Office of the Historian

56. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1

Saigon, July 13, 1965, 3:10 p.m.

123. Crop destruction. Following is evaluation of past crop destruction missions and recommendations for new guidelines.

1. Evaluation. Rand Corporation has prepared preliminary report (being pouched)2 of impressions of interviews with 33 VC captives and defectors who had experienced or observed effects of defoliation and crop destruction. Report states that spray operations have successfully destroyed crops grown by VC production units, further reducing already scarce food supply for VC combat units and forcing VC to seek food elsewhere. On the other hand, report states that spraying of crops belonging to civilians and popular belief that sprays are harmful to humans have had “significant adverse effect” on population’s attitude toward GVN and US.

MACV, however, points out that Rand findings are based on comparatively small sampling and that other intelligence sources do not support conclusion that adverse effect of chemical crop destruction has been sufficiently extensive to be described as significant. MACV also points out that Rand findings do not reflect procedures instituted recently to assure that psywar operations planned in connection with herbicide operations are in fact carried out.

MACV has drafted evaluation of crop destruction in three major VC areas since July 1964, which will be pouched as soon as staffing completed. According to MACV evaluation, Binh Thuan operation (summer 1964) destroyed 80 percent of VC crops in area, forcing VC into open to steal or purchase food. Psywar program drew 252 people out of an area in which previous psywar efforts had been singularly unsuccessful. Psywar [Page 142] teams successfully demonstrated to population that VC had failed to live up to their promises of protection.

Phuoc Long and Phuoc Thanh operation (October 1964) destroyed 3085 hectares of VC crops. There was confusion and lowering of morale among VC and supporters following spraying, and reduction in VC ability to conduct operations. Fact that only three hundred people were resettled from a much larger number of potential refugees attributed to lack of more aggressive psywar program.

Binh Dinh operation (April-May 1965) destroyed 3145 hectares of VC crops. Three hundred sixty people have been resettled, and many more are dissatisfied but forcibly detained by VC, creating definite anti-VC feeling in area. This is substantiated by reported murder of two VC cadre by villagers.

Available information, which thus far continues to be scanty, indicates following:

1.
Chemical crop destruction has caused hardship to VC.
2.
VC have attempted with limited success to turn peasant fear of unknown chemicals and loss of food against GVN. But Rand report found no evidence population has joined VC because of herbicide operations.
3.
When VC experience food shortage, initial reaction is to make greater food demands on population, who therefore frequently bear brunt of loss. But even if VC succeed in this objective, it necessitates (a) creating ill will among peasant population through seizing and taxing methods; (b) diversion of increased percentage of VC manpower from military activity to food production; (c) in some cases movement of VC units into open area in search of food, making them more vulnerable to GVN action and decreasing VC offensive capability. Rand and MACV estimate one-third to one-half of VC manpower devoted to food production.

Mission has come to recommendations below based on these findings and following considerations:

1.
Conditions of war are hardening. Areas tightly controlled by VC pose dilemma for GVN forces which are faced with alternatives of (a) abandoning area and its population; (b) striking with aerial bombardment and strafing; (c) undertaking ground operations supported by air strikes and artillery; or (d) destroying food and thus starving VC and population out. Viewed in this context, Mission considers chemical crop destruction poses comparatively less risk to civilian population in area.
2.
To be truly effective, operations must destroy all food in fairly extensive area.
3.
Most effective areas for crop destruction are now northern and central highlands, which are among most critical areas of expected VC summer offensive.
4.
There will undoubtedly be some resentment on part of population whose crops are destroyed. It is therefore crucial that this resentment be directed against VC rather than GVN. Rand evidence indicates need still exists for increased psywar/civil affairs program. MACV is actively pursuing this issue. Future operations will be approved here unless increased emphasis on psywar support is planned in each operation.

Mission therefore recommends:

1.
Extension of crop destruction operations sufficiently to result in major VC food denial.
2.
That Department’s guidelines (Deptel 1055, May 7, 1963)3 be amended to permit operations in less remote and more populated areas, provided they are strongly VC dominated and provided each operation offers significant military gain.

Taylor
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.↩
  2. Not found.↩
  3. Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. III, pp. 274–275.↩