Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

453. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, December 20, 1964–11 p.m.

1877. For Secretary Rusk. DOD for McNamara. White House for Bundy. CIA for McCone. JCS for Wheeler. At the end of an active day, it may be well to record a few personal impressions of the events which began in the middle of the night of 19–20 December and which are still in progress. It is fairly clear that the Generals had been developing for some time a growing antipathy for certain members of the HNC because they were considered hostile to the interests of the armed forces or because they were partisans of Big Minh or for both reasons. Apparently it was the opposition of the HNC to the retirement proposal (Embtels 1857 and 1858)² which would have ousted Minh from active service which brought matter to a head. There seems to have been some unexplained feeling of urgency that action had to be taken last night “to avoid a mutiny in the armed forces” as one of the Young Turks described the situation to us. In the background, there was also the impatience with civilian politicians which is constantly on the lips of the military.

The action taken against the HNC and the round-up of some of its members along with certain offending politicians seem to have received the approval of all (or a vast majority) of the Council of the Armed Forces which. in turn. includes most of the influential Generals. However, its authors did not look much beyond the pleasure of striking at their civilian adversaries and certainly gave no serious consideration to the consequences which they are now beginning to perceive with some dismay. Apparently they had hoped to break the political crockery and then retire to the more congenial task of fighting the VC. How to continue the work of the HNC in forming the national assembly without a HNC was considered only to the extent of hoping to pass the responsibility to Chief of State Suu who, everyone knows, is utterly incapable of discharging this responsibility even with extensive staff assistance. One may suspect that the Generals are trying to build up Suu’s powers because of the ease of manipulating him.

Suu certainly not capable of resisting the military; Huong is capable only with strong US encouragement. At the outset of our meeting this evening (Embtel 1874),³ he was quite prepared to accept the fait accompli presented by the Generals and stay in office pro bono publico until Alex Johnson and I pointed out some of the implications. It was Armed Forces Council Decree No. 1 announcing the dissolution of the HNC which Huong only saw as we arrived which convinced him of the need of some kind of understanding with the military before agreeing to remain in office.

Another outstanding point in the situation is that the Generals have felt no reluctance in acting without consultation with US representatives and in disregarding our advice on important matters once we became aware of developments. I specifically asked Khanh to put off a press conference if possible or, if one were held, to avoid reference to the dissolution of the HNC. Nevertheless, the conference was held and Armed Forces Council Decree No. 1 was issued. Perhaps most serious of all is the deliberate disregard of the message which I brought from Washington and personally transmitted to most of these Generals that continued and increased US aid for SVN depended upon governmental stability and evidence of national unity. We are not yet clear as to whether Khanh has lost control of the “Young Turks” or is using them to his own ends.

As I see it at this moment, we are faced with four possibilities:

a. Huong, despite our advice, may agree to continue in office without obtaining adequate concessions from the Generals. In this case, he will be the prisoner of the Generals and thus his government unable to speak with any authority or to cooperate effectively with us in the prosecution of the war. Every governmental official will be looking over his shoulder to see if the military headsman is watching him.

b. Huang may attempt to impose conditions on the military for his remaining in office, fail and resign. Suu may then persuade some civilian politicians to form a new government but it would be even more impotent than Huong under the situation of subparagraph a. above.

c. Huong may resign and the military may move in and reestablish a military dictatorship such as existed up to last August. If Khanh were the head, the government would have little chance of improving on Khanh’s former sorry performance. Under another General, we might hope for better things—depending on the General. After flaunting US advice in the present circumstances, any military government is likely to give us even greater problems—if the Generals get away with it this time.

d. Huong may make his conditions stick with the Generals. This will be good news and the ensuing government will be worth a serious try.

As the tenor of the foregoing analysis indicates, I can see good only in the last possibility and will do everything possible to realize it. If any of the other developments occur, we will have to give serious consideration to some shock treatment to restore a sense of responsibility to the leadership of this unhappy land.

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to the Department of Defense, CIA, the White House, and JCS. Received at 2:43 p.m.
2. Telegram 1857, December 19, reported on a conversation between Taylor and Huong on the draft administrative retirement order. Telegram 1858, also December 19, described a conversation with Suu on the retirement proposal. (Ibid., POL 1 VIET S)
3. Supra.