Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

122. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State ¹

Paris, August 18, 1965.

Literally eyes only for Ball. Today’s two hour session with Rupert most positive so far. In principal developments Rupert (a) revealed possible Viet fall back positions from recent Ho Chi Minh declaration;² (b) pinpointed halt of U.S. bombing as principal “tangible evidence” of acceptance in principle of Hanoi’s four points; (c) queried meaning (i.e., chiefly editorial and translation) of X’s four points,³ indication serious consideration; (d) stressed desirability further meeting. X believes necessary he return at this time to inventory talks in relation to developments and other indices Hanoi attitudes and discuss next steps.

1. Rupert telephoned yesterday to fix today’s meeting. At previous session he had indicated utility of talks and said that even if X were to leave now but “should pass again through Paris” it would be useful to consult.

2. He opened by asking whether X had studied Ho Chi Minh’s declaration. X desired clarification on number of points. First was date of Ho/Devillers interview which he assumed was on basis written questions. Rupert confirmed and said date was to be taken as that of appearance in Le Monde (i.e., August 14) and that answers “had only arrived from Hanoi evening before”. (X believes his friends correct in assuming interview was planted answer to him, which also implies indeterminate amount of French help in stage managing.) X said he discouraged by negative tone of statements and Rupert jested that X always seemed discouraged.

3. X noted that neither questions nor replies had made any reference to statement accompanying original four points re “most correct basis for political solution”.⁴ With uneasiness Rupert asserted Hanoi position still the same. He then linked “recognition of this basis” to “tangible proofs” required by Ho Chi Minh in latest declaration. These, he said, included in the first instance a suspension of bombing but he also referred to withdrawal of troops and halting U.S. “aggression”. (Re latter term X indicated that it would be better in these discussions if terms like “enemy”, “aggression”, etc., were abjured.) Rupert expatiated at some length on the bombing and worldwide condemnation of it. (X got some impression VC and DRV being hurt.) Promising to return to this point, X ⁵ proceeded to review Ho declaration from beginning.

4. Re point number one, Rupert was less categoric than Ho. He claimed that “realistically” only FLN, which was carrying on fight, was suited to speak for South. Whole world knew it was representative but Saigon was not. X disagreed and said it was “not realistic” to expect the most powerful nation in the world to go into negotiations at price of abandoning allies, accepting Hanoi fiat on agenda, and pulling all its troops out. In subsequent discussion X got strong impression Rupert and even Hanoi ready to accept some other formula for SVN representation but wishes to prod U.S. into putting it forward. Rupert alleged France had finally been obliged to accept FLN as sole negotiating agent in Algeria. He did not knock down idea that agreement on formula for representation could be accepted if other obstacles were removed. He did ask just what formula U.S. would imagine. Rupert referred to previous statements of U.S. Government leaders.

5. Re second question of Ho declaration, X judges significant Rupert’s confirmation that unification could wait quite some time. X insisted this depended on will of the people and asked what Ho meant by mention of program of front in this connection. Rupert said FLN recognized that unification would come “by stages” and on basis of popular consultation. Hanoi agreed. Rupert insisted on word “stages”. He even said that “there might be people in the south” (or just people) “who might not want unification” and in this case “Hanoi prepared to wait” until they did! Re mechanism for controlling elections, supervision, etc., Rupert made no substantive objection to hypothetical projections made by X.

6. Re point three, X asked what Rupert considered “proofs” to be. When latter again came forth with cessation of bombing Rupert ⁶ replied in preconceived terms that such a gesture had been made once before with no result or counterpart. It was conceivable that such a gesture might be repeated but it was not conceivable that it could be unilateral. Surely Rupert could not expect the U.S. in Saigon or the Saigon Government to negotiate under terrorism and while 325th Division roamed the country. Terrorist acts only weakened Hanoi’s case with those who might be disposed to sympathize. Since X said he and Rupert agreed to place their discussions under “sign of realism” it surely was “unrealistic” to pretend that Hanoi did not have units in the country. (Whereat Rupert laughed heartily.) Rupert then became very serious, appeared on the point of making a reply but decided to withhold it. It was entirely obvious that suspension of bombing has now re-emerged as key objective of Viets (as also confirmed in Para 10 infra). Rupert showed X an extract with a Washington byline from a French press digest7 to effect that Department of State spokesman had said that contacts with Hanoi had turned up nothing significant and then referring to an Aide-Memoire Department was supposed to have circulated to a number of governments explaining terms on which U.S. would again suspend bombing.⁷ Rupert asked if X knew of such a memorandum. X said he had heard something along lines of first part of release but not informed of any memo. Hazarded guess that if indeed it existed, which he questioned, it might be along lines he, X, had employed.

