Office of the Historian

84. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1

Saigon, July 24, 1965, 7:50 p.m.

266. Deptel 218.2 In approaching the matter of obtaining additional commitments from GVN in advance of U.S. statement of expanded military effort, we would divide the matter into two parts; those commitments which we might seek privately and those which we might get GVN to state publicly or allow us to use publicly in U.S.

In private, there would be some advantage in informing the senior GVN officials that prior to undertaking to provide additional military aid we would like to verify following understandings:

A.
Our joint war aims are expressed in general terms in the four points announced by FM Do on June 22.3 We will work together privately in refining and amplifying these general terms, meanwhile will avoid giving any public impression of divergence of views.
B.
We will continue as agreed previously to keep each other informed of policy decisions of mutual interest in advance of public information.
C.
We will cooperate together to control inflation and to end the currency black market. In this regard we agree that there will be no increase in GVN budget or wage increases without prior consultation.
D.
We will always exchange views frankly on the subject of incompetent U.S. or GVN officials who are not performing adequately and will undertake to replace those who are found to be unsatisfactory to the joint effort.
E.
U.S. military forces will be employed as determined by General Westmoreland who will be guided by the White House statement of June 9 (Depcirtel 2470, June 9).4
F.
GVN will take timely action to provide real estate required by U.S. forces.
G.
We will continue to place emphasis on population and resources control.

In presenting this list to Generals Thieu and Ky, we would avoid giving impression of asking for new agreements or imposing conditions for our increased aid commitments but would do so in context of seeking reaffirmation of understandings already explicitly or tacitly reached.

As to a public statement, we believe that one could be prepared which would be acceptable to the GVN, making the following points:

a.
Determination of GVN to put country on a war footing and to control inflation.
b.
Plans to increase forces and reduce desertion.
c.
Recognition of importance of Chieu Hoi.
d.
Reaffirmation of Do’s four points.

To attempt to go beyond the foregoing modest program would probably be unproductive. We do not want to raise conditions in terms likely to be rejected or to require prolonged debate. The private assurances will be no better than subsequent performance which is likely to be spotty. The public statement will be viewed as government propaganda by most observers. We would recommend our taking up the matter in the foregoing terms at our meeting with Ky scheduled for July 27. Meantime we will send the Dept. a draft of the proposed public statement which we will give Ky as a suggested public release.

Taylor
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok eyes only for Ambassador Johnson. Received at 8:21 a.m. on July 25 and passed to the White House.↩
  2. In telegram 218 to Saigon, July 24, the Department of State indicated that it expected an announcement soon of the expanded U.S. military effort in Vietnam and that an essential accompaniment was a clear understanding with the South Vietnamese Government that it would take every possible step to put the country on a war footing. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Not found.↩
  4. The statement is printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 28, 1965, p. 1041.↩