Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

373. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹

Saigon , October 9, 1964—10 a.m.

1064. CINCPAC for POLAD. I saw Khanh today, October 8, primarily to sound him out with regard to his views of the activities of the High National Council. He claims to be pretty much in the dark and reported having visited Minh yesterday to see if the latter could provide him with information. He seems to have got as little from Minh as I did on October 6 (Embtel 1049).²

I asked Khanh how he expected to detach himself from the government on October 27 as he has often expressed hope to do. He agreed it is quite clear that the High National Council cannot form a National Assembly by that time which can, in turn, select a new head of state and/or head of government. Khanh feels, however, that at least by implication the Council has power to name these officials on a provisional basis pending convocation of the National Assembly. He gave no indication that he expected to be extended beyond October 27 although there are many rumors of his growing reluctance to step down. With me, he has always stressed his anticipation of a return to a happy military life.

Khanh made a vague reference to the danger of neutralism growing out of the Council. I asked whether he had misgivings about any of the members. In reply, he expressed uncertainty about the intentions of Dr. Quyen and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] who represent the National Salvation Movement of Hue. He is unhappy because Minh invited them to membership on the Council in the first place and thus gave tacit recognition to their movement as a legitimate political activity.

I took up the matter mentioned in Embtel 1035³ of placing Ministerial representatives as troubleshooters at regional (Corps) levels of [for] pacification. Khanh said that he had given this some thought but preferred to take no action now for two reasons. First, he wishes to acquire experience through the operation of the III Corps Headquarters which has Ministerial representatives for the Hop Tac operation. Next, he pointed out that the new government may wish to replace the Corps commanders in their non-military functions by civilian governmental delegates. I asked whether he expected the province chiefs also to be replaced by civilians but he replied this would be impossible because of the need to centralize military and civil operations at the province level to prevent fragmentation of the pacification effort at the grass roots. I agreed.

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Also sent to CIA, the Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated to CINCPAC.
2. Telegram 1049, October 7, reported that Minh had little information on the events inside the Council. He had also asked if the United States was still backing Khanh. (Ibid.)
3. Document 371.