Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

455. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, December 21, 1964—8:36 p.m.

1319. State/Defense Message. Continue to believe line you are following entirely sound. We have talked over situation with Westmoreland and throw out following possible ideas for bringing military back into line and at same time making gestures that would ensure their support for Huong both basically and against possible Buddhist threat. We naturally continue to rely on your discretion whether or how any of these ideas should be applied.

1. Appears important that Huong himself get credit for dismissing Khanh and Westmoreland thinks such action would probably have favorable reception among most senior officers particularly Young Turks.

2. Perhaps even before announcing such action Huong might consult with members Armed Forces Council collectively or individually and indicate that he seeking their advice on appointment of successor, making clear that decision must be his and that officer appointed must necessarily have full powers as commander-in-chief. (Westmoreland believes Council members accept necessity basic unity of command and avoidance any semblance committee decision as opposed to advisory function to commander-in-chief.)

3. Hopefully such discussion might produce consensus on candidate. As we understand it, Ky has indicated to Westmoreland his own preference stick with Air Force and has told Westmoreland natural leader might be Thieu. However, latter is Catholic and Dai Viet, and appointment might give Buddhists issue. Our judgment is that Thi less stable than Ky himself, and Westmoreland suggests Dong or Co as possible dark horses, who have avoided involvement in politics. Criteria would appear to be most complete possible acceptance by senior officers but also not giving Buddhists any easy issue. We gather Ky not popular with Buddhists but suppose that would be equally true of any general prepared to act firmly in support of Huong Government.

4. Huong might express willingness, after new commander-in-chief appointed to discuss disposition of senior officers and to assure proper system for promotions and appointments throughout armed forces. He might offer handle question of senior officers by review of individual cases and possibly by retiring some to accept appropriate senior civilian government positions for which they qualified.

5. Above possible actions would all be aimed at strengthening Huong’s personal position, which seems cardinal objective, while at same time meeting all reasonable desires senior generals.

In effect above steps would be aimed at compensating Armed Forces Council for rescinding decree about HNC. Questions of replacing some HNC members and of their release are separate but might of course become integral parts of total package.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared with Westmoreland and McNaughton, and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to CINCPAC.