7. X asked whether it was correct to understand that Ho was calling for prior withdrawal of U.S. troops in same time scale as suspension of bombing and as prerequisite to discussions. Rupert again laughed, said that was not “realistic” and that of course he recognized that withdrawals would have to be phased. It should, however, be stipulated that final settlement should see withdrawals completed. X indicated that they should also be balanced, i.e., against pullback of DRV troops (whose presence in South Vietnam Rupert no longer denies). Rupert insisted in his interpretation of Hanoi policy despite fact X pointed out it seemed at variance with Ho interview.

8. X took occasion presented by Rupert’s insistence on “poor show” by South Vietnamese troops again to stress futility of Hanoi’s hope to force a decision; he remarked on differences between French military posture and that of U.S., said all DRV might achieve would be escalation of war, which could only be to its disadvantage, involving foreign influence in north and south, devastation of North Vietnam, and undesirable hatred between Americans and Vietnamese. Rupert said that in war it was necessary to envision the worst and that the consequences of escalation, including external intervention, had been foreseen and prepared for. (X’s purpose was to draw out Rupert on possible evolution of conflict and again to impress him that U.S. not speaking from weakness.)

9. X asked Rupert what he preferred or suggested as channel of contact with Hanoi. Rupert said all the same provided responsible people speak, whether it was in “Paris, Peking, Moscow, or Hanoi”. Then said that since X had obtained clarification Hanoi position he now wished clarifications from X. Latter recalled that in Rupert’s own words Rupert represented his government, X only the opinion of some of his friends in government.

10. Rupert then took up X’s earlier suggested four points with striking total recall (?) of verbal presentation. His most important observation was on point one: The basic rights of Vietnamese people to peace, etc., are recognized as set forth in the Geneva Accords, etc. Rupert verified French translation of this sentence and then said that point now was to give “tangible proof” that these rights were recognized. Such proof he said might be a cessation of bombardments.

11. Some other points of translation raised were: Line four (X’s text, not given to Rupert), “compliance” to which Rupert preferred “acceptance” and “execution” to “acquiescement”. Line nine, what was “quasi-military” and did it apply to personnel or weapons or both? X assumed this meant persons carrying out military functions, suppletifs and partisans, not necessarily regulars. Presumably a truck or aircraft could also be quasi-military. Line 13, “regrouping and redeployment”. X said these almost the same thing, one word perhaps more static than the other. Separation of combatants at some stage should be envisaged. In reply Rupert’s question re “indigenous” and “foreign personnel”, X assumed indigenous would mean all types of Vietnamese forces. This might include tribal groups as well as Vietnamese. What then was meant by “foreign personnel”? Just what it said, replied X. Of course if DRV had performed miracles in training indigenous forces to operate missiles they might not be involved in pullback. Rupert thought this a great joke and said “you mean if they were Soviets they should leave”? Yes, said X, and Chinese, etc.

X convinced foregoing had sufficient substance and implication to warrant further contacts. He convinced, however, he should at this point return home to touch base, make sure he does not get out of line, assess possible follow-up, and to discuss means of improving security, contacts, communications, etc. Also desirable to let Rupert marinate. X told Rupert he leaving over weekend and would give him date of departure. Also exchanged addresses, telephone numbers, and means of contact. X set up possibility of return in case he had to “confer further concerning his university connection in Geneva”.

New address of Rupert is: 3 Square de Trocadero, Paris 16e., Telephone [phone]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ. Top Secret; Nodis; XYZ. The source text is a copy that does not bear a telegram number or a time of transmission or receipt. For additional information, see the source note, Document 120.
2. See footnote 6, Document 120.
3. See Document 113. For text, see Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 97.
4. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 852-853.
5. On the source text the word “Rupert” is crossed out and “X” written above it.
6. “?X” is written in hand before “Rupert.”
7. Not further identified.
8. The source text bears no signature.