Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

183. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, November 3, 1968, 0710Z.

266151/Todel 1466.

1. The parallelogram of forces set up by Paris 23327 and Saigon 41765² leaves little doubt of the answer in terms of Sunday³ meeting.

2. Paris should propose that a bilateral meeting be held on Wednesday to discuss the procedures applicable to substantive meetings in the new format. Any broader meeting for any purpose should be postponed on the simple and true ground that we are not ready. We should propose that the bilateral meeting be in the smaller format used in May, but you have latitude for whatever size and level you think most effective.

3. In terms of arguments, there seem to us to be many:

a. Hanoi agreed to bilateral talks on procedure.

b. Even these turn out to be complex and require careful review of existing rules.

c. The agreement on a substantive meeting was not earlier than the 6th, as Xuan Thuy has now affirmed.

d. The GVN is not ready (and, as reports from Saigon make clear, the last-minute mortaring of Saigon did contribute to the atmosphere there on going along at once).

4. On the question of including the DMZ, you should make clear, as Saigon suggests, that an additional purpose of bilaterals at this time is to review exactly what is going on in SVN. You should make clear that the DMZ is a subject on which we could nail down what both sides are doing and how to be sure of it, and on a bilateral basis—but without pressing for an agenda item, so to speak, for Wednesday.

5. One purpose in raising this general subject and establishing its legitimacy (or at least our intent to keep it up), and doing so on the basis of the DMZ (in addition to the latter being a clear Hanoi responsibility and least a GVN one), is that we are reluctant here to adopt Saigon’s suggestion of hitting them at this meeting on the mortaring of My Tho, Vinh Long, and Quang Tri. The question of whether these are “major cities” within the meaning of our understandings is one on which we need further research and exchanges with Paris in any event; it may be that the record, and what the GVN understands, are both internally inconsistent and at variance with each other, and that we have some hard thinking to do. But even if these cases are within the understandings, the feeling here is that we should be acting and not bellyaching, if we really know our minds.

6. If Lau should fail to accept a bilateral meeting on procedure for Wednesday, you should say that you must urgently seek instructions. But you should give him the toughest possible time, for it seems difficult to see how he can legitimately refuse, even though he may do some taunting at our delay after our earlier insistence on speed and the GVN. As Saigon notes, that is inherent in the hand at this point, and adherence to the letter of what we had in mind in the last stages of the private talks is viewed here as wholly secondary to taking our time to bring Saigon aboard, along the lines of the strategy stated in Saigon 41738.⁴

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/HARVAN Double Plus. Drafted and approved by Bundy and cleared by Rostow, Katzenbach, and Dirk Gleysteen of S/S. Repeated to Saigon.
2. In telegram 23327/Delto 922 from Paris, November 3, Harriman and Vance suggested that the tentative November 6 meeting proceed strictly on procedural matters “if the GVN cannot be brought on board by that time.” In telegram 41765 from Saigon, November 3, Bunker noted his concurrence “that we should propose to Lau a bilateral meeting on procedures,” but recommended that “if this fails I don’t think we need to fix a date for a meeting including the NLF.” (Both in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/Double Plus, Vol. V)
3. November 3.
4. In telegram 41738 from Saigon, November 2, the Embassy recommended various steps that might compel the GVN to attend the expanded peace conference. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-November 1968)