Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

40. Paper by the Under Secretary of State (Ball)¹

Washington, undated.

A COMPROMISE SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIET-NAM

1. A Losing War: The South Vietnamese are losing the war to the Viet Cong. No one can assure you that we can beat the Viet Cong or even force them to the conference table on our terms no matter how many hundred thousand white foreign (US) troops we deploy.

No one has demonstrated that a white ground force of whatever size can win a guerrilla war—which is at the same time a civil war between Asians—in jungle terrain in the midst of a population that refuses cooperation to the white forces (and the SVN) and thus provides a great intelligence advantage to the other side. Three recent incidents vividly illustrate this point:

(a) The sneak attack on the Danang Air Base which involved penetration of a defense perimeter guarded by 9,000 Marines. This raid was possible only because of the cooperation of the local inhabitants.

(b) The B-52 raid that failed to hit the Viet Cong who had obviously been tipped off.

(c) The search-and-destroy mission of the 173rd Airborne Brigade which spent three days looking for the Viet Cong, suffered 23 casualties, and never made contact with the enemy who had obviously gotten advance word of their assignment.

2. The Question to Decide: Should we limit our liabilities in South Viet-Nam and try to find a way out with minimal long-term costs?

The alternative—no matter what we may wish it to be—is almost certainly a protracted war involving an open-ended commitment of US forces, mounting US casualties, no assurance of a satisfactory solution, and a serious danger of escalation at the end of the road.

3. Need for a Decision Now: So long as our forces are restricted to advising and assisting the South Vietnamese, the struggle will remain a civil war between Asian peoples. Once we deploy substantial numbers of troops in combat it will become a war between the United States and a large part of the population of South Viet-Nam, organized and directed from North Viet-Nam and backed by the resources of both Moscow and Peiping.

The decision you face now, therefore, is crucial. Once large numbers of US troops are committed to direct combat they will begin to take heavy casualties in a war they are ill-equipped to fight in a non-cooperative if not downright hostile countryside.

Once we suffer large casualties we will have started a well-nigh irreversible process. Our involvement will be so great that we cannot—without national humiliation—stop short of achieving our complete objectives. Of the two possibilities I think humiliation would be more likely than the achievement of our objectives—even after we had paid terrible costs.

4. A Compromise Solution: Should we commit US manpower and prestige to a terrain so unfavorable as to give a very large advantage to the enemy—or should we seek a compromise settlement which achieves less than our stated objectives and thus cut our losses while we still have the freedom of maneuver to do so?

5. Costs of Compromise Solution: The answer involves a judgment as to the costs to the United States of such a compromise settlement in terms of our relations with the countries in the area of South Viet-Nam, the credibility of our commitments and our prestige around the world. In my judgment, if we act before we commit substantial US forces to combat in South Viet-Nam we can, by accepting some short-term costs, avoid what may well be a long-term catastrophe. I believe we have tended greatly to exaggerate the costs involved in a compromise settlement. An appreciation of probable costs is contained in the attached memorandum. (Tab A)

6. With these considerations in mind, I strongly urge the following program:

• A. Military Program

  (1) Complete all deployments already announced (15 battalions) but decide not to go beyond the total of 72,000 men represented by this figure.

  (2) Restrict the combat role of American forces to the June 9 announcement,² making it clear to General Westmoreland that this announcement is to be strictly construed.

  (3) Continue bombing in the North but avoid the Hanoi-Haiphong area and any targets nearer to the Chinese border than those already struck.

• B. Political Program

  (1) In any political approaches so far, we have been the prisoners of whatever South Vietnamese Government was momentarily in power. If we are ever to move toward a settlement it will probably be because the South Vietnamese Government pulls the rug out from under us and makes its own deal or because we go forward quietly without advance pre-arrangement with Saigon.

  (2) So far we have not given the other side a reason to believe that there is any flexibility in our negotiating approach. And the other side has been unwilling to accept what in their terms is complete capitulation.

  (3) Now is the time to start some serious diplomatic feelers, looking towards a solution based on some application of the self-determination principle.

  (4) I would recommend approaching Hanoi rather than any of the other probable parties (the National Liberation Front, Moscow or Peiping). Hanoi is the only one that has given any signs of interest in discussion. Peiping has been rigidly opposed. Moscow has recommended that we negotiate with Hanoi. The National Liberation Front has been silent.

