Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

57. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

CM-750-65

Washington, July 14, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Over-all Appraisal of Air Strikes Against North Vietnam through 30 June 1965 (U)

1. (TS) US/RVN air activity against North Vietnam during June 1965 increased by approximately one-third over that performed during May. During June, 86 strikes were made against JCS-designated and special targets. Of these, 78 strikes were flown by US aircraft and eight jointly flow by US/VNAF aircraft. In addition, 69 armed reconnaissance missions were flown against LOCs, targets of opportunity, and coastal shipping.

2. (TS) During the reporting period, DRVMIGs reacted to the presence of our aircraft over North Vietnam on two occasions, both actions resulting in air combat engagements. The first engagement occurred about 45 nm south of Hanoi on 17 June between two Navy F4B Phantom II jet fighters on barrier cap patrol over Thanh Hoa Bridge and Yen Phu Barracks and four MIGs in loose trail formation. The release of a Sparrow AAM from each F4B exploded two of the four MIGs. VHF intercept indicates a third MIG may have been destroyed. Available data indicates the MIGs were engaged in routine training at time of encounter, however, when visual contact was made the MIGs changed heading to collision course with the US fighters. The fourth MIG was observed making direct landing approach to Phuc Yen. In contrast, the second occurrence on 20 June, supported by sequence of events, indicates a deliberate enemy interception effort by two MIG-17/FRESCOs against four A1H Navy aircraft while providing air cover on SAR operation for a downed USAF F4C earlier involved in air attack against Son La Barracks 100 nm west northwest of Hanoi. During an approximate five minute engagement, the MIGs fired unguided rockets at extreme range which burned out before reaching the A1Hs. One MIG was hit and exploded upon crashing. In other activity, enemy reaction has been limited to frequent, intense antiaircraft fire. US losses for the month were 14 aircraft. No VNAF aircraft were lost in June. As of 30 June 1965, 55 US aircraft were lost in air actions against North Vietnam.

3. (TS/NFD) Our air strikes have increased the time required for traffic movements from Hanoi south and have reduced the capacity and flexibility of the national transport system. Motor transportation and coastal shipping requirements have greatly increased. There are some indications that concentration on internal needs has reduced the level of logistic support to the Pathet Lao. The DRV has demonstrated the capability to infiltrate supplies to SVN from the Haiphong area by sea. Movement of military supplies overland and across water obstacles, especially Route 1A, with the advent of the monsoon season will become increasingly difficult and may block routes into Laos. However, it is felt that the capability of the PAVN to perform its mission of (1) defense of homeland, (2) to provide training for its own forces and for infiltration forces for SVN and Laos, and (3) to provide logistic support for its own forces and the Communist forces of SVN and Laos at the present level of activity has not been effected to any appreciable degree. The reduction of road capacity due to attacks of LOC targets in the southern part of the country has however limited the ability of DRV to support any major offensive beyond its own borders into Laos or SVN.

4. (S) The economic effects of the air strikes have been minor in relation to total economic activity of North Vietnam. The combined effects of transportation difficulties, loss of electric power, and disruption caused by actual or anticipated air strikes have probably reduced the rate of total output of the GNP by only a few percentage points. The volume of freight carried on the Thanh Hoa-Vinh rail lines was on the order of 440 short tons each way per day, or less than five percent of the total tonnage carried by the entire railroad system of North Vietnam. Three electric power plants, comprising about nine percent of total national generating capacity, have been rendered inoperable and will probably require at least 12-18 months for restoration. Viewed from the outside, the economic effects of the air strikes do not seem to amount to much. However, Hanoi probably has a different view. The damaged and destroyed bridges and power plants represent years of construction work which was made possible only with foreign assistance. Costs of reconstruction of the bridges, power plants, and POL storage facilities will represent about four percent of total annual investment. However, the country is barely self-sufficient in food, industrial output is small, and there are ambitious plans for economic expansion. There are strains in all elements of the economy and any disruptions add to the serious problems faced by the regime.

5. (S/LD/NFD) Assessment of the effect of our air activity on the attitudes of the North Vietnamese Government and people is based on reports received by Free World sources and from statements made by DRV officials and citizens. From an analysis of available evidence there is nothing to indicate definitely that the bombings have caused either physical damage or lowered morale to an extent that would compel the DRV to negotiate. The bombings may be factors in some reports that the North Vietnamese Government is perhaps slightly more willing to discuss a settlement. It might be conjectured, however, that a concern for preventing escalation of hostilities is another factor—and a strong one in the case of the Soviet Bloc pressure that is manifested in reported conversations in various parts of the world. Postal intercepts indicate that despite some economic upset, destruction, and suffering, there is a spirit of resistance to the air strikes.

6. (TS/NFD) In summary, the DRV still seems ready to endure further air strikes. DRV logistic support problems in southern North Vietnam have increased and further reduction of an ability to support external overt aggression has taken place. However, the strikes have not yet reduced DRV over-all military capabilities to train and support covert infiltration to South Vietnam. Preoccupation with their own internal defense, however, has affected the level of their logistic support to the Pathet Lao. Similarly, expanded civil defense duties, if prolonged, may prevent achievement of agricultural production goals—a problem of chronic concern in North Vietnam. Nevertheless, the regime at this point appears determined to persevere in its present course of action.

7. (U) At Tabs A through D are more detailed discussion of specific aspects.²

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ADMIN Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 381. Top Secret.
2. None printed.