112. Editorial Note
On August 6, 1965, the United States established direct contact with North Vietnam through the North Vietnamese representative in Paris, Mai Van Bo. In response to suggestions from Mai Van Bo, passed through the French Government in May (see volume II, Document 313) and through Urah Arkas-Duntov of the Dreyfus Fund in July (see Document 98), an authorized but unofficial U.S. representative was dispatched to Paris to explore with Bo the possibility of negotiations with North Vietnam. The U.S. representative was retired Ambassador Edmund Gullion, former Deputy Chief of Mission in Saigon. The decision to pursue the negotiating track was very tightly held, and for reasons of security Gullion was referred to in documents relating to the Paris contacts as X, and Mai Van Bo was referred to as Rupert. For records of the four meetings between Gullion and Mai Van Bo, which took place between August 6 and September 1, see Documents 113, 120, 122, and 133. Summaries of this and other documentation on the Paris contacts are in the unpublished portion of United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967 and are printed in George C. Herring (ed.), The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers, pages 77-107.
Initial talking points and overall objectives, as summarized in United States-Vietnam Relations, were outlined for Gullion before he established contact with Mai Van Bo:
[Page 313]“Initial talking points for X:
- “1. These were to be simple and vague, but to set limits in which talks can safely take place.
- “2. X was to show desire for peace, and a free, independent, and unified Vietnam.
- “3. X was to say that the prolongation of conflict is bound to lead to progressively larger US pressures and long-term China control in NVN.
- “4. X was to insist that nothing can force the US out. Indeed, X was to say that pressures in the US to a wider war were growing and that it would be increasingly harder to exercise restraint.
- “5.
If R[upert] does not seem receptive to a second meeting, then proceed as follows:
“Theme: US is flexible to some degree. See, for example, the President’s press conference of 28 July.
- “a. US ready to discuss the four points.
- “b. People of SVN have a right to peace and to determine their own destiny in free elections in SVN or throughout Vietnam under international supervision.
- “c. The four points, in some measure, parallel our own. Are we right in assuming these points are not stated as the only basis for starting talks and that other points can be discussed?
- “d. The four points mention withdrawal of forces. The US says it will do so once SVN ‘is secure from outside aggression.’
- “e. We did not ask SVN to be our ally or to keep US bases there — although a ‘sovereign government should have the right to call for help if necessary in its own self-defense.’
- “f. US is not opposed to unification ‘at some future time under democratic processes.’
“Purpose of X’s mission:
“Primary—To ascertain whether any serious purpose to negotiate exists and, if so, on what basis? Secondary—R as possible contact? Third—clarify the four points (prerequisite or best basis, timing on unification and elections, a settlement in accord with NLF program, timing on withdrawal). Fourth—Collateral intelligence (DRV attitude on the Indian proposal, UN, China, NLF, and the possible use of Laos and Cambodia as a gambit for talks).” (Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, page 97)
Regarding the President’s press conference of July 28, see Document 98. For text of the four points outlined on April 8 by Pham Van Dong as a basis for a peace settlement, see volume II, Document 245; excerpts from his address before the United National Assembly, during which he set forth the four points, are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pages 852-853. The Indian and Yugoslav initiative calling for an international conference to resolve the conflict in Vietnam was advanced in a joint communique on August 1; see Document 102.