  (5) There are several channels to the North Vietnamese but I think the best one is through their representative in Paris, Mai Van Bo. Initial feelers with Bo should be directed toward a discussion both of the four points we have put forward and the four points put forward by Hanoi as a basis for negotiation. We can accept all but one of Hanoi’s four points and hopefully we should be able to agree on some ground rules for serious negotiation—including no pre-conditions.

  (6) If the initial feelers lead to further secret exploratory talks we can inject the concept of self-determination that would permit the Viet Cong some hope of achieving some of their political objectives through local elections or some other device.

  (7) The contact on our side should be handled through a non-governmental cutout (possibly a reliable newspaperman who can be repudiated.)

  (8) If progress can be made at this level the basis can be laid for a multi-national conference. At some point obviously the government of South Viet-Nam will have to be brought on board but I would postpone this step until after a substantial feeling out of Hanoi.

  (9) Before moving to any formal conference we should be prepared to agree that once the conference is started (a) the United States will stand down its bombing of the North, (b) the South Vietnamese will initiate no offensive operations in the South, and (c) the DRV will stop terrorism and other aggressive acts in the South.

  (10) Negotiations at the conference should aim at incorporating our understanding with Hanoi in the form of a multi-national agreement guaranteed by the United States, the Soviet Union and possibly other parties, and providing for an international mechanism to supervise its execution.

George W. Ball

Attachment A³

PROBABLE REACTIONS TO THE CUTTING OF OUR LOSSES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM

We have tended to exaggerate the losses involved in a compromise settlement in South Viet-Nam. There are three aspects of the problem which should be considered:

• First, the local effect of our action on nations in or near Southeast Asia.
• Second, the effect of our action on the credibility of our commitments around the world.
• Third, the effect on our position of world leadership.

A. Effect on Nations in or Near Southeast Asia

Free Asian reactions to a compromise settlement in South Viet-Nam would be highly parochial, with each country interpreting the event primarily in terms of (a) its own immediate interest, (b) its sense of vulnerability to Communist invasion or insurgency, and (c) its confidence in the integrity of our commitment to its own security based on evidence other than that provided by our actions in SVN.

Within this framework, the following groupings emerge:

1. The Republic of China and Thailand, staunch allies whose preference for extreme U.S. actions, including a risk of war with Communist China, sets them apart from all other Asian nations;

2. The Republic of Korea and the Philippines, equally staunch allies whose support for strong U.S. actions short of a war with Communist China would make post-settlement reassurance a pressing U.S. need;

3. Japan, an ally that would prefer wisdom to valor in an area remote from its own interests where escalation could involve its Chinese or Russian neighbors, or both;

4. Laos, a friendly neutral dependent on a strong Thai-US guarantee of support in the face of increased Vietnamese-Pathet Lao pressures;

5. Burma and Cambodia, suspicious neutrals whose fear of antagonizing Communist China would increase their leaning toward Peking in a conviction that the US presence is not long for Southeast Asia; and

6. Indonesia, whose opportunistic marriage of convenience with both Hanoi and Peking would carry it further in its covert aggression against Malaysia, convinced that “foreign imperialism” is a fast fading entity in the region.

Of these varied reactions, the critical importance of Japan and Thailand calls for more detailed examination.

Japan

According to our Embassy, Japanese public opinion is largely unreceptive to our interpretation of the situation in Viet-Nam. Many if not most Japanese consider that the US is endeavoring to prop up a tottering government that lacks adequate indigenous support. Public media stress the civil war aspects of the struggle, portray Hanoi’s resistance as determined and justified, and question our judgment as to the dangers of an eventual war with Communist China.

The government as such supports our strong posture in Viet-Nam but stops short at the idea of a war between the US and China. Governmental leadership can—to a considerable extent—influence the public reaction in Japan. Government cooperation would, therefore, be essential in making the following points to the Japanese people: (1) US support was given in full measure, as shown by our casualties, our expenditures, and our risk-taking; and (2) the US record in Korea shows the credibility of our commitment so far as Japan is concerned.

Thailand

Thai commitments to the struggles in Laos and South Viet-Nam are based upon a careful evaluation of the regional threat to Thailand’s security. The Thais are confident that they can contain any threats from Indochina alone. They know, however, that they cannot withstand the massive power of Communist China without foreign assistance.

