Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

90. Notes of Meeting¹

Washington, July 26, 1965, 6:10-6:55 p.m.

PRESENT

• President
• McNamara
• Vice President
• Rusk
• Wheeler
• Ball
• Clifford
• Thompson
• Lodge
• Goldberg
• Raborn
• Helms
• Marks
• Rowan
• Busby
• Bundy
• Valenti

McNamara: Nothing has developed in our intelligence to show us any new data on missile sites.

Thompson: As long as it looks as if the sites are all not Hanoi we are going after, I think their reaction will be mild. We should not say they are manned by Soviets—need to fuzz that up. It would be good if we can tie it in with something else.

President: Would you take out ammunition dumps and sites simultaneously?

McNamara: Take them out separately.

Wheeler: Chiefs would take out all 7 sites at one time. If not, take out 4, 6, 7. There is the possibility that #4 was mixed up in this shoot-down.

President: Why against #4, Bob?

McNamara: #4 is a part of the Hanoi-Haiphong package. It would vex the Soviets. It is not directly associated with Lao Chi and ammunition dump. There is no operational need to take it out. It is too close to the Migs and would increase the number of aircraft in the air. We have never hit a SAM site and there is no need to make a difficult target more difficult. The chances of success are not perfect. They are about 50-50.

President: If you find them, can you destroy them?

McNamara: Yes, if we find them. However, we have narrow field of vision at 500 mph.

President: If you go in, lose planes and fail to get them, how will we look in the eyes of the world?

McNamara: I foresee no problem there.

President: Is SAM like Hawk?

Wheeler: It is a big van, high mass of radar—missiles like Nike-Hercules.

Rusk: Would the cap come in only if Migs react?

Wheeler: Yes.

McNamara: Possibly, because of lack of friend-or-foe identification, they may shoot our planes if they are present.

President: How far away are the Migs?

McNamara: The Migs are 25-40 miles away.

President: What protection do we have against Migs?

Wheeler: Our cap—F4C—8 F104. Two levels of defense.

President: Please summarize the pros and cons of going in to take out SAMs.

McNamara: (Brought situation up to date chronologically)

We think we should take out 6 and 7 because they lie athwart targets on our authorized list. If we don’t, we will give an incorrect reading to Soviets that we are willing to omit targets because of SAMs. It is hard to explain to Congress and the people that we will take out ammo depots but not SAM sites.

Rusk: While these sites are under attack, will radar be on them?

McNamara: Yes. We have changed authorized routes.

President: What about terrain or low level?

McNamara: It is relatively flat in that area.

Rusk: I see some advantage to striking other targets. However, it is unlikely we’ll find anything to hit. They will have moved. I wouldn’t rely on clearing out a path for the future. In terms of signals to the other side, would strike them and other targets quickly.

McNamara: I would not complicate matters by hitting targets simultaneously. That’s very difficult mission.

Lodge: (In response to question from President) I would be in favor of hitting 6 and 7 and hitting ammo targets as soon as practical.

President: Any objections to McNamara’s recommendation to hit?

Ball: No objection to recommendation, but let’s have no illusions that it will not cause tremors of tension around the world. Raise question of whether to take out all sites then troop deployment, etc.

McNamara: If Migs came out to attack us, we must destroy them.

President: Would you pursue in case of fight?

McNamara: No. Right now the orders are to fight only in the air.

Goldberg: In light of danger of Soviet involvement; intelligence is not sure #4 is not involved; not sure SAM is not mobile; I think we ought to know they are there and #6 and #7 are the responsible ones before making this attack.

I would send another memo to attack the target to make sure if they are knocked down that the SAM site is active.

President: You don’t mean sending boys over that SAM site?

Goldberg: Yes.

Raborn: We support Amb. Thompson 100%. Our Soviet experts tell us they are expecting us to come in.

President: If we don’t take them out, I want targets off list. If we do take them out, we can go on to better targets. I don’t want to send boys over those sites where we know they will be shot down. We may be mis-leading Russians again. Kennedy called up reserves and put nation on war footing after Vienna and Soviets understood that. In missile crisis they understood that.

For 20 months we have been restrained—and I don’t want them to misunderstand us. Only pressure we can have is our bombing. We have nothing else to bargain.

Can we find the targets—sites?

Rusk: What happens if we incur additional losses from Migs? We should not make any decisions now to go into Hanoi-Haiphong area. If we do, we will be moving into something by mistake. I would think hard about going into Hanoi to kill Migs.

President: This is not the subject of this meeting. Before we do that, you’ll be heard.

Clifford: We are not going to be pushed out of SVN. We show enemy our determination by taking out #6 and #7.

Bargaining: Most valuable asset NVN has is the industrial complex they have laboriously built. If they think SAMs can protect their industry, they have won an important element. We have no bargaining point if their industry is safe.

If Soviets put their men and material into a situation that knocks down American planes, they must expect retaliation.

Thompson: On balance, I support the recommendation.

Bundy: We ought to examine the way we’ll discuss this decision.

Rowan: We ought to understand that this will increase the “crisis atmosphere”. Every European newspaper takes it for granted that Russians shot down our plane. I say that even though I support the recommendation to knock them out.

The press reaction in Europe is bound to make the Soviets feel they have lost prestige if we knock out the sites.

V. Pres: I’m much impressed with what Clifford said about long term prospects. If these targets are valuable, we have to do something about what blocks us. I am concerned that we have changed emphasis—that we do indeed have mobile units to face.

McNamara: We are over-emphasizing the mobility of these units. They are semi-mobile. They haven’t been mobile in the 99% cases we have examined.

President: How long would it take to go?

Wheeler: If we gave “go” in the next few minutes, we could “go” at about 1 or 2 in the morning our time.

V. Pres: SAM sites #6 and #7 ought to be taken out. Caution: China is not Russia.

Bundy: The conference in Geneva² is primarily nuclear-proliferation oriented.

Valenti: This could be a piece of definitive action that would signal our determination.

President: TAKE THEM OUT.³ (Given at 6:55 pm)

1. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, Box 1. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. The notes were originally handwritten by Valenti and later transcribed.
2. Reference is to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee meetings in Geneva.
3. A situation report prepared in the White House for the President at 11:15 p.m. on July 26 stated that, in response to the President’s order, 44 Air Force strike aircraft were scheduled to attack SAM missile sites 6 and 7 that night. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII, Memos (B)) A subsequent situation report for the President, prepared at 6:40 a.m., July 27, indicated that the SAM sites and their associated barracks had been struck, and the pilots reported the destruction of site 6. The results of the attack on site 7 were not clear. Six F-105 aircraft were reported lost in the attack. (Ibid.) Both reports have indications that the President saw them. On August 3, R.C. Bowman sent a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy in which he noted that the attacks on the SAM sites “may have been a DRV trap.” Site 6, he noted, was evidently a dummy site, and there was probably no equipment at site 7. He added that General Wheeler had proposed to McNamara that strike aircraft be given authority to attack mobile SAM sites wherever they were discovered outside the Hanoi area. (Ibid.)