230. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1

2147. For the President. Herewith my weekly telegram:

1. Course of the war

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The entrance of North Vietnamese troops in large numbers into South Viet-Nam is truly an escalation of the war, with all the serious connotations which attach to the word “escalation”. For Hanoi, it means grave risks; for us it means the grimness of intensified effort.

If it were not for the incursion from Hanoi we could be taking some satisfaction from the progress which has been made with regard to the rank and file Viet Cong.

Porter recently was in a village surrounded by Viet Cong when one defector came into the village and said that he and his comrades simply could not stand the air and artillery attacks anymore, adding that if he was well treated many more of his comrades would come out. He appeared emaciated.

Viet Cong defectors to the Chieu Hoi camps during November numbered 1,482, the highest monthly total on record, with air and artillery attacks also playing a big part.

22 members of a V.C. platoon surrendered a few days ago to the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade. This is believed to be one of the largest single groups ever to surrender voluntarily to U.S. forces.

Mr. Goure, of the Rand Corporation, told me that his 14 selected Vietnamese investigators had interviewed about 180 Viet Cong prisoners and defectors between July and December of this year. They noted a change as between 1965 and 1964. In 1964, 65 percent believed in victory because they were convinced the Viet Cong had the support of the people. In 1965, only 20 percent believed in victory.

This too is due in great part to the jets, the B-52s, artillery and helicopters. In particular, the B-52s had had a big impact with their destruction looming large in Viet Cong eyes because of the comparison of sizes of bomb craters with the sizes of their own dwellings. The air attacks had put the value of their passive defense measures in doubt and made them realize there was no survival by digging.

They also had fear of detection and were obsessed with the idea that there were agents among them. The officers of one main force battalion made everybody strip off their clothes so as to look for hidden radios. Defoliation had been effective in enhancing detection. V.C. had adopted the practice of cooking in villages so that the smoke of their cooking would not be detected. If villages were not available, they cooked in special ovens so as to dispel the smoke. These are cumbersome. They also try to put out a fire when a plane appears. The result is that many units are down to one hot meal a day at 3 o’clock in the morning. The average food consumption is one can and a half of cold rice a day. There is much beri-beri. There is also a high rate of malaria in the army of North Viet-Nam.

Other items are:

The army of North Viet-Nam abandoned the dead at Plei Me.

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It is curious, he said, that there are no amputees, blind men, under-nourished veterans to be seen anywhere in the towns of North Viet-Nam. What happens to them?

The V.C. believe that the refugees, by taking farmers away from the farm, are reducing the Viet Cong food supply.

70 percent of the recruits are said now to be deserting.

The V.C. are transferring the civilian cadres to military work, many of whom, although loyal when in a civilian capacity, desert from the military.

Shortage of thoroughly indoctrinated officers means that when an officer is criticized, he tends to leave.

They are depressed by the reports of the bad condition of their family at home.

The saying now is: The ocean in which we are supposed to swim is receding and drying up. We must depend on the people; but the people are leaving us. End Goure account.

Keyes Beech, of the Chicago Daily News, who is, I believe, the senior American journalist as regards Viet-Nam, and a former combat correspondent in Korea, believes that success in Viet-Nam is now assured, provided U.S. opinion remains steadfast. He considers this to provide really the only chance for defeat. He believes that Hanoi intends to drag the conflict out until the 1968 Presidential election and is counting on the ending of the war being the issue which will cause an outcome in which the V.C. are still in power in the country-side. Incidentally, he added that there were more casualties after the peace talks began in Panmunjon than there had been in that period preceding the peace talks.

2. Economic and social

After remaining steady for four weeks the piaster has moved up in terms of gold and the dollar. Retail food prices and the prices of imported goods eased slightly during the week.

The cost of coastal trading between Danang and Saigon has gone down from 8,000 piasters per metric ton in July to 2,000 piasters in October to 1,200 today as result of measures USOM and the GVN have taken to supply more ships.

The U.S. medical teams are being received with enthusiasm in the provinces.

3. Psychological

There was much editorial comment about the recent terrorism attack against the U.S. enlisted billet.2 The vein of this commentary was generally one of loathing and hatred for the Viet Cong for having perpetrated this attack which produced so many civilian casualties.

Lodge
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 3:09 a.m.
  2. See footnote 3, Document 221.