Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

121. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, August 17, 1965.

505. For the President.

1. Probably the most important political development of the week was an interview with Buddhist bonze, Tri Quang, in a Hong Kong paper denouncing the Directory government in general and General Thieu in particular. On the military front, the most notable development was that the MACV estimate of VC losses (1,330 killed in action) was the highest since the war began here.

2. The Hong Kong Far Eastern Economic Review interview with Tri Quang quoted him as having said “the people” were against the government and he was also against the government, as well as saying that he hoped the war could be stopped as soon as possible by a cease fire or “by any negotiations which would have the peoples’ support”. He was also quoted as saying that a small country like Vietnam could rely only on itself and “certainly on no outsider”. Tri Quang may claim to have been misquoted as he did following an earlier interview with the same correspondent, but the sentiments attributed to him with respect to the government are consistent with what he has recently been telling Embassy officers. It is harder to interpret his enigmatic remarks with respect to the war. Not many weeks ago, he was privately telling visitors that we should pursue the war more vigorously, bombing the north harder and even taking on the Chinese Communists. Thus, I do not think that we should conclude that he is swinging toward “neutralism”, that is, negotiations with the Liberation Front for a coalition government. It is also too early to say what form his opposition to the government may take. A few days ago, he told us that he had discouraged the forming of demonstrations in Hue having anti-government character.

3. Ky and his party took off for Taipei early Sunday morning,² will be going directly from there to Bangkok, and returning here next Saturday or Sunday. I had a good talk with him before he left, both on his trip and some other matters including the “Chieu Hoi” program, treatment of prisoners taken in combat and land reform. I do not feel that the substance of what he does in Taipei will cause us any problem but, given his propensity for flamboyant statements, I will not make the same prediction for what he says publicly.

4. Our people in the field feel that there has been some improvement in popular attitudes as a result of the recent military successes and that popular aversion to the VC continues somewhat to increase although this does not necessarily translate itself into active commitment to or support for the GVN.

5. On the military side, not only were the VC losses highest ever but the ratio to friendly troops killed (214) was a little better than six to one. The other indicators were also good with more VC and VC weapons captured than government troops missing in action and government weapons lost. The VC also continued to avoid initiating any actions by major units although they kept up their heavy harassment of villages and outposts. The government made a little progress in clearing lines of communication.

6. On the economic side, negotiations with the government on the US currency “black mart” problem made good progress, and we hope that we can have this tied up in the next few days. The rice imports from Thailand appear to have met our immediate needs and should hold the situation until the arrival of additional PL-480 rice.³

Johnson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:06 a.m.
2. August 15.
3. On a copy of this telegram retyped for President Johnson, the President wrote: “Mc—Let’s rush him plenty of rice now.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXIX, Memos)