Office of the Historian

228. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Califano) to President Johnson1

Washington, December 13, 1965, 9:45 p.m.

I appreciate the magnitude and the difficulty of the decisions you now face in respect to Vietnam. Although I do not want to complicate [Page 638] your problems or impinge upon the roles of your primary advisers in the national security area, I have myself given a lot of thought to this over the past week-end as a result of the meetings last week. For what they are worth, my views are as follows.

The more I think about it, the more I am opposed to a pause in the bombing as the dramatic gesture for peace. I think it is very difficult for a President to order such a pause when the Joint Chiefs of Staff are unanimously opposed to it and when they (to some degree) base their opposition on the ground that the bombing is effective in supporting the effort of 200,000 American boys on the ground in South Vietnam. Further, I think many Americans, including many influential Congressmen, would raise vigorous objections to such a pause and would become aware through one means or another (and through no fault of the Chiefs) of the JCS views. Finally, I fear that Hanoi may be able to place us in the position of protracted but totally non-productive negotiations with our men still fighting on the ground—only so long as we do not resume bombing. By shrewd diplomacy, they may be able to present us with the dilemma of denying us the benefits of bombing through such pseudo-negotiations or putting the onus of breaking off such negotiations on us for resumption of bombing.

Nevertheless, I believe some dramatic peace gesture is necessary. In part, it can be the trip of Averell Harriman to various capitals of the world. However, I would suggest that some consideration be given to your responding to the 12-hour ceasefire proposed by the Viet Cong with a longer ceasefire—perhaps to run from Christmas through Tet (the Vietnamese holiday), with the obvious caveat that our boys would fire in self-defense and resume the attack on ground and in the air if the Viet Cong do not honor the ceasefire. (I do not know how workable in the field a step of this kind is but you might want to have the Defense Department explore the feasibility of an action such as this.) While the ceasefire was in effect, you might offer to send some distinguished American directly to Hanoi.

Short of an action such as a ceasefire, and in addition to Averell Harriman’s trip, I believe you might at least offer to send someone directly to Hanoi to try to bring them to the negotiating table.

  1. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, ND 19/CO 230, Vietnam 1964-65. Secret; Eyes Only. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw the memorandum.↩