Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

170. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, November 1, 1968, 0440Z.

41688. For Secretary from Ambassador Bunker.

1. After talking with you² I immediately went to see President Thieu to report on my final conversation. The Vice President, Foreign Minister, and Presidential Assistant Duc were still with him.

2. I told Thieu the President would not make the announcement as originally planned for 0900 Saigon time, but would make a nationwide speech. The President had decided that he must go ahead. He had informed the three Presidential candidates who all enthusiastically endorsed the course. “The President asked me to say to you that you should not be disheartened or discouraged. He would say some very fine things about Viet Nam in his speech and he wants me to assure you that we intend to continue our firm support of your country and your government. We intend to continue to work together with you to achieve what we set out to do. We are all sorry that we could not be together on this.”

3. Thieu asked me if the TCC countries had been informed of the decision, and I said they were being informed.

4. His further remarks were somewhat disjointed, and I will give them to you as he gave them to me:

A. “I cannot guess whether we will achieve the result we hoped for. Our firm purpose is to have serious talks directly with Hanoi to achieve peace and progress. The most legal right of our government is not to accept serious talks with Hanoi with the NLF as an independent entity.

B. “I never doubted the sincerity of President Johnson and the US Government not to recognize the NLF and its promise to support us in the talks. We have our own problems here. If we had gone into these talks with the NLF it would have meant the disintegration of the nation. The state must have stability, not trouble, not instability; that is our gravest concern.

C. “I am sorry I cannot join the joint announcement. I look forward to the speech of President Johnson before I make any speech to the nation. Please assure President Johnson that I will continue to have the greatest gratitude to him and the US Government. I think we have to await developments now of the situation after we see how we could proceed to find the way to peace with Hanoi.”

5. To this I replied I hope we will find a way out of this situation. We are faced with a practical situation with the NLF, and that is why we proposed the our side/your side formula. It is a fact of life. The NLF is not recognized by you or us, and our whole purpose is to find a way around this problem so as to get on with serious peace talks. That is what we will try to do in the period which lies ahead.³

6. Thieu asked the Vice President if he had anything to say, and he shook his head.

Bunker

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-November 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/HARVAN Double Plus. Received at 12:20 a.m.
2. See footnote 4, Document 167.
3. In telegram 41698 from Saigon, November 1, Bunker reported the verbatim account of an exchange in which Thieu charged that the United States would “not support our position that the other side is one delegation.” In response, Bunker denied this statement and Berger replied: “I said that if you make this a condition for your attendance at the talks, we will not support you. But we will support you in the position that in the negotiations the other side will be treated as one delegation.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET)