Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, July 26, 1965, 9:18 p.m.

237. Saigon’s 266 and Deptel 236.² There follows rough first draft of possible US position to be stated at a high level concerning augmentation US forces South Viet-Nam. You should show this draft to General Ky in your July 27 meeting and secure his concurrence, as noted final para ref Deptel. In discussion with Ky you should not refer to other related actions (e.g. calling reserves) which may be taken in connection with these deployments but on which final decisions not yet made.

“In this last week the situation in Viet-Nam and the actions it requires have again been reviewed. This has been the most careful and sustained review that has been made at any time since President Johnson took office. The President has discussed the problem with members of the Cabinet—Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Ambassador Goldberg. He has discussed it with distinguished Americans in private life who have earned the thanks of their country by earlier service, like Mr. Arthur Dean and Mr. John McCloy. He has had the advice of two great Ambassadors, Maxwell Taylor and Henry Cabot Lodge. He has talked at length with the leaders of the Senate and the House of Representatives. By personal messages and diplomatic discussions the problem has been reviewed with friends and allies in foreign countries. Out of these deliberations have come three important decisions—

• The first is that US policy and purpose in Viet-Nam are sound and right.
• The second is that the US must now take important additional military measures in support of that policy and purpose.
• The third is that the US should continue and intensify its diplomatic search for peace.

The US purpose and policy in Viet-Nam are right. The US is there to keep a promise. That promise was and is to help the people and Government of South Viet-Nam to help themselves against attack supported from outside. This American commitment must and will be kept—both for its own sake and for its meaning to world peace. For the peace of the world cannot be kept if there is not respect for the given word of the United States of America.

But there is more to it than that. South Viet-Nam is not the only small state which is threatened by external pressure and ambition. It is not the only country menaced by subversion and infiltration and terror. If South Viet-Nam is lost, then others are weakened.

And finally, the US is there because it has a deep and enduring national interest in preventing the Communist conquest of Asia. It seeks nothing in Asia for itself, but the independence of the peoples of Asia is essential to the peace of the world and to American security itself.

In pursuit of these great purposes, the US has supported and sustained its friends in Asia for a quarter of a century, in war and in peace. It has respected their choice of neutrality or alignment. It has respected their right to determine their own political and social systems. It has helped them to resist aggression—whether by open attack as in Korea, or by bombardment and threat as in the Formosa Straits, or by the more complex and destructive methods now in use against Viet-Nam. This course of action has been right, and it is right today.

And now it is necessary that the US increase its effort in Viet-Nam. The battles of the spring and early summer have brought heavy losses to both sides. It is clear that over a period of many months there has been a growth in the infiltration of Communist forces from North Viet-Nam. The armed forces of South Viet-Nam continue to fight with great courage and with growing skill. But they need more help, and they will get it.

Authorization has been given today for the movement to South Viet-Nam of additional forces which will bring US total troop strength in that country to 175,000 men by November. These enlarged forces will provide 34 combat battalions, 24 air squadrons, and 31 helicopter companies. Under the command of General Westmoreland—an officer who has earned the confidence of all his countrymen—these forces will be used where they are needed. And they will fight.

Like every action the US has taken in Viet-Nam, these new deployments are ordered at the request of the Government of Viet-Nam and in support of the efforts of the Vietnamese people themselves. It is fully agreed and understood between that Government and the US that the main effort in South Viet-Nam must still be made by the Vietnamese themselves. Ambassador Taylor has been assured that as US efforts are increased the Vietnamese Government itself is reenforcing its own measures to build up its armed forces and to meet the economic pressures caused by war. That Government is reaffirming its determination and announcing its own programs of increasing action at home, including certain measures in the economic and social fields to enhance the solidarity of the Vietnamese people and their government in their critical efforts.

The decisions announced today are decisions to do what is necessary—and only what is necessary. This has been US policy; it is US policy still. These new and increased actions are made necessary by the growing battlefield action of others.

The ever closer partnership of the US with the people and Government of Viet-Nam is the inevitable answer which the US gives, with them, to the increasing efforts of the attackers. Yet the purpose remains unchanged. And it is a purpose of peace.

While the US does all that is necessary to turn back the attackers in South Viet-Nam, it will do all that is possible to open the path to peaceful settlement. Again and again it has said that it is ready for unconditional discussion. The US and others have made fifteen efforts to get discussion started. These efforts have all been rejected out of hand. But the US will not be discouraged.

In these last days, messages have been sent to all the more than 30 countries that have given concrete evidence of their concern for the people of South Viet-Nam. It has been emphasized again that just as there is need for wider effort to resist aggression, there is equal need for further effort to open doors to peace. America’s friends in these countries know that all their efforts to this end are welcome to the United States.

And the US will do more. Today Ambassador Goldberg has been instructed to consult most urgently with the Secretary General of the United Nations to see if there is not some way in which the good offices of the United Nations can be engaged for peace in Viet-Nam.³ The earlier efforts of the Secretary General have met with rebuff, but no possibility of progress must be overlooked. Ambassador Goldberg will make it entirely plain that the United States continues to hope that a way can be found to bring the United Nations into action in Viet-Nam. The Ambassador will submit a full report on US actions there and its purpose of peace, both formally to the Security Council and informally to all the Delegates who seek to know the US stand. If it proves possible to engage the United Nations in Viet-Nam, the United States will actively support that engagement.

At the same time that the US seeks by every means to start the discussions that can bring peace, it and its friends in South Viet-Nam are making it plain that they are ready for the kind of peace that will be fair and honorable for all. Already in June, the Foreign Minister of Viet-Nam and the Secretary of State of the United States have stated for all to hear the fundamental principles of such a peace:

An end to aggression and subversion.

Freedom for South Viet-Nam to choose and shape its own destiny by democratic principles and without foreign interference.

An end of the military measures now made necessary by aggression, and the removal of foreign military forces from South Viet-Nam.

And effective guarantees for the independence and freedom of the people of South Viet-Nam.

Beyond these principles, it has been made clear that the US looks forward to the day when relations between North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam can be worked out by peaceful means—including a free decision by the peoples of all Viet-Nam on the matter of reunification. These principles imply and include the use of free election under international supervision, just as soon as the end of aggression permits.

These purposes in essence are the purposes of the Geneva Agreements of 1954. The failure of the 1954 Agreements was not in purpose but in practice—not in the quality of the objectives, but in the effectiveness of the instruments. When there is a new settlement in Southeast Asia, it must be based on stronger and more lasting guarantees than those of 1954.

But the purpose of peace remains as the US has stated it. The program of peace remains the same. And the program meets the interests of all who have a stake in Southeast Asia.

For the people of South Viet-Nam—on both sides of the current contest—it will bring opportunity for an active and honorable part in the peaceful life of a freely growing society.

For the people and Government of North Viet-Nam it will bring relief from the burdens of war and a prospect of new and peaceful relations with the people to the south.

For the smaller neighbors of Viet-Nam it will mean an end to the danger of nearby warfare and a widened prospect of peaceful development for the whole area.

For the people and Government on the Mainland of China, this plan of peace contains no threat and no danger.

And on a still wider plane, a peace so clearly fair and reasonable for all can remove a clear obstacle to understanding between all of these who call themselves Communists and all of those who don’t.

For the real future of Southeast Asia is a future of peaceful progress, not a future of contest and conquest. While the US resists aggression—and probes for peace—it is planning for progress. Already there has been an encouraging response to the proposals put forward in April. The prospects for Asian development are good, and US readiness to help has been made plain.

So today America appeals once again to those who have chosen the path of battle. Let them turn from terror to talk, and from subversion to settlement. Let all interested governments go to the conference table and let them bring with them any other parties that they choose. The US will come with its proposals—let them come with theirs. And let diplomacy replace destruction. The first business of such a conference must be to work out terms that can permit an end of fighting. Its final business must be peace. The Government of Viet-Nam and the Government of the United States are ready.

This readiness comes not from weakness but from strength—not from weariness but from resolution. Until there is a settlement and an end of aggression, America’s efforts will go on and they will grow.

The deployments ordered today will be carried out. The Americans who go to Viet-Nam will do their duty. The forces of the United States will carry out the order to resist and to punish aggression. The US is ready for honorable peace, but it will persevere in the hard task of battle until others are ready, too.”

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Unger, cleared in substance by William Bundy and McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Unger.
2. Documents 84 and 88.
3. See Document 99.