Unfortunately, the Thai view of the war has seriously erred in fundamental respects. They believe American power can do anything, both militarily and in terms of shoring up a Saigon regime. They now assume that we really could take over in Saigon and win the war if we felt we had to. If we should fail to do so the Thais would initially see it as a failure of US will.

Yet time is on our side, provided we employ it effectively. Thailand is an independent nation with a long national history and—unlike South Viet-Nam—an acute national consciousness. It has few domestic Communists and none of the instability that plagues its neighbors, Burma and Malaysia. Its one danger area, in the Northeast, is well in hand so far as preventive measures against insurgency are concerned. Securing the Mekong Valley will be critical in any long-run solution, whether by the partition of Laos, with Thai-US forces occupying the western half, or by some cover arrangement. Provided we are willing to make the effort, Thailand can be a foundation of rock and not a bed of sand on which to base our political-military commitment to Southeast Asia.

South Korea

As for the rest of the Far East, the only serious point of concern might be South Korea. But if we stop pressing the Koreans for more troops to Viet-Nam (the Vietnamese show no desire for additional Asian forces since it affronts their sense of pride) we may be able to cushion Korean reactions to a compromise in South Viet-Nam by the provision of greater military and economic assistance. In this regard, Japan can play a pivotal role now that it has achieved normal relations with South Korea.

B. Effecton the Credibility of Our Commitments Around the World

With the exception of the nations in the Southeast Asian area, a compromise settlement in South Viet-Nam should not have a major impact on the credibility of our commitments around the world. Quite possibly President De Gaulle will make propaganda about perfidious Washington, but even he will be inhibited by his much-heralded disapproval of our activities in South Viet-Nam.

Chancellor Erhard has told us privately that the people of Berlin would be concerned by a compromise settlement in South Viet-Nam. But this was hardly an original thought and I suspect he was telling us what he believed we would like to hear. After all, the confidence of the West Berliners will depend more on what they see on the spot than on news of events half way around the world. They have much to gain by the prevention of a confrontation between East and West elsewhere and by the gradual developments of a spirit of entente that might pave the way for ultimate reunification.

In my observation, the principal anxiety of our NATO allies is that we have become too preoccupied with an area which seems to them an irrelevance and may be tempted to neglect our NATO responsibilities. Moreover, they have a vested interest in an easier relationship between Washington and Moscow.

By and large, therefore, they would be inclined to regard a compromise solution in South Viet-Nam more as new evidence of American maturity and judgment than of American loss of face.

These would be the larger and longer-term reactions of the Europeans. In the short run, of course, we could expect some cat-calls from the sidelines and some vindictive pleasure on the part of Europeans jealous of American power. But that would, in my view, be a transient phenomenon with which we could live without sustained anguish.

Elsewhere around the world, I would see few unhappy implications for the credibility of our commitments. No doubt the Communists will try to gain propaganda value in Africa, but I cannot seriously believe that the Africans care too much about what happens in Southeast Asia.

Australia and New Zealand are, of course, special cases since they feel lonely in the far reaches of the Pacific. Yet even their concern is far greater with Malaysia than with South Viet-Nam, and the degree of their anxiety would be conditioned largely by expressions of our support for Malaysia.

C. Effect on Our Position of World Leadership

On balance I believe we would more seriously undermine the effectiveness of our world leadership by continuing the war and deepening our involvement than by pursuing a carefully plotted course toward a compromise solution. In spite of the number of powers that have—in response to our pleading—given verbal support from feelings of loyalty and dependence, we cannot ignore the fact that the war is vastly unpopular and that our role in it is perceptibly eroding the respect and confidence with which other nations regard us. We have not persuaded either our friends or allies that our further involvement is essential to the defense of freedom in the Cold War. Moreover, the more men we deploy in the jungles of South Viet-Nam, the more we contribute to the growing world anxiety and mistrust.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII, Memos (C). Top Secret. Sent by Ball to McGeorge Bundy on July 1, with a covering note indicating that the paper was “for inclusion in your book for the President.” Also printed in The Pentagon Papers: New York Times Edition, pp. 449-454.
2. See vol. II, Document 339.
3. Top Secret.