Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

454. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Ambassador in Vietnam (Taylor) and the Commander in Chief of the Vietnamese Armed Forces (Khanh)¹

Saigon , December 21, 1964, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• December 20 Armed Forces Council Action against High National Council

(Following is a more complete account than that contained in Embassy telegram 1881² of the foregoing conversation based on notes made at the time by Mr. Johnson. It was from these same notes that the conversation was recounted to Prime Minister Huong immediately following the meeting with General Khanh.)³

We met General Khanh in his office at the JGS at 10:30 a.m., December 21. He was alone. The conversation was entirely in French. As usual, General Khanh had a large pad with him and, on occasion, took notes during the conversation. General Khanh was very self-possessed and the atmosphere throughout was very calm, matter of fact and straightforward.

Ambassador Taylor opened the conversation by asking who was responsible for the action of December 20, recalling that the previous day the four Generals had stated that the Armed Forces Council was only advisory to Khanh and that the final responsibility was his.⁴

General Khanh replied that it was “a decision of the Army”, a decision by all of the Armed Forces Council including himself—“It is not my Army”. He said that it was not only his decision but that of everyone else. However, “I am responsible—je suis responsable.” He said that as Commander-in-Chief he must listen when the great majority of the officers express their opinion. The decision was taken to “limit the deterioration of the situation”. Under the Charter, the High National Council had only two missions—that is, to act as the legislative branch during the interim and to provide for the formation of a National Assembly. It had exceeded its authority.

Ambassador Taylor asked what was the authority for taking action against the High National Council. General Khanh replied, “Those fellows in the Council are not good-ces yens ne vent pas bons”, citing Quyen as a Communist. General Khanh then referred to the proposed retirement of the nine generals and other officers and said that “Mirth’s people” in the High National Council had opposed this. This was an “unconstitutional” act by the High National Council. Now that the matter has been taken care of, “We will return to our position”. Suu had been given the responsibility for the legislative functions of the High National Council and, if necessary, Suu could form a Committee of Lawyers (Conseiller des Juristes) to assist him. However, there was little in fact to be done as the laws for the election of the National Assembly were already completed.

Ambassador Taylor then asked whether this meant the re-entry of the Army into politics to which General Khanh replied that, “It would remain in its role—reste dans son role”.

Ambassador Taylor then inquired as to whether the Armed Forces Council replaces the High National Council to which General Khanh replied that the Armed Forces Council was not the MRC. After taking this “sole” decision, it returns to its military role.

Ambassador Taylor inquired as to whether General Khanh thought the Government could, in fact, govern after the events of December 20. The Ambassador recalled his conversations following his return from his last trip to Washington on the importance of stability in the government and having a loyal ally with whom we could work with confidence. He did not feel that the act of December 20 was consistent with this. In effect, there would be a civilian facade with the military shadow hanging over them. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for us to cooperate with such a setup. General Khanh replied that loyalty was a reciprocal matter and that Vietnam was not a vassal of the United States.

Ambassador Taylor said that he could not but say that he had lost confidence in General Khanh. General Khanh replied that the Ambassador should keep to his place as Ambassador and, as Ambassador, it was really not appropriate for him to be dealing in this way with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on a political matter nor was it appropriate for him to have summoned some of his Generals to the Embassy yesterday.

Ambassador Taylor replied that General Khanh had faced him with a fait accompli without even the courtesy of informing him until long after it was all over. General Khanh replied that he had not wanted to disturb the Ambassador during the middle of the night and had informed “Colonel Miller”, asking that he inform the Ambassador. The Ambassador said that informing “Colonel Miller” was not informing him. General Khanh finally appeared to admit that he should have taken better steps earlier to inform the Ambassador.

General Khanh then said, “I am ready to quit.” He asked the Ambassador whether he thought this would be helpful in the situation to which the Ambassador replied in the affirmative. He indicated that he was thinking of possibly taking command of a Corps or retiring from the Army and becoming a civilian. What would the Ambassador think of that? The Ambassador replied that this was entirely a matter between General Khanh and his government, but that he saw no objection if, as a civilian living in the country, Khanh was loyally supporting the government. The Ambassador said that he had previously heard that General Khanh was thinking of taking a trip abroad—did he have any thought of this—to which General Khanh replied in the negative. General Khanh then referred to Diem saying the U.S. had not been very “loyal” to him. The Ambassador replied that some Americans may have perhaps done things that they had no authority to do.

General Khanh then indicated that he was attracted by the thought of leaving the country and asked what our views would be if “his generals” did not agree, or the Prime Minister would not accept his resignation. The Ambassador said these were entirely matters between him and his government.

General Khanh asked how long he had to reach a decision to which the Ambassador replied that he was certainly not setting any time limits and felt that General Khanh should give serious consideration to a prompt resolution of the problem that had been created. As we left, he again referred to the possibility of leaving the country and said that he would get in touch with the Ambassador.⁵

1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T–272–69. Secret. U. Alexis Johnson, the only other participant, presumably prepared this record. The source text indicates the meeting took place at Khanh’s office at the JGS. For other accounts of the meeting, see Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 331, and Johnson, Right Hand of Power, p. 418.
2. Telegram 1881, December 21, transmitted a summary of this conversation. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
3. Taylor reported on his conversation with Huong, which immediately followed that with Khanh, in telegram 1880 from Saigon, December 21. Among other things, Taylor told him that he had received word from Washington agreeing entirely with the position that he had taken with both men. (Ibid.)
4. Regarding Taylor’s meeting with the Generals, see Document 451.
5. Following the meeting, Taylor reported that Khanh was prepared to step down and asked for funds to allow him to travel. (Telegram 1890 from Saigon, December 22; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The Department of State agreed that Taylor should accept Khanh’s offer (telegram 1321 to Saigon, December 22; ibid.), but its telegram informing Taylor crossed with another Taylor message stating that General Khanh was reconsidering his offer to step down. (Telegram 1897 from Saigon, December 22; ibid.)