452. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
1874. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtel 1870.2 Alex Johnson and I have just again seen Prime Minister Huong.3 Deputy Prime Minister Vien was also with him. He said no one from the military had contacted him since the 2:00 a.m. call on him last night reported reftel. However, Huong had seen Chief of State Suu and they had decided that it was important for both of them to remain with the Chief of State taking over the legislative functions of the High National Council and the government taking on preparations for the formation of the assembly. They would thus stay on provided that there were a solemn undertaking by the military, confirmed by secret vote of each General, not again to “interfere in civilian affairs”.
[Page 1017]I outlined my conversation with the four Generals (reftel), pointing out that in spite of my urgings on them, as well as on Khanh, they had nevertheless just held a press conference (Embtel 1871)4 at which, also in spite of my urgings, they had formally announced by a “Military Council Decree No. 1” the dissolution of the HNC. I said that it seemed to me the Prime Minister had only two choices, either to accept the action of the military or to denounce it. If he accepted the completely illegal action of the Military Council, situation would clearly be one of military dictatorship with only a civilian facade. Obviously his government would have no power and would be operating only in the shadow of the military. This would present us with an entirely new situation and I could not predict the attitude of my government. However, it could certainly jeopardize the possibility of our continued support, including everything I had discussed following my recent return from Washington. It was impossible for me to see how govt could accept the validity of a “decree” by the Military Council. (It was evident that up to this time neither he nor Vien had focused on the fact that the Military Council had issued what purported to be a decree and finally were impressed by the problem this presented.)
I said that it seemed to me that he was in a strong position to exact conditions from the military, and that as a price for remaining in office he should do so. I suggested that these conditions should be:
- 1.
- That he not accept the legality of the Military Council decree purporting to dissolve the HNC; in rejecting it, he might use some face-saving words about the favorable intentions of the Generals.
- 2.
- That he agree in consultation with Suu, Vinh (Vice President of HNC) and Huyen (HNC member who seems to be respected by the military) to revamp the membership of the HNC (or an analogous committee under a different name).
- 3.
- That military immediately release to the custody of the government all prisoners they had taken; and
- 4.
- That there be a specific undertaking by the military to support his government, including a willingness to participate in it and share responsibility by accepting a Cabinet post, such as Ministry of Defense.
Huong and Vien agreed to these conditions, expressed intention of immediately seeing Khanh and then having a Cabinet meeting later this evening. They will promptly inform us of results. I told them they could say bluntly to Khanh and the military that we have lost confidence [Page 1018] in either a true military dictatorship or a military dictatorship behind the facade of a civilian government and under such circumstances there was real doubt USG could continue support SVN.
Will report further developments soonest.5
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, London, Paris, Vientiane, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC. Received at 9:19 a.m.↩
- Supra.↩
- The meeting took place at 4:30 p.m.↩
- Telegram 1871, December 20, 5 p.m., transmitted the text of Military Council Decree No. 1. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) The text of the proclamation read at the press conference was transmitted in telegram 1872 from Saigon. (Ibid.)↩
- At 10:06 a.m. on December 20, the Department of State transmitted a flash telegram drafted by William Bundy which reads: “Entirely agree with line you are taking. We are following closely.” (Telegram 1313 to Saigon; ibid.)↩