

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/Double Plus, Vol. V. Secret; Flash; Nodis/HARVAN Double Plus. Received at 4:17 p.m. Repeated to Paris.
2. In telegram 23320/Delto 916 from Paris, November 2, the delegation noted that it had postponed that day’s meeting on procedural arrangements between Vance and Lau in order to note and receive guidance on the matters to be discussed at that meeting. Paragraph 7 of the telegram read: “As we have pointed out, physical arrangements for a procedural meeting should be simpler to arrange. If it is to be a plenary meeting we have two choices: (A) to attempt to hammer out the physical arrangements directly with Lau, or (B) to suggest that we work through the French to establish physical arrangements in a manner acceptable to both sides. This was the procedure used at the opening of the Official Conversations.” (Ibid.)
3. See Documents 159, 162, 165, and 170.