Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

229. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson ¹

Washington, December 14, 1965, 7:45 p.m.

RE

• Broodings on Vietnam

As I said on Saturday,² I think the moment of truth on peaceful moves before Christmas is likely to be Friday morning³ after Dean Rusk’s return. (Bob McNamara gets back Wednesday night, but Dean is spending another day on a long scheduled visit to Madrid.) As of Saturday, Rusk and McNamara and all their top subordinates were strongly favorable to the pause. Rusk himself has moved steadily and strongly in that direction over the last two weeks, although he wants you to be absolutely certain that whatever you decide will also be his recommendation. The arguments are wearisomely familiar to you, but the interesting thing to me is that people with very different basic views of the course of the war think that a pause would help now. And no one believes, either that the other side can trap us or that a two-week pause in the North would weaken us in the South.

Today Bill Moyers and George Ball and I have discussed the wider proposal of a cease-fire and a peace mission to Hanoi in accordance with your instruction to Bill this morning. This is an idea which has real attractions and real disadvantages. We will be working on it some more tomorrow with Cy Vance, because it turns out—not for the first time—that the people in Defense have done more staff work in this peace proposal than the people in State.

The possible advantages of a cease-fire are these:

1. To the degree that it is respected by the other side, our casualties stop;

2. We get a chance to emphasize peaceful actions and to go about the work of relief and reconstruction, and other works of peace. If the other side allowed such free movement, we should be able to make some money in the countryside. If they did not, it would be plainly their fault.

3. If the cease-fire is rejected—which is quite possible—the international political rewards are very great indeed.

4. If the cease-fire is accepted, the chances of turning the whole business toward the peace table are considerably greater than they would be with a pause.

The disadvantages a cease-fire offers are also serious:

1. The Chiefs and Lodge and Westmoreland would all be unanimously and very strongly opposed. They would use some or all of the arguments that follow.

2. The whole object of our deployment is to get the initiative against the Viet Cong. A cease-fire would hand it back to them and allow them to rest, refit, regroup, retrain, and redouble their resistance after the fighting begins again.

3. A cease-fire would gravely shake the morale of the GVN and of the people in Saigon. It would also reopen the whole question of U.S. determination, doubts of which were so near the center of the crisis in morale a year ago.

4. A cease-fire offer could convey a very bad signal of apparent weakness to Hanoi. (I don’t quite believe in this one myself because if we ourselves use a cease-fire to move around the countryside, we can make things very tough for Hanoi and the Viet Cong both.)

5. If the South Vietnamese stop fighting, it may be very hard to get them to start again.

My own personal worry about a cease-fire right now is that I doubt if we can get organized to do it right in the short time between now and Christmas. I also believe that it is a card which we can play a little better some distance down the road than we can today. I believe the pause is both easier to defend and easier to execute, and I do not believe that it carries unacceptable costs with the troops in the field or public opinion. I feel this far more strongly because I am quite certain that with careful explanation of the need for a pause as a prelude to cease-fire, we can get the solid support of both Westmoreland and Eisenhower and if they are with us, I do not fear those who are against us.

McG. B.

P. S. George Ball made an interesting argument this afternoon to the effect that it would be a very good thing for us all if we could get out of bombing in the North altogether. He was talking from rough notes, and I asked him to leave them with me for my instruction. Because of your interest in every aspect of this problem, I think they may interest you too, and I attach them at Tab A.

Attachment⁴

VIET-NAM

Original purpose of bombing North:

1. Primarily to improve morale in South.

2. To interdict movement of supplies to South.

3. To persuade Hanoi to quit or to come to conference table.

Present consequences of bombing:

1.Is it fulfilling purposes?

a. Not needed to raise morale in South with massive troop deployments.

b. Not effective to reduce flow of supplies below critical level although it raises cost.

c. It is not breaking popular will of Hanoi but is uniting country against U.S.

2. Unfavorable aspects:

a. Driving Soviet and Peking together when we should be splitting them since Soviets want a pause.

b. Prevents possibility of settlement since Communist cannot settle in the face of US bombardment of socialist state.

c. Enormously raises the dangers of escalation—already signs of creeping involvement on both Chinese and Soviet sides.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XVII. Top Secret; Sensitive. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw the memorandum.
2. December 11.
3. December 17.
4. No classification marking. A handwritten note at the top of the source text reads: “G. Ball’s informal notes on bombing.”