Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

374. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 9, 1964—7 p.m.

1068. Deptel 783² Organizing session was held October 8 and terms of reference agreed ad referendum to Ambassadors Unger and Martin. Agreed text will be transmitted Department.³

Group also discussed all operations of common interest mentioned in Saigon’s 1017⁴ with particular emphasis on rules of engagement for US aircraft three countries and SAR operations, particularly problems of SAR for OPLAN 34A crews that may be downed in Laos. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

Very useful discussion of problem of SAR for OPLAN 34A crews clarified situation for Vientiane which will undertake definitive comments on Saigon’s 1030⁵ to Dept as basis for Washington decision.

[1 paragraph (2–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

There was also discussion on sharpening existing coordination and responsiveness of all intelligence assets to Viet Cong movements through Lao corridor. Specifically, a military targeting sub-committee was formed to extend and improve the target list and reaction time.

In view of stand down on ground cross border operations and good possibility that ARVN will be unable to afford detachment any significant ground combat capability for corridor in foreseeable future, air strikes are sole remaining dependable alternative.

Fixed targets (the 22 Target List), will soon be destroyed if the RLAF performs as advertised and authorization received for Yankee Team strikes. Thus, the group discussed at length problem of acquisition additional targets in corridor and particularly problem of quick air reaction to targets of opportunity developed by ground observers. Saigon and Vientiane will further examine their assets and possibilities in this regard. [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

There was also unanimous agreement that US participation in air operations in corridor is essential if such operations are to have desired military and psychological impact, particularly since initiative for operations came from US. US failure to participate would diminish US influence over these operations (whether we wish to expand or to limit them) and their continuation could well be jeopardized if Lao are expected to do job unassisted. Although Vientiane believes Lao prepared to go ahead with strikes against first twelve targets authorized Deptel 785 to Saigon,⁶ their initial enthusiasm may not survive loss of a few aircraft.

Also, If Lao do not hit those four targets for which US strikes were requested and are discouraged from strikes on Mu Gia Pass, the five most important targets in the corridor will go unscathed. These omissions will grossly diminish the military benefits of these bombings. The group thus hoped that Washington would reconsider present ban on RLAF attack on Mu Gia Pass and approve soonest Yankee Team strike on other targets.

It was noted that Washington is still considering the Lao recommendations that the US provide cap over RLAF strike aircraft. The present rules of engagement for US aircraft currently permit US attack on Communist bloc aircraft attacking Laotian aircraft over Laos. Provision of a cap would hence be a relatively minor extension of existing authority. Since the Lao have requested such cap, it would have psychological value and group recommends early Washington approval. Vientiane anticipates RLAF would initiate operations October 14. Affirmative decision re cap prior to that date would be most helpful.

Vientiane does not expect RLG will initiate any publicity on strikes but will probably acknowledge RLAF operations in response to queries. Saigon and Bangkok will privately inform Khanh and Thanom prior to initiation operations. Vientiane will undertake keep Souvanna currently informed.

It is tentatively proposed that next meeting be held November 5.

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane, and CINCPAC. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Johnson. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 578–579.
2. Telegram 783, October 7, approved an organizational meeting to coordinate military-political recommendations affecting Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S; printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 757–758)
3. Transmitted in telegram 1080 from Saigon, October 10. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XX, Cables; printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 759–760)
4. Telegram 1017, October 2, discussed cross-border operations from South Vietnam into Laos and from Laos into North Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
5. Telegram 1030, October 3, posed several questions on how search and rescue operations in Laos should be conducted. (Ibid.. Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, Tiger Operations)
6. Dated October 7. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XIX, Cables and Memos; printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 576–577)