Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

41. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, July 1, 1965.

A “MIDDLE WAY” COURSE OF ACTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

This memorandum advocates the following military decisions as the basis for US action during the next two months:

a. Complete the deployment of the balance of the Marine force at Da Nang (early July), and of the additional six battalions from the 1st and 101st Divisions (July 15 and July 28). This would bring combat strength to 18 battalions, and overall US strength to about 85,000.

b. Revise the current decision on the Air Mobile Division so that this division is alerted and could be sent to South Vietnam three weeks after decision at any time, but not decide now that it will in fact be sent.

c. Start now to weed out and prepare for deployment as many combat units as possible to meet the possible military need for 44 combat battalions by the end of the year, but defer any decision on deploying these units and on calling up major reserve units. (DOD should supply the time factors and indicate whether and to what extent such deferral would prevent our meeting the possible force needs if we later decided to do so.)

d. Continue to avoid the urban areas of Hanoi and Haiphong in our bombing of the DRV, being prepared to attack SAM sites and airfields if but only if they are used to inflict militarily significant losses on us. Hitting these cities would not now lead Hanoi to give in but might on the contrary toughen it. It would almost certainly lose us the support of such key governments as the UK and Japan. Above all, it would inevitably intensify the Soviet commitment and probably remove the chance of the Soviets exerting restraint in the fall.

e. Defer decision on mining North Vietnamese harbors and/or cutting the rail and road lines from China to North Vietnam. The harbor operation would tend to throw North Vietnam into the arms of Communist China and diminish Soviet influence. The rail and road operation could be useful added pressure but should be held in reserve; it would have much more effect if it came after a summer stalemate, and it cannot affect DRV capabilities in the short term or perhaps to any major degree.

f. Maximum air action in the South, including B-52’s.

This military program would be accompanied by every effort to galvanize the political and economic programs of the Ky Government, in the direction of “maximum revolution and reform, but minimum repression.” We would be preparing the way for a really major reform and amnesty program to be launched in the fall if the monsoon offensive is blunted so that such action would not have a note of weakness.

The program also involves the possibility of discreet contacts with Hanoi, and cut-out contacts (not identified with the US) with the Liberation Front. These would not be with any serious negotiating expectations, but to open channels and to soften both up by playing on Hanoi’s fear of Peiping and the possible Liberation Front fear of being totally under Hanoi’s domination.

In essence, this is a program to hold on for the next two months, and to test the military effectiveness of US combat forces and the reaction of the Vietnamese army and people to the increasing US role. Basic to the program is that US combat forces would be employed on a fairly strict interpretation of the June 9 White House statement, used in combat as reserves where a battle has been or can be joined and US military advantages are greatest, not in general countryside operations.

The program rejects withdrawal or negotiating concessions in any form, and equally rejects a present decision to raise our force level above about 85,000. The latter appears unwise because:

a. We have not tested whether our forces can really find and hit the VC. This program gives us enough reserves to give a fair test.

b. We simply do not know, and probably cannot now know, whether raising the US force level and combat involvement to the point where we take over much of the combat load would (1) cause the Vietnamese government and especially the army to let up; (2) create adverse popular reactions to our whole presence, on “white men” and “like the French” grounds. So far things have been all right while we were sticking to secure areas and were not in combat; we just don’t know what will happen when we start fighting and are in contact with the people in disputed areas. At some point, we could be playing into VC hands, and negating immediate military results, thus getting into a truly disastrous situation. Again, what we need now is to test; perhaps, these fears will be groundless, but we lose little by waiting, compared to the risks. And these risks are affected by pace and timing; we might be readily accepted if we moved gradually, but arouse the world fears and adverse reactions if we moved fast.

c. While military effectiveness is the basic reason for holding at about 85,000, we must also reckon the Congressional and public opinion problems of embarking now on what might appear clearly to be an open-ended ground commitment. The present rationale of meeting the monsoon offensive and balancing DRV regulars has put us on a solid and sober footing for 85,000; any major increases would require a much broader base and explanation.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII, Memos (C). Top Secret. Included in memoranda sent to the President by McGeorge Bundy on July 1; see Document 43. William Bundy later recalled that this memorandum was sent to the President at the latter’s request. Bundy drafted it after helping Ball prepare his June 28 paper (Document 26) advocating U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Bundy could not agree with that conclusion, and was influenced by U. Alexis Johnson, who believed that military reports from Vietnam were too bleak and that the introduction of more than 15 U.S. battalions would cause serious problems for the South Vietnamese Government. Accordingly, Bundy concluded that “there must be a presentation to the President of a military operation looking not to early compromise on the most crucial issue, but to a genuine trial period to see if the South Vietnamese were tough and American forces effective.” The memorandum printed here was a summary of a longer memorandum, dated June 29, entitled “Holding On in South Vietnam,” which was discussed on June 30 by the senior review group that earlier had discussed Ball’s June 28 paper. (Johnson Library, Papers of William P. Bundy, Ch. 26, p. 26 and Ch. 27, p. 7) Bundy’s June 29 memorandum is ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV.