Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

120. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, August 13, 1965.

Literally eyes only for Ball. In one and one-half hour conversation with X this afternoon Rupert was rigid, even retrograde, in comparison with first meeting. This possibly tactics and possibly connected with appearance Ho Chi Minh interview. X considers it useful to hold third talk if only for purposes of record and to allow for any changes of position which may yet occur in interval. However, if more flexibility is not then manifested X believes his mission should be suspended.

1. X began by reading from Paris papers² and Reston’s recent columns certain references to growing pressures upon President for drastic and conclusive military action. Rupert replied mildly that his government understood “lobbies and pressure groups” in America but it was not these which would decide the issue of war.

2. X asked if Rupert had developed any thoughts since last meeting, particularly with respect to X’s version of four points³ which were undoubtedly pretty close to position of U.S. Government leaders. Rupert had indeed reflected and wished to know “what U.S. thought of Pham Van Dong’s four points”. X said he thought this had been covered but he reviewed position, as per earlier report. Rupert then stated that X’s version did not constitute the basis for a correct solution.

3. At this point (and at least three times thereafter) X tried to pin Rupert down on whether Hanoi’s points had to be accepted in toto before conference could be convened. Rupert was more negative than at previous meeting. He assured X that his principals understood point U.S. trying to clarify but that Hanoi’s four points had to be taken as “base.” Despite this statement Rupert could not be brought to say categorically one thing or the other with respect to whether or to what extent substance of Hanoi’s points had to be stipulated or accepted in advance of the meeting.

4. Rupert said his government believed a “conference of the Geneva type” should be held; whether it should be convened sooner or later depended upon the Americans. X replied that his friends also thought a conference of the Geneva type was desirable if it could be held without pre-conditions. Such a conference he said might deal with Vietnam or with a general examination of conditions under the Geneva and subsequent accords, or with Laos, or with Cambodia. Impression in U.S. was that Cambodian conference project⁴ aborted because of Hanoi/Peking insistence on FNL as representative of South Vietnam. Rupert asserted Hanoi had not taken this position but had merely gone along with Prince Sihanouk’s insistence on FNL. X urged Rupert to check record and said his recollection was that Sihanouk had altered his attitude ending with willingness to see SVN represented by Saigon or by FNL or both and in a variety of combinations. Anyway, X continued, if the Cambodian setting created difficulty conference could be related to other subjects. Rupert had no reply to this but switched to question of FNL.

5. Hanoi had noted President Johnson’s reference to some formula for meeting with FNL⁵ but it was up to U.S. to give concrete details. FNL, Rupert said, bore brunt of struggle, controlled four-fifths of the territory, was suffering “massacres and destruction” while whole world knew Saigon Government represented nothing. X observed that Saigon also had carried on fight for twenty years, its soldiers now fighting and dying, and hundred of thousands of refugees were fleeing Hanoi-controlled regions. Discussion on this point, however, said X, was sterile. Rupert and he should set themselves task of exploring possibility of convening useful meeting. What for example, were obstacles which Rupert saw to such a meeting?

6. Rupert again signally failed to cite U.S. bombing as an obstacle; he did say that U.S. must leave Vietnam alone to work out its destiny without interference; claimed that President Johnson recently said U.S. must remain in Vietnam and could never leave it, which X vigorously denied. In response Rupert’s query what U.S. objectives in Vietnam were, X emphasized again that they were those stipulated in Geneva Accords. He also cited his version of Hanoi’s four points, particularly numbers three and four, to stress U.S. desire to see self-determination and unification of Vietnam; he emphasized that if there were no North Vietnamese troops or arms in Hanoi U.S. ready to put its policies to the test (i.e., self-determination by Vietnamese and possible non-alignment), and would be ready to begin withdrawals. He said these would have to be phased and balanced with pullback of North Vietnamese. Rupert indicated agreement with idea of balance and verification. He asked if this was what X had meant by “redeploiement” in his version of four points. He then claimed that “these accusations” of North Vietnamese activity in Vietnam were only recent whereas U.S. had begun to sabotage the situation as far back as ’54 with the Ngo Dinh Diem operation and sending advisers. X replied that there were other forms of interference, including intimidation, subversion, terrorism, Chinese influence. To latter Rupert countered that Vietnam had defended its independence for thousands of years and X need not worry.

7. At this point X remarked discussion so far provided little prospect for constructive work. He reviewed his understanding of Rupert’s position, which he said was apparently more negative than previously. He reiterated that his friends in U.S. would be ready for Geneva-type conference which would certainly take Pham van Dong’s program as point of departure; provided this conference were without pre-condition or ultimata. After all we were not in position of French after Dien Bien Phu and in fact possessed fantastic strength we hoped not to use. Hanoi surely could not expect U.S. to accept a conference which stipulated prior acceptance of its points, or which was to be preceded by U.S. troop withdrawals or which obliged us to desert our allies by setting up FNL as sole negotiator. X thought his version of four points if picked up by U.S., as it well might be, represented a very forthcoming effort. He asked again whether Rupert had carefully noted these and whether they had been under study (mis a l’etude). Rupert confirmed that they had.

8. At this point Rupert meaningfully asked whether X had seen declaration by Ho Chi Minh in today’s Le Monde in response to written questions from Philippe Devillers.⁶ (X had not and it would have been hardly possible for him to have done so since paper was only just reaching subscribers at time of interview. It is possibly significant that X had seen Devillers shortly before leaving U.S.) Ho Chi Minh’s declaration, said Rupert, represented his government’s position and my answer to X. (Timing and Rupert’s manner implied possible connection between release of Ho Chi Minh’s statement at this time and conversations between Rupert and X.)

9. X asked if it might not be possible for Rupert and him to come to grips with semantics and problem of agenda by envisioning terms in which an initiative on conference might be announced, e.g., “… in order to secure and preserve fundamental right of Vietnamese people, etc., as affirmed in Geneva Accords a meeting of Geneva conferees to be held which would take up Pham Van Dong’s four points and other propositions.” Rupert nodded agreement to first part of phrase, disagreement to its ending.

10. Finally, X professed himself discouraged and puzzled at Rupert’s greater rigidity. He hoped history would not record that he and Rupert had failed in their duty to seize present opportunity. Said he was not offering any threats but begged Rupert to reflect on devastation which might be unleashed if war escalated. No one who had not seen U.S. power could imagine its full potential. To avert this his friends in U.S. earnestly desired to move the confrontation from the battlefield to the diplomatic table.

11. X said he must now begin to doubt utility of continuing conversations but probably should be one more contact before he obliged to return home. In one of very few positive developments Rupert was eager to have a further meeting in case he said there should be “some change in the points of confrontation”. X said he must return home Tuesday or Wednesday.⁷ Rupert is moving out of his flat but said he would inform X where next meeting should be held.

12. General impressions and recommendations:

(a) Despite negative atmosphere, it could be that stiffening of Rupert’s attitude was the obvious thing for him to do tactically. Also whole meeting was held under shadow of Ho Chi Minh’s declaration.

(b) X believes he went about as far as it is possible to go, without giving impression of U.S. weakness, in exhibiting U.S. readiness to negotiate under various formulae and in various combinations. He established beyond doubt that the alternate version of Hanoi’s four points had been studied and rejected by Hanoi. It is still too early to say, however, that this rejection is final.

(c) Points on which there seem to be some flexibility on part of Hanoi are with respect to troop withdrawals and FNL representation. (X believes Rupert himself would envision ancillary negotiating role for FNL; he inquired how U.S. had dealt with Red China at international conferences.) Less flexibility than before shown on agenda for conference but this may reflect impact of Ho Chi Minh’s declaration.

(d) Before next meeting may be desirable to have: (1) statement of X’s friends’ position on Ho’s declaration, especially in relation to Ruperttalks; (2) any further version of four points; (3) a brief formulation X might use as his suggestion along lines of 9 above. This would have virtue of eliminating semantic confusion as source of division, smoking out Viets and making the record of U.S. attitude unmistakable.⁸

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-14 VIET/XYZ. Top Secret; Nodis; XYZ. The source text is a copy that was enclosed in a letter from Springsteen to McBride, November 3, together with copies of telegrams reporting on Gullion’s (“X”) meetings with Mai Van Bo (“Rupert”) on August 18 and September 1. The copies do not include telegram numbers or times of transmission or receipt. Springsteen transmitted these copies and other documents to McBride at the request of Sturm (“Y”) so that they would be available to Sturm in Paris. In United States-Vietnam Relations, the meeting described in this telegram is incorrectly dated August 15. (Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 100)
2. Not further identified.
3. See Document 113. For text, see Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 97.
4. Reference is to the March 15 Cambodian proposal to reconvene the Geneva Conference of 1954 to consider the question of the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia. See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 715-716.
5. In his July 28 press conference, President Johnson stated that the Viet Cong “would have no difficulty being represented” in negotiations “if Hanoi for a moment decides she wants to cease aggression.” See Document 97.
6. Ho Chi Minh’s responses to Devillers’ questions appeared in an issue of Le Monde apparently distributed on the afternoon of August 13. In its August 14 issue, The New York Times carried an article datelined Paris, August 13, stating that the interview was published “today in Le Monde.” The text of the interview was broadcast in English over Hanoi radio on August 15. Ho Chi Minh stated that the “U.S. Government must give tangible proofs that it accepts the four-point stand of the Government of the DRV.” For text, see Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 99.
7. August 17 or 18.
8. The source text bears no signature.