Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

39. Paper by Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, July 1, 1965.

VIET-NAM

1. U.S. Objective

The central objective of the United States in South Viet-Nam must be to insure that North Viet-Nam not succeed in taking over or determining the future of South Viet-Nam by force. We must accomplish this objective without a general war if possible.

The “war aim” of the United States is not concerned with what the South Vietnamese would do if they were left alone. There are many problems in the country which only the South Vietnamese can solve. U.S. forces are present in South Viet-Nam only because of the aggression of Hanoi in sending men and arms into the South. If this aggression were removed, U.S. forces could be withdrawn. We would not use U.S. forces to settle issues in South Viet-Nam among the Buddhists, Catholics, the sects, the local Chinese and Cambodian communities, the Montagnards, and the genuinely “indigenous” Viet Cong. The sole basis for employing U.S. forces is the aggression from the North.

2. U.S. Commitments

There can be no serious debate about the fact that we have a commitment to assist the South Vietnamese to resist aggression from the North. If the South Vietnamese were to ask us to withdraw our help, we would have to do so. There is no present likelihood that they will do so.

The integrity of the U.S. commitment is the principal pillar of peace throughout the world. If that commitment becomes unreliable, the communist world would draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war. So long as the South Vietnamese are prepared to fight for themselves, we cannot abandon them without disaster to peace and to our interests throughout the world.

3. Comment on the present situation

There is no question but that the situation in South Viet-Nam is critical. It is said that we are “losing”; this means that we are not making headway, but rather falling behind, in the effort to stop the infiltration and to pacify the country. But that does not mean that the Viet Cong are “winning”; they have the power to disrupt, but they are not capable of occupying and organizing the country or any major part of it. The Viet Cong can be denied a victory, even if complete pacification will be a long and tortuous prospect.

4. The Risks

There are obvious risks in any engagement between free and communist countries, especially where large communist countries are contiguous to the area of conflict. But these risks are present for the communists as well. If they discover that we are less resolved than they, the prospect for the future is exceedingly dark. Moscow and Peiping do not wish a general war with us over Southeast Asia. Our problem, therefore, is to deny to Hanoi success in South Viet-Nam without taking action on our side which would force the other side to move to higher levels of conflict. If they decide to move to a larger war rather than fail to absorb South Viet-Nam, we could not shrink from that eventuality; but such a decision on their part does not appear likely. It is least likely in relation to what we do in South Viet-Nam.

5. Main Courses of Action

a. Maximum South Vietnamese effort.

We must use the leverage of U.S. presence and assistance to insist that South Vietnamese leaders declare a moratorium on their bickering and knuckle down to the increased effort needed to defeat the Viet Cong. They must be told bluntly that they cannot take us for granted but must earn our help by their own performance.

b. A level of U.S. effort in South Viet-Nam, as a supplement to the best the South Vietnamese can do, to deny a Viet Cong success.

Even present levels of U.S. forces are not yet reflected in corresponding damage to the Viet Cong. Reinforcements now in course should open the way to a war plan to engage concentrations of Viet Cong with punishing effect.

c. Maintenance of present character of air action against North Viet-Nam, both for its practical effects and to establish that there is no sanctuary for participants in the war.

The elimination of the sanctuary is the principal brake upon direct Chinese participation. We should not, for the present, attack targets in the immediate Hanoi-Haiphong area. Priority should be given to any need for air strikes on targets in South Viet-Nam.

d. Intensify the mobilization of “other flags” in support of South Viet-Nam.

e. Pursue our readiness to seek a peaceful solution through any available channel.

f. Initiate as soon as possible the “Acheson Plan” in South Viet-Nam; if not for the entire country, perhaps in the III and IV Corps, or in selected provinces around Saigon.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII. Top Secret. According to William Bundy, Rusk did not circulate this paper before submitting it to the President. (Johnson Library, Papers of William P. Bundy, Ch. 27, p. 11)